Evolution's shorthand : a presentational theory of the phenomenal mind by Dooremalen, Hans






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
Evolution’s Shorthand
A  Presentational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de wijsbegeerte
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, op gezag van de 
Rector Magnificus Prof. dr. C.W .P.M. Blom, volgens besluit van het College van D ecanen in het 
openbaar te verdedigen op m aandag 14 april 2003, des namiddags om  3.30 uur precies
door
H ans D oorem alen
geboren op 8 septem ber 1967 
te Rijen.
Promotor:
Prof. dr. A.A. Derksen
Manuscriptcommissie:
Prof. dr. J.A.M. Bransen
Prof. dr. J. Leilich (Universiteit Antwerpen -  UFSIA) 
Dr. M.A.M.M. Meijsing (Universiteit van Tilburg)
© 2003 Hans Dooremalen
2
CONTENTS
acknowledgm ents -  5 
introduction - 7
chapter one: two assum ptions & two questions -  10
1. the tw o main assum ptions: qualia realism  and broad  physicalism  -  10
1.1 the m ereological m odel -  13
1.2 nonreductive physicalism -  14
2. the problem  of phenom enal consciousness -  16
chapter two: the evolutionary shorthand theory of the phenom enal mind -  19
1. phenom enal experiences are p resentations -  20
2. phenom enal experiences are direct p resentations -  20
3. phenom enal experiences are internal states -  21
4. phenom enal experiences are projected  -  22
5. phenom enal p resentations usually are used as representations -  24
6. phenom enal represen tations are nonconceptual represen tations -  25
7. phenom enal represen tations are indirect representations -  27
8. phenom enal rep resen tations represent environm ental and bodily properties -  30
9. phenom enal represen tations are approxim ately projected  to  the cause of the experience -  30
10. phenom enal representations represent in a reliability way: causal covariance -  31
11. evo lu tion’s sho rthand  -  33
chapter three: conceivability: the road to nowhere -  35
1. how  dualism  th reatens a scientific so lu tion  to  the problem  of phenom enal consciousness -  35
2. possibility -  36
2.1 logical possibility -  36
2.2 epistem ic possibility -  3 7
2.3 ontological possibility -  39
2.4 m etaphysical possibility -  41
3. dualists should claim that zom bies are physically possible -  41
4. evaluating the conceivability argum ent -  44
4.1 Chalm ers’ main conceivability argum ent -  44
4.2 evaluating the zom bie argum ent -  44
5. ignorance -  45
chapter four: david chalmers’ property dualism  -  47
1. the sho rt version o f the argum ent -  47
2. logical and natural supervenience -  48
2.1 logical supervenience -  48
2.2 natural supervenience -  50
2.3 tw o kinds o f  supervenient properties -  52
2.4 an ambiguity concerning physical laws -  52
2.5 there are no exam ples o f m ere natural supervenience in the broadly physical dom ain  -  55
2.6 there are no intelligible exam ples o f  merely naturally supervenient properties outside the broadly physical 
dom ain  -  55
2.7 is there a know able merely naturally supervenient property  after all? -  57
2.8 the prob lem  o f  phenom enal judgm ent -  58
2.9 the prob lem  o f  phenom enal judgm ent -  58
2.10 the fallacy and backfire -  59
2.11 leaving the prob lem  o f phenom enal judgm ent unsolved -  61
2.12 there are no know able merely naturally supervenient properties -  61
chapter five: no harsh dem ands -  63
chapter six: the natural m ethod -  67
1. anti-constructive naturalism  -  67
2. constructive naturalism  -  69
3. the natural m ethod  -  70
3
chapter seven: case study #  1: experiences of phantom  lim bs -  74
1. the natural m ethod  applied to  experiences o f p h an tom  lim bs -  75
1.1 the phenom enology o f experiences o f  phan tom  lim bs -  75
1.2 the neurology o f experiences o f  phan tom  lim bs -  76
2. w hat experiences o f  phan tom  limbs tell us about phenom enal experiences -  80
3. reflexive m onism  -  82
chapter eight: case study #  2: synesthesia -  88
1. synesthesia -  89
2. the natural m ethod  applied to  synesthetic experiences -  91
2.1 the phenom enology o f synesthesia -  91
2.2 the psychology o f synesthesia -  94
2.3 the neurology o f synesthesia -  101
3. the relevance o f  synesthesia to  the problem  o f phenom enal consciousness -  106
3.1 externalism  about intentional con ten t -  107
3.2 possible objections -  112
chapter nine: case study #  3: dreams -  118
1. the phenom enology  o f dream s -  118
2. the neurology o f dream s -  120
3. the 40 H z thesis -  125
4. the evolutionary biology o f dream s -  130
chapter ten: case study #  4: color experiences -  133
1. the phenom enology o f color experiences -  133
2. John  L ocke on prim ary and secondary qualities -  134
3. the planet o f the colorblind -  135
3.1 the neurology o f color vision -  135
3.2 cerebral colorblindness -  137
3.3 retinal colorblindness -  137
3.4 the genetics o f protan  and deutan color deficiency -  139
3.5 Mrs. T etrach rom at -  140
3.6 conclusion -  142
4. the A ustralian view -  142
4.1 the psychology & physics o f color experiences -  143
4.2 conclusion -  147
chapter eleven: case study #  5: experiences of beauty evoked by faces -  148
1. the phenom enology o f experiences o f beauty evoked by faces -  148
2. the psychology o f experiences o f beauty evoked by faces -  149
3. the biology o f experiences o f beauty evoked by faces -  152
4. experiences o f  beauty evoked by faces are evo lu tion ’s shorthand  -  155
4.1 tw o o ther exam ples -  157
4.2 affordances -  158
5. som e speculations abou t the experiences o f beauty evoked by landscapes and by art -  159
chapter twelve: three threats to representationalism  refuted -  161
1. rebuttal o f the first reductionist threat: losing consciousness -  162
2. rebuttal o f the second reductionist threat: conscious inessentialism  via overrepresentation  -  164
3. rebuttal o f representation  inessentialism  -  166
epilogue -  172 
Summary (Dutch) -  175 
References -  194 
Curriculum vitae -  198
4. splitting auditory attention -  70
4
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Writing a dissertation would no t be possible without a great deal o f help. Many people have 
contributed in various ways and different stages to  this enterprise. I would like to  thank them  all.
First o f all, T on Derksen provided me with the opportunity to  do research in the interesting area 
o f phenom enal consciousness. I have benefited enorm ously from  his extensive com m ents on the 
various drafts o f all the chapters o f this dissertation.
The position I have developed in this dissertation also owes a lot to  the discussions I had with 
Marc Slors and the suggestions he made. I also w ant to  thank him for being the subject o f the 
only empirical experiment I have ever done as a philosopher.
Many o f my ideas have been inspired by the -  often informal -  discussions in the research group 
Rationality and Non-Reductionism. Besides T on and Marc, I would like to thank the other 
participants: Chris Buskens, Anthonie Meijers, M onica Meijsing, Herm an de Regt, Esteban Rivas, 
Pouwel Slurink, and Arno W outers. It has been a privilege to  listen to  you.
Special thanks to  Filip Buekens. It is simply no t conceivable that I could have written this 
dissertation w ithout his contagious enthusiasm for analytical philosophy having infected my 
mind.
I owe a special debt to  Chiel Bertens en Anique Lensen. Being close to me both  emotionally and 
in space-time they were in turns the first to hear what I had thought up. Thank you for listening 
and responding to me.
Thanks to  V incent Kwantes and W annes Rom bouts for all the lively discussions about every 
topic in this dissertation and many, many more. Apologies for all the times I rattled on while we 
should have been rocking.
Thanks to  Frank Scheele for drawing my attention to  tetrachromacy.
N o idea is w orth being developed if it isn’t shared. I like to thank my friends: Boudewijn Aerts, 
Olga Ansems, Bregtje Bertens, Hedwig Spadaccini-Zeedijk, Piet-Hein Clijsen, Sander Colijn & 
Laura van Driel, Leon van Egm ond, Peter & Sharon van Gestel, Janneke van Gog, Gerard van 
Gorkum , Sylvie van Halder, Liane den Hartog, Renske & Frank Henzel, Kiki van der Horst,
5
Renate Hovius, E sther de Kok, Cyrano Opdebeke, Ron Peek, Myriam & Johan van Rooijen- 
Horsten, Renske Somerwil en Lex van Tilburg, Thank you all for patiently listening to my 
lectures in bars, at parties or wherever I saw a chance to  tell you about your own but mostly other 
minds.
I also extend my thanks to  others who have contributed in various ways: Jan Bransen, Daniel 
Cohnitz, Joachim  Leilich, Jeroen Linssen, Peter Reijnaert, Johan Veldeman and Teresa Viader- 
Rapp.
Finally, I want to thank my parents, my brother and his wife for always supporting my decisions 
in life, even though -  be it refusing to  serve in the army, studying philosophy, or writing this 
dissertation. I could never have accom plished that w ithout your support and love.
6
INTRO DUCTIO N
This dissertation is about the scientific study o f conscious experiences. If  one takes a look at the 
contributions to  recent conferences on consciousness like the Tucson Conferences and those 
organized by the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness one cannot escape the impression 
that there seems to  be a growing consensus among scientists and philosophers that such a science 
is possible and that exciting scientific discoveries about the phenom enal mind have been made in 
the last decade. Even though consensus seems to be growing, there are som e philosophical views 
on consciousness that deny that a science o f consciousness is possible. I will argue against these 
views. I will present Owen Flanagan’s natural method, as the way to  find answers to questions 
about consciousness. Applying this m ethod to  different kinds o f experiences leads to the theory 
that I call the evolutionary shorthand theory o f the phenom enal mind. This theory provides an 
answer to the question why phenomenal consciousness was selected in evolution: it is a quick way o f picking 
up inform ation that is im portant to  the survival and reproduction o f the experiencing subject. My 
goal in this dissertation is to  support the theory by recent empirical data.
In chapter one I will present my two assumptions, viz. qualia realism and broad physicalism, and 
the two questions that together form  the problem  of phenom enal consciousness: How is 
phenom enal consciousness realized and what is it’s evolutionary function?
Chapter two presents the evolutionary shorthand theory o f phenom enal consciousness. There I 
give a characterization o f the phenom enal mind. The chapter is an exposition o f the theory. The 
defense o f this theory follows in the rest o f the dissertation and consists o f (1) argum ents against 
different reasons to  think that a scientific solution o f the problem  o f the phenom enal mind is 
impossible; (2) a presentation and discussion o f empirical data concerning five varieties o f 
phenom enal experiences; (3) a critique o f argum ents against a representationalist account of 
phenom enal consciousness.
In chapters three and four I argue against the m ost recent view o f tough dualism. U nder tough 
dualism every variety is classified that denies that the phenom enal belongs to the broadly physical 
domain. If  tough dualism is right, a scientific theory o f the phenom enal mind is impossible, for 
science is only concerned with the broadly physical domain. The conceivability argum ent is the 
tool m ost used by the tough dualists. In chapter three I will dem onstrate that this kind o f argum ent 
begs the question if it is applied to  som ething we are ignorant about. In chapter four I argue against 
the tough dualist position itself. Basically the problem  is a variety o f the interaction problem: if
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the phenom enal mind is no t physical and it does have influence on our behavior, how can this be 
explained w ithout giving up either tough dualism or the claim that the phenom enal has influence 
on the physical?
Some philosophers are agnostic about accepting either tough dualism or monism. Their argum ent 
that we have to remain agnostic, starts with the observation that scientific concepts are objective 
and that conscious experiences are subjective. The question here is: How can we have an 
objective science about something that is subjective? It seems that we could never have the right 
scientific concepts: how can an objective theory ever explain w hat it is like to  be a human? Those 
w ho do believe we do n o t have an answer to  this question, but do n o t exclude that we will find it 
som e day, remain agnostic. In chapter five I will argue that this question poses a demand on a 
scientific theory o f consciousness that is too strong.
N o t only tough dualists and agnostic philosophers argue against the possibility o f a science o f the 
phenom enal mind, there is also an argum ent coming from  the m onist camp: maybe we are no t 
intelligent enough -  cognitively closed -  to  understand phenom enal consciousness and its 
relations to  the rest o f the broadly physical domain. This argum ent is discussed and 
rejected in chapter six. O ne o f the arguments against cognitive closure comes from  Owen 
Flanagan. He argues that the natural m ethod provides a way to understanding consciousness. I 
agree. This m ethod is presented in chapter six, and will be applied to  various kinds o f phenom enal 
experience in the chapters seven through eleven. I use these case studies to present different aspects of 
the evolutionary shorthand theory o f phenom enal consciousness as presented in chapter two.
Though many aspects recur in the chapters describing the case studies, each o f these chapters has 
one aspect o f my characterization o f the phenom enal mind that is central.
Chapter seven focuses on projection. Using phantom  limbs I will show that phenom enal experiences 
are projections. In the discussion following the presentation o f the data the evolutionary 
shorthand theory is compared with Max Velmans’ recursive m onism  that also defends a 
projectionst view on the phenom enal mind. I argue that contrary to  his view phenom enal 
experiences are located in the head.
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The central aspect o f chapter eight on synesthesia is that phenom enal experiences are presentations 
that can be used as representations. Here the main discussion is with Michael Tye. I mainly disagree 
with his claim that all phenom enal experiences are representations.
In chapter nine the central aspect is the interpretation o f presentations as representations. The case 
study concerns the phenom enon o f dreaming. This chapter is also m eant as an illustration o f the 
natural m ethod, for m uch o f the data are derived from  Owen Flanagan’s book Dreaming Souls 
(2000) in which he successfully uses this m ethod to  gain knowledge about dreaming.
The focus o f attention o f chapter ten is the secondary quality view of phenomenal experiences, i.e. the claim 
that no object really is colored, sweet, or beautiful. I will defend this claim for colors against the 
view of Frank Jackson.
In chapter eleven the aspect that is central is the species-specific indirect representation of bodily and 
environmental features. I t is here that I dem onstrate that phenom enal presentations can be used to 
represent features o f the environm ent that are advantageous to the representing organism’s 
survival and reproduction. Since this way o f representing is fast and indirect I call it evolution ’s 
shorthand.
In chapter twelve I discuss three problem s that any representationalist theory o f the phenomenal 
mind should face. First, a general threat to representationalism will be rebutted: since 
phenom enal representations create intensional contexts, phenom enal representations cannot be 
reduced to  nonphenom enal representations that express the same content. The remaining 
discussion will be with a philosophers which I suspect to  be a defender o f conscious 
inessentialism (problem two), Max Velmans, and with those who defend representation 
inessentialism (problem three; the view that all our actions can be perform ed w ithout conscious 
representations) Kevin O ’Regan and Alva Noë. The evolutionary shorthand theory o f 
consciousness shows that both  kinds o f inessentialism are incorrect and comes out as the view 
which is best in line with the empirical data.
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CHAPTER O N E  
TWO ASSUMPTIONS &  TWO QUESTIONS
I really like Chimay Grande Réserve. Sometimes this causes me to  drink too much, which results in a 
severe hangover the next afternoon. This, I believe, is the shortest argument for the claim that 
phenom enal consciousness is real and that it causally interacts with the physical world. Together 
with the scientific com m itm ents to the causal closure o f the physical world and the rejection of 
causal overdeterm ination, it follows that all phenom enal states are part o f the physical world. It 
also shows that normally we believe that it is the beer that tastes so good and makes us feel good. 
That is the hedonic reason why I buy and drink it even though I am consciously aware o f the 
negative impact it has on my behavior, perceptual and cognitive capacities and on my future 
qualia: I  want it and I  want it now. But what is it that I want? Can we give an account o f w hat qualia 
are, why we have them , and how  they are related to  the rest o f the world?
In this chapter I will do two things. First, I will present the two main assum ptions that I accept 
throughout this dissertation, viz. qualia realism and broad physicalism. Secondly, I will describe the 
two serious parts o f problem  of phenom enal consciousness are: why is there phenomenal consciousness? 
And how is phenomenal consciousness realized?
1. the two main assumptions: qualia realism and broad physicalism
In asking the kind o f questions I ju st posed and trying to  answer them, I assume the tru th  o f two 
positions: qualia realism and broad physicalism. Phenom enal consciousness is real: som e o f our 
m ental states have a what-it-is likeness, a certain qualitative feel. This is no t an issue that is open 
for debate as far as I am concerned. I try to  avoid painful situations and pursue pleasurable ones, 
som ething creatures w ithout phenom enal experiences can and will n o t do. For instance, my 
phenom enal zombie-twin -  a hypothetical being that is a physical but no t a phenom enal duplicate 
of me -  will have no reason to  go to  a bar to  have a beer with his friends, he will only see things 
in a blur, will have trouble thinking and walking straight and the next day his body will be sick. 
Hum ans with phenom enal experiences som etim es take all this for granted -  even the pounding 
headache the next day -  because there are som e seriously enjoyable qualia to  be found in bars. 
Fortunately for my zombie-twin, there is nothing it is like for him  to have a hangover. It is 
som ething it is like to  be a drinker, and tha t’s enough to start with. Here, I rest my defense o f 
qualia-realism.
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Being a qualia-realist I should give at least a provisional answer to the questions that arise from  
both parts o f this term: what am I  a realist about? And what do I  mean by the claim that something is real? 
First o f all, it should be noted that the qualia-realist is n o t com m itted to  a restricted definition of 
qualia. O n this account qualia are defined as nonrepresentational, no t functionally analyzable, or 
no t causally efficacious. I believe it is a bad idea to start o ff with such a definition, for qualia are 
real and there m ight n o t be anything real corresponding to such a restricted definition. It is 
enough to  say that qualia are the what-it-is-likeness o f experiences. Scientific data, no t intuition, 
should provide us with a m ore elaborate description o f w hat the properties o f qualia are. Chapter 
two starts with a description based on empirical data.
Usually phenom enal consciousness is distinguished from  access consciousness (Block 1995) or 
psychological consciousness (Chalmers 1996b). I f  this distinction is the distinction between those 
conscious states that are functionally analyzable and those that are not, I do no t believe it is a 
useful distinction, for then I would have to  say that I doubt w hether phenom enal consciousness 
exists: it is no t a priori evident that phenom enal consciousness cannot be functionally analyzed. 
The distinction is m ore useful as it is m eant to distinguish between those conscious states that 
essentially have a what-it-is-likeness and those that have not. Even though I believe that every 
conscious state has a phenom enal feel (and it m ight even turn out that this is necessarily so), 
som e o f the conscious states m ight well have no phenom enal feel and still be conscious states. 
Believing that it rains is such a state that does have a phenomenal feel (which is different from  -  
say -  hoping that it rains) but conceivably it would still be a conscious state if there were no 
phenom enal feel to  accom pany it. This is in contrast with the conscious experience o f red, which 
essentially is phenomenal. Leave this out, and the whole conscious state has been left out.
To the question about what I mean by the claim that phenom enal experiences are real, I can give 
a very sho rt answer: they belong to the broadly physical domain. But now  the question arises what 
does it mean that a property or object belongs to  the broadly physical domain? By a broadly 
physical property I mean that that property is constituted by physical entities. Biological 
properties for instance are broadly physical, for they are realized by molecules, which evidently 
are physical entities. So, if a property belongs to  the broadly physical domain, it is either itself 
physical (in the narrow  sense, e.g. the way molecules are said to  be physical), or it is constituted 
by it. This logically entails that all broadly physical properties also have a location. This then is a 
monist view on the world: everything in the world that exists is eventually constituted by physical
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‘stuff.’ The reason for calling this view physicalist lies in the fact that we can have physical 
properties w ithout biological or other higher-order properties, but no t vice versa.
Are there also properties that fall outside the broadly physical domain? In chapter four I will 
argue that we can only know properties that belong to the broadly physical domain. This means 
that if there are other properties we do no t and cannot know them, hence we cannot affirm that 
they exist. This leads to  agnosticism with respect such properties. Since we do know that we are 
phenom enally conscious it follows that phenom enal consciousness is a broadly physical property.
Some philosophers like John Searle (1992) classify the broadly physical properties as physical 
themselves. O ne m ight also be agnostic about w hether the lowest level still can be called physical, 
which results in a neutral view on monism: if the lowest level is no t physical we do no t know 
w hat to call it, bu t the assum ption will be that there is ju st one kind o f “s tu ff” that realizes the 
physical properties in our world, which in turn realize the mental properties in our world.
This kind o f neutral monism should no t be confused with the kind o f m onism  that says that there is 
one kind o f “pro tostuff” which is neither physical nor mental, and that this constitutes the particulars 
of these otherwise very different ontological classes, which would leave the option open that 
there is another world where this p ro tostu ff realizes only mental but no physical properties or vice 
versa.
Broadly physical properties can be characterized by saying that they all have causal powers. In 
chapter four I will argue that we only can know and understand those kinds o f existent things 
that do have causal powers. This means that we should be agnostic about accepting entities in our 
ontology that lack causal powers. W ithin a broadly physicalist framework such entities are no t 
acceptable, hence to  belong to  the dom ain o f the broadly physical is the same as to  belong to  the 
realm of the causally efficacious. Since we cannot know any noncausal entities, every noncausal 
entity that was ever discussed was merely a postulate.
Again, this raises a question: does this imply reductionism, where only the -  yet unknown -  
fundam ental properties o f the universe are causally efficacious? The answer is no: being a 
physicalist does no t imply being a reductionist: higher-order properties are ju st as real as 
fundam ental properties. Hence, one o f the assum ptions I make is that nonreductive physicalism is
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correct. W ith this comes the acceptance o f a mereological or layered model o f  the world. I will discuss 
the mereological m odel and nonreductive physicalism in turn.
1.1 the mereological model
I am aware o f the fact that talk about layers, levels or orders is largely metaphorical. Maybe we 
should use term s that describe am ounts o f complexity and functional relations between 
properties. I use the mereological terminology as an economic way of doing ju st that. Having said 
this, we can go about using the model. The world consists o f different layers or levels: e.g. the 
level o f atoms, the level o f molecules and the level o f liquids.
T he b o tto m  level is usually though t to  consists o f elem entary particles, o r w hatever our best physics 
is going to  tell us are the basic bits o f m atter ou t o f w hich all material things are com posed. As we 
go up the ladder, we successively encounter atom s, molecules, cells, larger living organisms, and  so 
on. (K im  1998: 15)
Jaegwon Kim  claims that this view on physicalism also implies the acceptance o f mind-body 
supervenience:
[M ]ind-body supervenience can serve as a useful dividing line: it can be viewed as defining minimal 
physicalism. (Kim 1998: 15)
Jackson holds a similar view. He argues that when we do serious metaphysics we should n o t try 
to  make a list o f  everything that exists. Instead we should make a small list o f  fundamental 
entities (1998: 4). A physicalist account o f our world does ju st that. Everything that is real but 
which is no t explicitly listed in this account has to  be “entailed” by it. (Here I use “entailed” as an 
ontological notion, as Jackson does.) Though these claims are about a physicalist theory, they 
evidently are relevant to the ontology, since the theory is about our world. Physicalism claims that 
a complete account o f our world can be given in term s o f the properties and relations between 
them  that belong to the small list o f  fundamental entities. It further claims that the physical 
nature o f our world determines the nature o f our world w ithout reminder. This means that “[a]ny 
world that is a minimal physical duplicate o f our world is a duplicate simpliciter o f  our w orld.” 
(Jackson 1994: 104) Let us call this the minimal physical duplicate thesis.
According to  Jackson materialism is a claim about the actual world -  hence the phrase “our 
w orld” (1998: 11) and any physical duplicate has to be a duplicate w ithout adding nonphysical 
stu ff -  hence the phrase “minimal physical duplicate” (1998: 12). Jackson (1994: 104-105) argues 
that every materialist is comm itted to  this claim. Suppose that the duplicate world does have
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some nature that our world does no t have. Then this would be a nonphysical nature, for both 
worlds are physically identical. However, the duplicate world cannot contain any nonphysical 
nature by definition, for we only duplicated the physical properties. O n the o ther hand, our world 
might contain some nonphysical nature. If  this is true, then materialism is evidently false. Hence, 
a materialist has to  defend this claim.
In turn this thesis implies the following:
Let F  be the story as told in purely physical term s, w hich is true at the actual w orld and all the 
minimal physical duplicates o f the actual w orld, and false elsewhere: ? is a hugely com plex, purely 
physical account o f our world. Let ? be any true sentence w hich is about the psychological nature 
o f our w orld in the sense that it can only com e false by things being different psychologically from  
the way they actually are: every world at w hich ? is false differs in som e psychological way from  
our world. Intuitively, the idea is tha t ? counts as being about the psychological nature o f our w orld 
because making it false requires supposing a change in the d istribution  o f psychological properties 
and relations. N ow , if [the minimal physical duplicate thesis] is true, every w orld at w hich F  is true 
is a duplicate simpliciter o f our w orld, and so a fortiori a psychological duplicate o f our w orld. But then  
every w orld at w hich F  is true  is a w orld  at w hich ? is true -  th a t is, F  entails ? . (1998: 25)
This is w hat Jackson calls the entry by entailment thesis. Clearly, Jackson uses the notion o f 
“entailm ent” no t as a logical notion, in the sense that ? can be deduced from  F. Here, 
entailm ent is used to  indicate that statem ents that are part o f ? are made true by the same 
properties and their relations that are described by F (1998: 25). Since it is the properties that 
make the statem ents true, this is also an ontological claim: the claims referred to  by the terms of 
the psychological theory are made true by the ontological entities in the world that can be 
described by the physical theory. If  the psychological claims are true, then the entities described 
by this theory have to  exist and have top be determined by some of the entities described in the 
physical theory.
I agree with all o f the aforem entioned claims: all physicalists have to  concede to  minimal 
physicalism or a general supervenience thesis, which implies a mereological view o f the world. 
Nonfundam ental properties are supervenient on the fundam ental properties and cannot vary 
independently o f these fundam ental properties.
1.2 nonreductive physicalism
Yet, being a physicalist does no t imply that one is a reductionist. It is because that a group o f 
H 2O  molecules interact in m anner X  with each other at the level o f molecules, that water is a 
liquid at a higher level. I f  the same molecules were to  interact in m anner Y , then the water would 
be ice. This means that liquidity cannot be reduced to  the lower level, for there is no liquidity at
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this level, or as John Searle puts it: “one cannot reach into a glass o f water and pick out a 
molecule and say ‘This one is w et’ [.]” (1994: 181)
A nother argum ent against reductionism  works the o ther way round: n o t only can the same lower 
level entities constitute different higher level properties preventing reduction o f higher-level 
properties to  lower-level properties, bu t the same higher-level properties can also be realized by 
different lower-level properties, e.g. liquidity can also be realized by copper, iron or gold 
molecules, which means that there is no t one specific lower-level property to  reduce the 
phenom enon to. O ne m ight argue that it is functional properties -  o f say water and copper 
m olecules -  that the phenom enon o f liquidity can be reduced to. But this will no t work, for even 
if it is exactly the same set o f relations between water and copper molecules that constitute 
liquidity, water and copper molecules are very different, and the reduction will stop there at the 
level o f molecules, which is no t enough for reductionism, where only the lowest level properties 
count.
As I argued earlier, the kind o f physicalism I endorse is also a kind o f m onism. This, however, 
does n o t imply that there are no non-physical properties. Biological properties are no t themselves 
physical, but they are broadly physical. The same goes for social or phenom enal properties: they 
are no t physical themselves but are constituted by physical properties, hence they are broadly physical. 
The broadly physical domain, thus, is a domain that contains many different kinds o f properties 
th a t are all constituted in the end by physical properties and entities. Property pluralism and 
monism, then, go hand in hand in this nonreductive physicalism.
Nonreductive physicalism does n o t imply that there cannot be reductive explanations. I agree with 
David Chalmers (1996a; 1996b) that we should make a distinction between reduction and reductive 
explanation. Chalmers sees reduction as identification (1996b: 43) as does Max Velmans (2000: 3). 
M ost natural phenom ena are not reducible, liquidity being one o f them  as I just argued. 
According to  Chalmers a reductive explanation starts with a functional analysis o f the 
explanandum, after which an explanation has to  be given in causal terms. A reductive 
explanation, then consists in answering two questions: (1) a question about w hat the 
phenom enon does: what is the function of the phenomenon to be explained?, and (2) a question about the 
execution o f that function: how is this function realized? Suppose we w ant to  explain the biological 
phenom enon o f being a heart. First, we have to  answer the question: what is the function of a heart? 
The answer lies along the following lines: a heart pum ps the blood in an organism in order for
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oxygen and other chemicals in the blood to  reach their destination in the body o f the organism. 
The second question is: how  does the heart do this? A long explanation follows about contraction of 
muscle-tissue, signals that are being sent via neurons from  the brain to  the heart, etcetera. The 
level o f the functional analysis (the heart) is one that is higher than the level o f explanation (the 
cells from  which the heart is build), hence this is a reductive explanation, where no reduction is 
involved: the heart is as real as is the muscle tissue that constitutes it.
I claimed that having causal powers is the same as being broadly physical. I will use Victor 
Johnston’s (1999) example to  indicate how higher-level properties can have causal influence (in 
the course o f evolution), w ithout falling into the trap o f causal overdetermination. He uses a car 
analogy (1999: 9 f). A car has been made in factory and has to  complete a course that leads back 
to the factory. Only if the car is able to make the sharp turns and can accelerate up a hill, the car 
can get back to  the factory. Hence, the only cars that make it back hom e are those who have the 
higher-order properties o f acceleration and the cornering ability, regardless o f how these are 
realized by the parts that constitute the car. So even though these parts constitute the car and do 
m ost o f the work, it is the higher-order properties that emerge from  or supervene on the 
arrangement o f the parts that influence w hether the car gets back to  the finish line.
Johnston extends this example to  evolution. Suppose designers only use (combinations of) the 
designs again from  the cars that made it back to  the factory to create new cars. In that case the 
higher-order properties o f acceleration and cornering ability have causal influence on which 
lower-level properties get passed on to  next generations. And these lower-level properties in turn 
constitute the bases for the emergence o f the future higher-order properties o f the next 
generation o f cars. The same goes for the relation between consciousness and the brain: “O ver 
the long course o f evolution, the functional attributes o f the mind have been responsible for 
shaping the physical and chemical structure o f brains. From  this viewpoint, functional 
consequences dictate structural design.” (Johnston 1999: 11) Johnston presents this evolutionary 
functionalism (1999: 9) as part o f the solution to  the problem  o f consciousness (1999: 11). I agree 
that it is, bu t what is this problem?
2. the problem of phenomenal consciousness
I believe that the problem  of phenom enal consciousness is the a com bination o f two questions:
(1) why do we have phenomenal consciousness given our physical make-up? And (2) why did phenomenal 
consciousness evolve?
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The first question m ight be taken as expressing a problem  that stem s from  a combination o f the
dualist intuition m ost people have and conscious inessentialism, where
Conscious inessentialism is the view that fo r any intelligent activity i, perform ed in any cognitive dom ain  
d, even if we do i w ith conscious accom panim ents, i can in principle be done w ithout these 
conscious accom panim ents. (Flanagan 1992: 5)
Conscious inessentialism is based on the physicalist view that everything in the world is done by 
(broadly) physical entities and properties. If  this is combined with consciousness realism and the 
view that consciousness is n o t physical nor broadly physical, a tough kind o f dualism results: it is 
ju s t a small step from  the claim that consciousness exists but is no t (broadly) physical to the claim 
of full-blown substance dualism. O ne only needs to  add that it does n o t depend on the (broadly) 
physical in any way. (There are several reasons why one would accept conscious inessentialism. In 
this dissertation som e o f them  are discussed and refuted. Cf. chapter three, six, and twelve.)
If  such a position would be correct, then the problem  arises: I f  all the work is done by the (broadly) 
physical properties in the world, then why is some (or maybe all) of this work accompanied by phenomenal 
experiences? Nowadays this problem  is mostly referred to  as the ‘hard problem ,’ a phrase made 
famous by David Chalmers (1993; 1995; 1996a; 1996b; 2002). As I will argue in chapter four, if 
one puts the question like this, then one already accepts epiphenomenalism, which renders the 
question insolvable. So, the first question is no t a form ulation o f the hard problem  o f 
consciousness.
Contrary to  Chalmers’ view, the first question is a question that has to  be interpreted within the 
context o f broad physicalism: how is the broadly physical property of phenomenal consciousness realized by the 
physical? This is a genuine part o f the problem  o f phenom enal consciousness: if phenom enal 
consciousness is a real property it has to  be a property that belongs to  the broadly physical world. 
The question then becomes the one Colin M cGinn famously formulated: “How can technicolour 
phenomenology arise from  soggy gray m atter?” (1991: 1) This interpretation o f the first question 
clearly differs from  the hard problem, for in this version o f the problem  it is accepted that the 
phenomenal mind belongs to the broadly physical domain, something which is denied in the 
interpretation according to  Chalmers.
To this question I will present only a partial answer, for I believe that neurology plays a central 
role here, and at this m om ent the neurology o f phenom enal experiences is far from  complete. I
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will discuss som e neurological findings that are relevant to  this question and that hint at how 
some kinds o f phenom enal experiences are realized in the brain.
The second question is an evolutionary one. Why did phenomenal consciousness evolve? What is its 
evolutionary function? I hope that my answer to this question will be satisfying for those who are 
both realists about phenom enal consciousness and are convinced that it has causal efficacy (I will 
argue for this latter claim in chapter four, by refuting Chalmers’ position).
In taking an evolutionary look at phenom enal consciousness it immediately becomes clear that 
we can talk about phenom enal consciousness in general, though there are many different 
phenom enal conscious states. In o ther words, phenom enal consciousness is both homogeneous and 
heterogeneous at the same time: even though experiences o f red, pain or beauty are very different 
experiences, they all have a what-it-is-likeness. This heterogeneity makes answering questions 
about phenom enal consciousness hard, for two problem s surface immediately. The first problem  
is how to  distinguish the experiences that were selected for from  those that were not. If  
phenom enal consciousness is heterogeneous, then probably n o t every kind o f phenom enal 
experience was selected for. Experiencing a pleasant taste while eating a ripe strawberry is a 
candidate for selection, but experiencing beauty while listening to  Lou Reed is not. Why, then, do 
some o f us have this latter experience? In chapter eleven I will answer these related questions.
The second problem  is a more general one: if there are many different phenom enal experiences, 
then it m ight be necessary to  investigate each and every one o f these kinds separately, both with 
respect to  the why-aspect o f the problem  of phenom enal consciousness, as well as with respect 
to  the how-aspect. The consequence o f this is that we have to  be patient: a solution to  these 
aspects o f the problem  o f phenom enal consciousness cannot be given in a single article or book, 
it will take many years o f investigation before all the answers will be given. In this dissertation I 
hope to  contribute to  the answer to  the general question why is there phenomenal consciousness at all?
N ow  I have made clear my assum ptions, I will first present the evolutionary shorthand theory o f 
the phenom enal mind in chapter two. This theory is the result o f  applying the natural m ethod to 
different phenom enal experiences. The m ethod is one where data from  dfferent scientific 
disciplines and from  phenom enology are combined. The successful application o f this method, 
then, can be interpreted as an argum ent against the pessimistic view that a science o f the 
phenom enal mind is impossible.
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CHAPTER TWO
T H E EVOLUTIONARY SHORTHAND THEORY OF T H E PHENOM ENAL M IND
The upshot o f this dissertation is to  show  that phenomenal experiences form a heterogeneous set of causally 
efficacious internal and direct presentations. In most normal conditions they are used to represent real properties of 
external objects or bodily states in a nonconceptual, indirect though reliable way, approximately projecting them 
back on these states with which they causally covary. In other words: they represent or track those properties. The 
normal conditions are those conditions in which the experiencing organisms evolved. Phenomenal representations are 
a species-specific evolutionary shorthand for complex information about the environment or the body that -  in 
principle -  could also be represented in another less economic way. It is precisely this economic manner of 
representing, which makes phenomenal consciousness a feature that is selected for in evolution by natural selection. 
In all other conditions phenomenal experiences are either just presentations not representing anything (e.g. 
afterimages), or they are used to represent features that are not found in the environment in which the experiencing 
organisms evolved (e.g. the beauty of art). Since phenomenal experiences were selected for their representational 
abilities, experiencing organisms have the natural inclination to interpret any phenomenal experience as 
representational, even if it is merely a presentation.
In the present chapter I will explain w hat I mean by the term s I use in this characterization. I will 
also discuss differences o f opinion regarding the different aspects o f this theory with others who 
defend a representational theory o f the phenom enal mind. As I said before, my intention is not 
to  present a new theory, but to  show  that the different aspects o f this theory are all supported by 
empirical evidence, which will be presented in the chapters seven through eleven. O ne aspects o f 
this characterization are already argued for: the claim that phenom enal experiences form  a 
heterogeneous set is dem onstrated in chapter one.
This chapter is m eant both as a presentation o f the theory and as a guide for reading the chapters 
to  come. The different aspects o f phenom enal consciousness are discussed, but the main body of 
evidence will be presented in the chapters seven through eleven. Very little empirical data on 
which this theory is based will be presented in this chapter. This means that m ost arguments will 
be brief. It is not, however, my intention to convince the reader in this chapter o f any o f the 
aspects I discuss, only to clarify these different aspects and show  how I will argue for them  and 
where I differ from  those w ho say similar things about the phenom enal mind. Evidently, this way 
o f presenting the theory brings with it som e repetition o f arguments, but the advantage will be 
that the reader has a good idea w hat the point o f the different case studies will be.
19
1. phenomenal experiences are presentations
I am  no t the only one defending a representational account o f the phenom enal mind. However, 
there is a big difference between my theory and those o f for instance Michael Tye (1995) and 
Fred D retske (1995). They both maintain that all phenom enal experiences are representational 
states.
In  my view, all experiences and feelings have representational content, no t ju s t perceptual 
experiences. (Tye 1995: xv)
All m ental facts are representational facts[.] (D retske 1995: xiii)
It is here that the evolutionary shorthand theory o f the phenom enal mind differs the m ost from  
other representational accounts o f phenom enal consciousness. I do not agree that every 
experience or feeling is representational. As I will show  in chapter seven, phenom enal 
experiences are first and for all presentations we have experiences w hether they represent 
something or not. The main idea here is that presentations do no t have any intrinsic meaning or 
purpose. Phenom enal experiences are first and for all presentations, nothing more. The idea is 
that we have experiences that can be used as representations. Consider the following analogy. A 
stone can be used as a ham m er, bu t no t all stones are ham m ers. By analogy the same goes for 
phenom enal experiences: phenom enal experiences can be used as representations, but no t all 
phenom enal experiences are representations. Some phenom enal experiences are just 
presentations.
This presentational character o f phenom enal experiences will be spelled out in m ore detail in the 
rest o f this dissertation. For the m om ent it suffices to  say that we can and do have 
nonrepresentational experiences. A good example is an afterimage: even though one experiences 
a certain color and a certain shape one knows that there is no real object that has this color or 
shape. I will also return to  this example.
The discussion o f the differences o f opinion with o ther representationalist theories o f the 
phenom enal mind are discussions within a large framework o f agreement. I believe that m ost of 
the point o f disagreement stem  from  my acceptance o f the presentational character of 
phenom enal experiences.
2. phenomenal experiences are direct presentations
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Phenom enal experiences are direct presentations. If  one has an experience o f red, this is no t 
mediated by anything else: the experiences are immediate presentations. T hat phenom enal 
experiences are direct experiences is probably n o t a controversial claim, though I m ention it here 
to  m ake sure that the direct character o f the presentation is distinguished from  the indirect 
character o f what is represented by a phenom enal representation, for which I will argue later.
3. phenomenal experiences are internal states
One o f the main points o f the following chapters is to show that phenom enal experiences are 
states internal to biological creatures with a certain kind o f brain. Phenom enal experiences are 
located in the head, even though they are experienced as i f  they are out there (with the exception 
o f headaches and the like). I take it that m ost people would claim that it is the grass that is green, 
that it is the tom ato  that is red, that the pain due to  hitting your thum b with a ham m er is in your 
thum b, and that it is the face o f your loved one which is beautiful. I will argue that every 
experience is in the head, supervenient on a spatiotem poral brain state. There are no experiences 
or parts o f experiences out there. So, I am explicitly arguing against any externalist theory of 
phenomenal consciousness that places (a part of) phenom enal experiences outside the brain.
If  externalism is the thesis that the external world is part o f the cause o f  the experiences, then of 
course I am an externalist: the physical world exists and it causally interacts with us.
Externalism, though, is mostly taken as a thesis about content. In this view externalism requires 
realism about the content o f the mental states that is out there.
[E]xternalism  is incom patible with the likes o f idealism and phenom enalism  and projectivism . In  
o ther w ords, externalism  presupposes (a form  of) realism about the external world: it takes worldly 
facts to be fixed m ind-independently, so that these can be exploited in the fixing o f mental facts. 
(M cGinn 1989: 10)
This means that a secondary quality view o f color (and other phenom enal properties) is 
incom patible with externalism.
[I]f colours or m oral values, say, are taken to  be p rojected  on to  the w orld  by the m ind, then  there 
can be no  explaining the relevant distinctions o f m ental con ten t by reference to  prio r worldly 
distinctions. If  an object’s being red consists in its looking red (crudely), then  it cannot also be true 
that its looking red consists in being b rough t about by red things. [... ] H ence if we have reason to  
believe externalism (about som e class o f mental states), then  we thereby have reason to  favour 
realism about the subject m atter o f those states. The tru th  o f externalism about a class o f mental 
con ten ts w ould entail that the relevant sector o f reality is no t mentally constituted. (M cGinn 1989:
11)
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To turn M cG inn’s reasoning the other way round: if we have reason no t to  believe realists about 
some subject matter, then we thereby have reason to  favor internalism about the class o f mental 
states that have this subject m atter as content. Hence, the primary quality view o f color and 
externalism about color stand or fall together. In the chapters on synesthetic and color 
experiences I will argue for the secondary quality view o f colors and hence for internalism about 
the content o f phenom enal states.
O f  course I do not claim that there are no tomatoes out there o f which we say that they are red. 
A thought about a tom ato is about a real tom ato out there. W hat I am an internalist about is a 
particular kind o f content, viz. those that are about the secondary properties o f an object. This is 
compatible with an externalism about the primary properties o f objects. I f  I perceive a red and 
round tom ato, the experience o f roundness is brought about by the actual round shape o f the 
tom ato. Here we can say that the content o f the experiences is the actual roundness o f the 
tom ato, which is an externalist view. In the case o f the redness, the content is in the head. This 
comes down to the claim that the phenom enal experience is its own content: we cannot be 
internalist about the location o f the phenom enal experience and externalists about its content, for 
they are both one and the same. Leaving aside the implications o f Tye’s claim that all 
phenom enal states are representational, he says som ething very similar: “According to the theory 
developed in Tye 1995, phenom enal character is one and the same as representational content 
that m eets certain conditions.” (2000: 45) If  the phenom enal character itself is content, then one 
should be either an internalist about character and content or an externalist. Dretske and Tye opt 
for the latter:
T he rep resen tations are [in the brain], bu t their con ten t is not. In  this sense, the m ind isn ’t in the
head any m ore than  stories (i.e., story contents) are in books. (D retske 1995: 38)
O n  the PA N IC  theory, as I have elucidated it, phenom enal character ain’t in the head. So the thesis
tha t the phenom enal supervenes on the neural is false[.] (Tye 1995: 194)
4. phenomenal experiences are projected
The claim that phenom enal experiences or phenom enal content is located in the head usually is 
m et with great resistance and is often regarded as naïve. Is it no t the grass that is experienced as 
being green? I agree that this indeed is how  it seems, bu t that the actual experience o f green is in 
the head and is projected onto the grass. This seems to be som ewhat counterintuitive, for it seems 
that if the grass is green and the grass is out there, then the green is out there. However, the fact 
that the green seems out there does no t imply that is actually is out there. This is the mistake both 
Max Velmans and Michael Tye seem to make, though in different ways.
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Velmans (e.g. 1991a; 1991b; 2000) also claims that the right theory o f consciousness is one that 
claims that the phenom enal world is ou t there, and that it is projected there. O ne o f the problem s 
with his theory is that he is no t clear about what is projected and from  where. He explicitly denies 
that phenom enal experiences are located in the head, for in his opinion that would am ount to 
two phenom enal worlds for every person: one in here and one out there. Velmans argues that 
there is ju st one phenom enal world and that it is out there. He remains silent about what is 
projected or w hat the ontological status o f the projection -  the phenom enal world -  is.
This shows a problem  with the notion o f projection. Normally, if we use this word, we do so 
with respect to  an apparatus with a light bulb in it emitting photons that travel through a slide, 
eventually projecting a picture on a screen. In this case som ething actually changes at the screen, 
and other people (or machines) can detect this change. However, the projection o f experiences 
onto the cause o f the experience does no t add anything at all. I t is a projection as it is the case in 
afterimages. If  I have been looking at a colored spo t on a piece o f paper right in front o f me, and 
then look at the white wall ten m eters away, I will project an afterimage on this wall. But the wall 
is no t changed, there are no photons coming from  my eyes projecting the picture on the wall for 
others to  see. For me however, there seems to be a large colored spo t on the wall. This is the way 
in which I will use the notion o f projection. If  this is what Velmans means by the claim that the 
phenom enal world is out there, then I agree. However, I do no t think that this is w hat he means, 
for he denies that there are phenom enal states inside the head (with the exception o f headaches 
and the like). In chapter eight I will discuss his theory in m ore detail.
T ye’s claim that the green o f the grass is out there is a totally different claim. He bases his view 
on the transparency o f experiences. Suppose you have an experience o f a blue square. Now, 
examine the experience. Tye argues that there does n o t seem  to be m ore than that w hat it is an 
experience o f a blue square: “one experiences blue and square as features o f an external surface, 
but introspection does no t seem to reveal any further distinctive features o f the experience over 
and above w hat one experiences[.]” (1995: 30) The same goes for other experiences, like pain. I 
agree with his following conclusion: “The lesson o f the problem  o f transparency is that 
phenomenology ain’t in the head. [...] To discover what it’s like, you need to look outside the head to 
w hat the brain states represent. Phenom enology is, in this way, externally based.” (1995: 151) 
This claim however can be taken in two ways. My interpretation o f the claim that 
phenom enology is externally based would be that the causes o f our experiences are external: we
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represent those causes in a certain way, projecting them  back, as if the presentation was out there. 
Tye means som ething different. He claims that from  the fact that experiences are transparent it 
follows that there really are blue squares out there, independent o f us. “[T]he best available 
hypothesis is that color is an objective, physical property o f external things.” (2000: 167) This 
means that Tye has to  reject Locke’s secondary qualities. O f  course, he is right that a Lockean 
account o f color experiences includes the thesis that experiences o f colors involve an aspect o f 
illusion; that the secondary quality view of colors implies that: “there is a basic illusion involved 
in normal experiences o f color, that colors are really (response-dependent) relational properties 
even though we experience them  as nonrelational. That, it seems to  me, is ju st no t credible.” 
(1995: 145) Believing that som ething is no t credible is n o t a good argum ent for rejecting the view 
that colors are secondary properties, and to  claim that: “Colors are objective, physical features o f 
objects and surfaces.” (1995: 150) In chapter ten I will present data that show  that this view has 
to be wrong.
5. phenomenal presentations usually are used as representations
Phenom enal presentations usually are used as representations: the sugar tastes sweet, the grass is 
green and the music is loud. In chapter eleven I will argue that it is in virtue o f this ability o f the 
presentations that they were selected for in evolution by natural selection. From  an evolutionary 
point o f view, experiences that are n o t used as representations are useless to  the organism, hence 
were no t selected for. This does not mean that all presentations are used as representations, only 
that those selected for were. Experiences that were n o t selected for are -  by definition -  
evolutionary epiphenom ena. As I will argue in chapter nine, dreams may well be such 
phenom enal experiences: they exist as spandrels o f sleep and the evolutionary selected capacity o f 
our mind-brain to  make sense o f our experiences by immediate interpretation o f the 
presentations as representations. In the same chapter I will also argue that the fact that 
experiences are selected for their usefulness as representations has the consequence that we 
immediately project any experience onto the objects we are perceiving: we have evolved in such a 
way that m ost o f our presentations are used as representations, resulting in a natural inclination 
to  interpret almost all experiences as properties o f the objects around us. This natural inclination 
usually goes quite far: we have the natural inclination to  interpret experiences as properties o f 
objects even if there are only experiences and no objects, as is the case in dreams, hallucinations 
and afterimages.
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This natural inclination m ight be the reason why other representationalists claim that all 
phenom enal experiences are representational, and that “ [i]n the case o f an afterimage, what is 
represented is that there is som ething perpendicular to the line o f sight that is F  and G, typically, 
som ething that has a dim and hazy character.” (Tye 1995: 107) Since there really is no object that 
corresponds to  the experience and Tye claims that every phenom enal experience is a 
representation, he claims that “an afterimage is a m isrepresentation^]” (1995: 109) In my view 
this is incorrect. Since we all know that there is no corresponding object to  an afterimage, we 
should say that afterimages are merely presentations. Furthermore, because we evolved in such a 
way as to  immediately interpret any presentation as a representation we are inclined to do this too 
in the case o f an afterimage. But even thought we have this inclination, in this specific case we do 
no t interpret the presentation as a representation, for we know that there is nothing out there 
that is represented.
A nother case where we know  that there is nothing corresponding to  our experiences is when one 
has the tem poral lobes stimulated by transcranial magnetic stim ulation (TMS). Subjects are well 
aware that their experiences are artificially induced via TM S. Still they often try to make sense of 
their experiences by interpreting them  as religious experiences (Persinger 1987; H itt 1999). Here 
we also see that the brain tries to  interpret presentations as representations, even if it has to come 
up with a pretty weird scenario to interpret the experiences in a coherent way.
Using TMS to investigate consciousness is still a new way of gathering data about the 
phenom enal mind, so there is no t m uch to go on right now. The data provided by Persinger are 
coherent with the evolutionary shorthand theory o f the phenom enal mind, for they show that 
experiences can occur w ithout the usual stimulus, hence that the experience is a mere 
presentation. This presentation can be interpreted as a representation, even though one knows 
that it is no t a representation at all.
6. phenomenal representations are nonconceptual representations
For those experiences that are used as representations, I agree with both Tye (1995: 137) and 
Dretske (1995: 1) that phenom enal experiences have nonconceptual content. According to  Tye, 
the phenom enal content “is content that is appropriately poised for use by the cognitive systems 
[...]. I call this the PA N IC theory o f phenom enal character: phenom enal character is one and the 
same as Poised Abstract N onconceptual Intentional C ontent.” (1995: 137)
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Tye says that the content is abstract, for no particular objects enter into the content. A fire truck 
is red, ju st as a tom ato is, hence the phenom enal character o f red does n o t involve trucks or 
tomatoes, but is abstracted away from  these objects.
The claim made by Tye and Dretske that phenom enal content is nonconceptual has to be 
understood as saying that one can have pain w ithout having a higher-order concept -  or a 
m etarepresentation as Dretske calls it -  of pain.
The claim that the con ten ts relevant to  phenom enal character m ust be nonconceptual is to  be 
understood  as saying that the general features entering into these con ten ts need n o t be ones for 
w hich their subjects possesses m atching concepts. [...] Phenom enal character, I claim, is wholly 
nonconceptual. (1995: 139)
With this I wholeheartedly agree: content can be nonconceptual. Peter Carruthers (1998) 
interprets the view that phenom enal content is nonconceptual as a defense o f a first-order 
representational (FOR) theory. However, this is incorrect, for it is possible to  have higher-order 
nonconceptual content.
First o f  all a FO R  theory in my opinion is incorrect, for n o t all phenom enal experiences are 
representational. Secondly, the usual interpretation o f higher-order mental states as conceptual 
states is incorrect, though I agree that in m ost cases phenom enal states are indeed used as first­
order representations. But this is no t always the case. Intuitively this makes sense by considering 
the following. A photo  o f self-portrait o f Rem brandt is a representation o f a representation of 
Rem brandt, hence a higher-order representation. But ju st as the painting is a nonconceptual 
representation, so is the photo. Hence, higher-order representations can be nonconceptual. As 
will become clear in the discussion o f synesthesia som e phenom enal states are naturally used to 
transparently represent other representational mental states, which in effect makes them  higher­
order phenom enal states. I f  a phenom enal presentation is used in this way, it still is a 
nonconceptual representation.
The first reason that higher-order representationalist (HOR) theories o f phenom enal 
consciousness are also incorrect is the same as why FO R  theories are incorrect: no t every 
phenom enal experience is a representational state. Furtherm ore, it denies any creature lacking 
higher-order representations (interpreted here as concepts o f conceptual or nonconceptual 
representations) phenomenal experiences, which is absurd. O ne might bit the bullet on this, as 
Peter Carruthers does, agreeing that: “H O R-theories m ust deny phenomenal-consciousness to
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the mental states o f animals (and very young children)[.]” (1998: 214) I think this is obviously 
wrong: a baby cries when it is hungry and smiles when it sees a familiar face, which is typical 
behavior expressing the corresponding phenom enal experiences. Also, in the case o f animals, a 
dog seeing another dog, his boss, or about to get his food seems very happy. This, in my opinion, 
refutes Carruthers’ H O R  theory beyond any doubt, even though he does not accept this as an 
argum ent (1998: 214).
So, in essence I disagree with both FO R  and H O R  theories, for both theories take all higher­
order representations as conceptual representations. W hereas H O R  theories are wrong, for an 
organism m ight have phenom enal experiences w ithout higher-order representations, FO R 
theories seem to  be the victim of a conceptual interpretation o f the notion o f a higher-order 
representation, thereby leaving out the higher-order nonconceptual phenom enal representations. 
Phenom enal presentations, if used as representations, are nonconceptual representations that are 
either first-order or second-order representations.
A more serious problem  with Tye‘s theory is that it does seem  to lose the phenom enal character 
of consciousness along the way. It seems that the only difference between propositional attitudes 
and phenom enal experiences is that the first are conceptual and the second are nonconceptual. 
But being nonconceptual does no t account for being phenom enal. A photo  o f a tree or the rings 
of a tree are also nonconceptual representations, but w ithout phenomenology. So the PA NIC 
theory seems to  leave out an essential feature o f conscious experiences.
7. phenomenal representations are indirect representations
In a theory o f representations we have to  make various distinctions. First, we need to  distinguish 
between natural and nonnatural representations. The nonnatural representations include pictures, 
movies, words, com puterbits, etcetera.
D retske distinguishes natural from  conventional representations.
W hen a th ing ’s inform ational functions are derived from  the in ten tions and purposes o f its 
designers, builders and users [...], I call the resulting representations conventional. R epresentations 
that are no t conventional are natural. (Dretske 1995: 7)
I think we can equate the nonnatural with the conventional representations, though there may 
seem  to be a problem  with the language that is mostly used in the discussion o f evolution. We 
often speak o f something that is designed by evolution or the functions o f certain biological
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features. O f course, it is always added that this language is metaphorical: evolution has no 
intentions. So, if we drop the literal interpretation o f such language, there is no danger of 
interpreting the phenom enal presentations that were selected for in evolution as conventional 
representations.
The nonnatural representations are n o t the ones we are interested in, since phenom enal 
representations are natural representations: representations o f a biological system. These 
biological systems represent features o f their system or their environm ent in a m anner relative to 
the creature and its interests. We represent a m ountain as big, because it is bigger than we are; we 
represent som ething as edible, because it is edible for us; we represent some people as beautiful, 
because they are beautiful to  us.
A further distinction that should be made is that between direct and indirect epresentations. Some 
property A  is represented directly if it is represented as A, and indirectly when it is represented -  
but n o t m isrepresented -  as B. These two ways o f representing are the representational 
counterparts o f primary and secondary properties as distinguished by John Locke (1690).
A t first sight there is a certain risk involved in presenting a theory in which the representations of 
a biological system are all relative to  the interest o f the creature: all represented properties seem 
to become secondary qualities. A wall has a certain shape and color for us: if we were as small as 
an electron the wall would be a vast colorless space, with few other particles in it. N o t only for 
colors but also for shapes to  exist an observer with a particular configuration is needed. 
However, this is no t a serious problem. Even if it is true that a red wall is hard for us, because it 
resists our pushing and we cannot pass trough it, representing it as hard is a direct representation 
of a property the wall has independently of us, hence it is a representation o f a primary property. It is 
an objective feature o f walls, that objects that belong to  the same macrophysical domain cannot 
be at the very same place as the wall or pass through it. H um ans are one kind o f macrophysical 
entities that fit this category. Entities o f o ther dom ains m ight be either so small that a wall is ju st 
a vast space with occasionally another m icrophysical entity, or so big that walls are no obstacles at 
all. But this does no t mean that the solidity, hardness and shape o f the wall depend on us for 
their existence: they exist independently o f us, but these properties cannot be encountered at 
higher or lower levels in the mereological m odel o f the world. So, shape, solidity, liquidity, 
hardness and the like are all primary qualities o f objects. I f  hum ans represent walls as being solid, 
they represent this property directly: property A  is represented as A . In such a representation the level
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in the mereological m odel is implicit. I f  I represent a wall as being hard, I represent a property o f 
a macrophysical object. The fact that on a different level the object is a vast space through which 
microphysical particles can pass is irrelevant for the representation at the macrophysical level.
Before I turn to  the representation o f secondary properties, I have to say something about the 
form o f the representation. T o represent a wall as square or hard does no t imply that the 
representation itself is square and hard. Just stating in words that “the wall is square and hard” is 
enough to  represent these properties o f the wall directly.
The color o f  the wall on the o ther hand is a secondary property: in order for the color red to exist 
there have to  be creatures that respond to certain primary properties in the way that they 
experience red.
I f  we take a look at the parts o f our universe where there are no observing creatures, then we can 
safely state that phenomenal experiences of colors are absent there. Logically, this does n o t imply that 
colors themselves are absent. Just as hardness still exists even when it is no t observed, colors 
m ight exist, even though they are no t experienced. In chapter ten I will dem onstrate that colors 
do no t exist: there are only experiences o f colors. This seems strange at first sight, for how can 
we have experiences o f colors, when there are no colors? I believe the answer to be relatively 
simple: we represent som e real properties in an indirect way, viz. som ething is A  independent from 
us, but we represent it as B  (as having a certain color for instance). It is precisely this strange way of 
representing that makes phenom enal representations so special. This also has the consequence 
that talk about colors is as-if talk, even though m ost o f us do no t realize this.
A nother useful way to  distinguish between direct and indirect representations is with respect to 
the physical laws that hold on a certain level -  or between levels -  o f  the mereological model. 
Physical laws describe the behavior o f physical entities at the appropriate level o f the 
mereological model. These laws are independent o f hum an beings or o ther observers. Hence, 
everything that is referred to  by the term s in a physical law, such as mass and m otion, can exist 
without observers. So, mass, motion, shape, hardness, etcetera all are primary properties of 
objects in our universe, since they can function in physical laws that exist independently o f us. 
Colors, smells, sounds, tastes do no t feature in any physical law, only their various objective 
physical counterparts -  like wavelengths and chemical com position -  do. This means that direct 
representations can feature in physical laws while indirect representations cannot. I should note
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that this cannot be take as an argum ent against physicalism, for it will become clear that what is 
indirectly represented can figure in physical laws too, so nothing is left out by broad physicalism 
by no t using certain representations.
8. phenomenal representations represent environmental and bodily properties
Phenom enal representations are representations o f a certain kind, they also have species-specific 
contents: they can either be used to  represent properties o f the environm ent o f the representing 
system or o f the bodily states o f this system. Here I agree with Tye, who claims that sensory 
representations are representations o f “either the outside world or o f certain sorts o f internal, 
bodily changes.” (1995: 94)
As I already said, phenom enal experiences are inside the head, but their content seems to  be out 
there: it is the grass that seems to  be green. W hether the grass actually is green, does n o t m atter 
for the claim that the grass is represented as such. The same goes for the pain in the thumb: 
w hether or no t the thum b actually is the location o f the pain is irrelevant for the truth o f the 
statem ent that the thum b is represented as painful. W hat we can say at least is that there is some 
property o f grass that is represented as green, and som e property o f my thum b that is represented 
as painful, hence that phenom enal experiences represent environm ental or bodily properties. 
They do this in an indirect manner. In chapter eleven I will discuss the experiences o f beauty 
evoked by faces to  show  that the feeling o f beauty is a presentation that is projected back onto its 
causal origin (a face) and that indirectly represents primary properties o f the person w ho’s face it 
is the observer looks at. These primary properties are fertility or health.
9. phenomenal representations are approximately projected to the cause of the
experience
I already said a few times that the experiences we have are projected onto the cause o f the 
experiences. The tree is the source o f our green-experience, and we perceive the tree to  be green. 
So the green-experience is projected onto the tree. However, it should be noted that the 
projected location o f the phenom enal world and the actual physical world do no t m ap neatly. 
Variances in depth estimations between individuals shows that the projected locations 
phenom enal worlds o f each o f us differ, hence cannot all be precisely m apped onto the physical 
world (Koenderink et al. 1995; Koenderink et al. 1997). However, even though the depth 
perception is no t veridical and differs from  individual to  individual, there are no problem s in
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dealing with the world, for the mismatch between true depth and experienced depth applies 
throughout the visual field (1997: 835).
10. phenomenal representations represent in a reliability way: causal covariance
The distinction between direct and indirect representations brings us to  the question o f reliability. 
I f  a feature A  is represented as A , this evidently is a reliable representation. But what about the 
representation o f B  as C? Here, the usual indirect representations are reliable, in the sense that the 
same features o f the environm ent usually are represented in the same indirect way: the grass is 
normally represented as green, ripe tom atoes as red, and sugar as sweet. The primary properties 
o f sugar have causal im pact on our taste-buds, that send signals to  the CNS, leading us to 
experiences o f sweetness. M ost o f the times we eat sugar this occurs: there is a causal covariance 
between the eating o f sugar and the experience o f sweetness. The same goes for all other 
phenom enal representations: they are caused by stimuli, and the same stimulus normally leads to 
the same experience. This is w hat Michael Tye calls “tracking” (1995: 101): the experience o f 
sweetness tracks real features o f the sugar cube. The conditions for successful representation 
have to  be optimal (1995: 101). I think the term  “optim al” is too  strong here: in optimal viewing 
conditions a banana seems to  be yellow, but this is still the case at dusk, when the viewing 
conditions are no longer optimal. This phenom enon is called color constancy. I think it is better 
to use the notion “norm al” for it is less restrictive then optimal, allowing for correct tracking o f 
properties w ithout the optimal conditions being obtained. The conditions o f the environment are 
norm al when they are the same as the conditions in which the representing system evolved. So 
the viewing conditions o f our cities at night are far from  normal. Also, the representing system 
should be in norm al condition, which means that it should n o t be damaged. Here we probably 
can ju st look at w hat the m ost com m on features are, which for hum an beings include having two 
eyes with three kinds o f cones. If  the conditions are no t normal, then misrepresentation might 
occur.
If  the light is dim, or if the context o f a norm al external stimulus is changed (as I will show  in 
chapter ten using the Land color M ondrian experiment) the phenom enal representation does no t 
successfully represent the properties o f an object any more; e.g. a banana m ight no longer seem 
yellow.
As I said before, the main difference between the evolutionary shorthand theory and other 
representational theories o f phenom enal consciousness is that I believe that phenom enal
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experiences can be used as representations, but are n o t always representational as Tye and 
Dretske argue. This has its consequences for the view on afterimages. Tye and Dretske have to 
argue that afterimages are representational, and that since there is no object corresponding to  the 
experiences, they are m isrepresentations. Dretske makes the claim that there are two kinds o f 
misrepresentations. First there is som ething that is incorrectly represented (e.g. a cat is 
represented as a rabbit). Secondly, there is no t som ething that is represented as an object. “If 
there is no object o f representation, then S represents (i.e., misrepresents) this as being blue when 
there is no this.” (1995: 27) Clearly, an afterimage would be a good example o f the second kind of 
m isrepresentation.
As we saw in section five Tye also regards afterimages as m isrepresentations (1995: 109). 
However, I do n o t see how the conditions are no t norm al (or even optimal) here. I f  one o f our 
perfectly healthy ancestors looked briefly into the sun he would have experienced afterimages 
afterwards. Both the environm ent and the organism were in norm al condition, still there was an 
afterimage. If  m isrepresentations only occur if norm al conditions do no t obtain, afterimages 
cannot be misrepresentations. Afterimages are merely presentations. That is what I believe is the 
correct view. (I will discuss m isrepresentation in m ore detail in chapter eight.)
In the case o f afterimages the conditions are normal, but these phenom enal experiences are not 
representational. I f  the conditions are not normal, misrepresentations might occur. In other 
words: if the conditions are no t normal, then the representation does no t track what one believes 
it does: If  the light is dark, a rat m ight be represented as a cat. The representation in this case 
would no t be tracking rats, for the object o f the representation would behave differently from  the 
instances o f the representation o f which it would be a representation o f under norm al conditions. 
(Note that interpreting a presentation as a representation o f som ething in the absence of 
anything, is different from  a representation o f som ething that no longer exists. A picture o f my 
grandm other is still a representation o f my grandm other, even though she is no longer alive: a 
representation obviously can survive the represented.)
For a phenom enal presentation to  be a reliable representation, then, norm al conditions have to 
obtain, and the presentation has to  be used as a representation. For indirect representation a 
problem  similar to  that o f m isrepresentation seems to  rise, for in both cases A  is represented as 
B . In the case o f m isrepresentation a cat m ight be represented as a rat, and in the case of 
phenom enal representation -  according to  the evolutionary shorthand theory -  no thing that is
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indirectly represented as being B  ever is B  (e.g. no things that are represented as green are green). 
I will turn to this problem  now.
11. evolution’s shorthand
D oes it make evolutionary sense that we represent our environm ent in an indirect way? Why 
represent som ething as som ething different from  what it is -  even if it is a reliable representation, 
that is, even if it occurs time and again with the same stimulus?
Here the answer is that evolution does no t care about w hether a representation is direct or 
indirect, it only cares about w hat is fitness enhancing. In the case o f phenom enal representations, 
how things are represented could also have been represented in another -  viz. direct -  way (of 
course the phenom enal feel would be lacking). Why, then, did we evolve having those puzzling 
representations? The answer is simple: phenom enal representations are evolution’s shorthand: 
the indirect way of representing is m uch shorter and faster than the direct way would be. This is 
especially useful in life-threatening situations, bu t also in m ore m undane situations as looking for 
food. N ote that presentations are always direct, and that these direct presentations are used as 
indirect representations. It is precisely the immediate character o f the presentation that gives the 
indirect way o f the phenom enal representations the advantage over the direct way of 
nonphenom enal representations.
Suppose that the natural habitat o f Homo is the Savannah o f eastern Africa. Even though they had 
the ability to  make weapons, the first weapons were very primitive and predators were a threat to 
them. It makes good evolutionary sense to  be able to  pick up inform ation about the environm ent 
very quickly. Picking up affordances has to  be done in an economic manner. Being afraid if one 
sees a predator ju st is one o f the phenom enal experiences that precisely does this job . W hen we 
see a predator -  say a lion -  we immediately are scared and will stand still, try to hide, flee or 
attack. The inform ation could also be specified along the following lines: “There is a big feline 
animal, which I know to be carnivorous and seems to be hungry, probably intending to have me 
as his dinner. This is something which is very bad for my gene-survival. Hence I should either 
hide, flee, or try to  render the attacker powerless.” By the time the prey is halfway through this 
reasoning, he will be the lion’s dinner. Hence, nonphenom enal representations can indeed 
express the same content -  from  an external observer’s point o f view -  but creatures that would 
do this could no t have been evolved, for predators would get to  them.
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An additional problem  would be that the creatures have to have some knowledge o f 
neodarwinistic evolution theory, which evidently m ost creatures lack. It is physically impossible 
that a creature could have evolved based on knowing how evolution via natural selection works, 
for the very first creature that should do this would already have to have this knowledge. So, if a 
certain kind o f knowledge was fitness enhancing, it had to  be another kind, a kind in which 
explicit knowledge about the mechanisms o f evolution were absent, but which works ju st as well 
-  or even better: phenom enal experiences.
This means that phenom enal experiences -  ju st like linguistic thoughts -  create intensional 
contexts. If  Ralph believes that the m an in the brown coat is a spy, and that m an happens to be 
O rtcutt, then  it is no t necessarily true that Ralph believes that O rtcu tt is a spy, for he m ight no t 
know that the m an in the brown coat is O rtcutt. The same goes for phenom enal representations. 
Even though being scared o f a predator is a representation that is -  from  an objective point o f 
view -  equivalent to a very long nonphenom enal representation o f which knowledge o f the 
neodarwinistic theory o f evolution is expressed in com bination with an evaluation o f the 
situation, we cannot substitute the latter representation fcr the first. This also shows why 
phenom enal representations cannot be reduced to o ther representations: they create intensional 
contexts.
I call the above theory the evolutionary shorthand theory of the phenomenal mind. Its main claim is that 
phenom enal experiences are presentations that can be used as representations, thereby becoming 
candidates for evolutionary selection. This main claim and the other claims o f this theory are all 
the result o f  applying the natural m ethod to  a variety o f phenom enal experiences. These 
phenom enal experiences are discussed in the chapters seven through eleven. Before I turn  to 
these case studies, I will first address several views that would imply that a scientific study o f 
phenom enal consciousness within a broadly physical framework is n o t possible, either in 
principle, or at this m om ent. I will start by discussing both the usual argum ent for dualism 
(chapter three) and this position itself (chapter four).
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CHAPTER TH REE  
CONCEIVABILITY: T H E  ROAD TO NOW HERE
If  it is accepted that science assumes m onism , then the biggest threat to  a scientific solution of 
the problem  o f phenom enal consciousness evidently comes from  dualism. In this and the next 
chapter I will argue against this position using a two-fold strategy. In the present chapter I will 
show that the m ost frequently used argum ent for dualism is invalid, and in chapter four I will -  
for the sake o f argum ent -  accept the m ost recent version o f property dualism showing that this 
leads to  a reductio ad absurdum. In both chapters zombies play a central role. In this chapter I will 
show  that the argument in favor o f zom bies is invalid, and in the next that the notion o f  a zombie 
itself is incoherent.
1. how dualism threatens a scientific solution to the problem of phenomenal 
consciousness
In the contem porary consciousness debate alm ost no one is a substance dualist. M ost dualists are 
property dualists, where the physical world has primacy over the phenom enal world. As I already 
said in chapter one, we should distinguish between two kinds o f dualism. First, there is the kind 
that is compatible with neutral monism: broad physicalism. The world is made out o f one kind o f 
stuff, but there are different ontological levels. We can be dualists about liquidity in this manner: 
at the level o f individual molecules there is no such thing as liquidity, this is a real property o f a 
higher level: groups o f molecules. This kind o f dualism m ight better be called pluralism, for there 
are m ore than two levels in the mereological model.
Secondly, there is the tough kind o f dualism that threatens a scientific solution to  the problem  of 
phenom enal consciousness that makes a m uch stronger claim. According to  this m uch stronger 
kind o f property dualism, the phenom enal is totally different in kind from  anything that m ight be 
called broadly physical, even though the physical is necessary for the phenomenal. The m ost 
recent version o f this view is the position o f David Chalmers (1996b) who argues that a physical 
duplicate o f our world is logically possible (hence sharing all the broadly physical properties of 
our world) without there being any phenom enal property in that world. In this so-called zombie 
world certain natural (nonphysical) laws are absent, and it is because this world lacks these laws 
that phenom enal consciousness does no t arise. In this zombie world there are biological creatures 
that are our physical counterparts -  our zombie twins so to speak -  tha t are physically identical 
and functionally equivalent to us, but that do no t have any phenom enal experience whatsoever.
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There is nothing it is like to be a zombie. In this and the following chapter I will discuss this 
tough kind o f dualism.
Usually the kind o f argum ent given for dualism is a conceivability argument. This starts with the 
claim that zom bies (or otherwise phenomenally different physical duplicates) are conceivable. In 
addition, there is supposed to  be some route from  the conceivability to  the possibility o f the 
zombies, thereby proving dualism. The further implication is that -  since science assumes 
m onism  -  there can never be a scientific solution to  the problem  o f phenom enal consciousness.
In this chapter I will argue that conceivability arguments are not valid. This severely weakens the 
case for tough dualism, for this leaves its proponents em pty-handed unless they come up with 
another argument. I will first present the traditional framework in which different kinds of 
possibility are distinguished. I then will point ou t the kind o f possibility that is needed for 
conceivability arguments to show that dualism is false, and see whether the other kinds of 
possibility provide a route to it. After this, I will present Chalmers’ main conceivability argument. 
Lastly I will evaluate w hether this argum ent indeed provides a way to  defend dualism. I will argue 
that it does not.
2. possibility
Traditionally a variety o f possibilities has been distinguished. I will describe the m ost im portant 
varieties, namely logical, epistemic, ontological, and metaphysical possibility.
2.1 logical possibility
In general, we can say that a statem ent s is logically possible, when it does no t contain a (conceptual) 
contradiction; when it is n o t self-contradictory.
If, fo r exam ple, I w ere to  say tha t it is possible tha t beginning tom orrow  the tem perature  o f physical 
objects will vary w ith their colors, or tha t it is possible that in one m inute the desk on w hich I am 
w riting will vanish from  sight, one thing w hich I should m ean is that the statem ents “Beginning 
tom orrow  the tem perature  o f physical objects will vary w ith their co lo rs” and “In  one m inute this 
desk will vanish from  sigh t” are n o t self-contradictory. (Malcolm 1950: 252-253)
A nother characterization comes from  Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy:
Intuitively, a sentence is logically possible if it could be (or could have been) true, at least on logical 
grounds. T here might be som e o ther reason, say physical, why the statem ent could no t be true, but 
there are no logical reasons preventing it. For example, it is no t physically possible to  go faster than 
the speed o f light, though  it is logically possible: they do it on Star T rek all the time. O n  the o ther
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hand, it is no t even logically possible fo r an object no t to  be identical to  itself. T hat w ould simply 
violate the m eaning o f identity. (1999: 94)
There are at least two accounts o f logical possibility: what is logically possible on one account 
m ight no t be logically possible on another. I think it is best to  make a subdivision within logical 
possibility. Statements can contain a contradiction on formal (syntactical) or on conceptual (semantical) 
grounds. Something is formally or syntactically possible when it is no t o f the form  (A & —A). 
This means that only explicit contradictions fail the test. So it is formally impossible that the 
m orning star is no t the m orning star, while it is formally possible that Kennedy survived his 
assassination since, even though the statem ent is false because o f the concepts used, it is n o t of 
the form  (A & —A). The evaluation o f this last example changes if one uses the conceptual 
variety o f logical possibility.
“The conceptual criterion marks possibility by conceptual content. It says a claim can be true 
when its falsity is n o t ensured by the concepts from  which it’s built.” (Sturgeon 2000: 103) 
Chalmers also uses logical possibility in this conceptual variety.
In  determ ining w hether it is logically possible that som e statem ent is true, the constraints are largely 
conceptual. The notion  o f a male vixen is contradictory, so a male vixen is logically impossible; the 
notion  o f a flying telephone is conceptually coherent, if a little out o f the ordinary, so a flying 
telephone is logically possible. (1996b: 35)
W hat we see in this subdivision is that there is nesting of possibilities: that which is conceptually 
possible is also formally possible, but no t vice versa : conceptual possibility is nested in formal 
possibility.
2.2 epistemic possibility
The second kind o f possibility is epistemic possibility.
A state o f affairs is deem ed epistemically possible if it is no t ruled out by the knowledge, b o th  a 
priori and scientific, that we happen  to have at a certain time. In  o ther w ords, if, relative to  the 
know ledge we happen  to  have at a certain  time, it w ould be inconsisten t to  adm it a certain  thing, 
event, or state o f affairs as actual, then  the existence o f that thing, event, or state o f affairs is 
epistemically im possible for us at that time. It is clear that because the state o f our knowledge is 
constantly changing, w hat is epistemically possible at one tim e may be declared epistemically 
im possible at ano ther time. (Aune 1967: 423)
Here we should distinguish between w hat we m ight call mere and positive epistemic possibility. In 
the first case there is no epistemic reason to  believe som ething is no t possible. For instance, we 
have no reason no t to believe that black holes are passways to  other dimensions, so we m ight 
safely conclude that it is merely epistemically possible that black holes are passways to  other
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dimensions. In o ther words: “W hen an agent claims that som ething is possible, he or she often 
means that it is “possible for all I know .” (Barwise 1997: 495)
In the case o f positive epistemic possibility, som eone has som e epistemic reason to  believe that 
som ething is possible. Or, as Malcolm puts it: “W hen it is said in ordinary life that “It is possible 
that so and so will happen,” what is very frequently m eant is that there is some reason to believe that 
so-and-so will happen.” (1950: 254) We m ight for example have some evidence that Plato was 
no t the author o f The Republic
I f  a G reek  scholar w ere to rem ark “I t ’s possible tha t Plato was no t the au tho r o f The Republic” we 
should  ask “W hy do you say so?” and it w ould be only a joke  if he w ere to  reply “T he sta tem ent 
‘Plato was no t the au thor o f The Republic is no t self-contradictory [.]” [...] W e should naturally 
in terpret his first rem ark to m ean “T here is evidence that Plato was no t the au thor o f The Republic”; 
and our question  “W hy do you say so?” w ould be naturally understood  as a request fo r him  to say 
w hat the evidence was. (M alcolm 1950: 255)
In this light we m ight say that is positively epistemically possible that tom orrow  biologists might 
discover giant living insects in the Am azon rain forest. We have som e reasons to  believe this, for 
we know from  the fossil record that once there were giant insects on the Earth: we have found 
their remains. So, once they existed, which is reason enough to  believe that they still m ight be 
around, ju st like o ther animals like crocodiles that have been roaming the Earth for a very long 
time.
B oth  mere and positive epistemic possibility differ from  logical possibility. Both varieties o f 
logical possibility depend on logic, which is independent from  us. We m ight no t see a logical 
contradiction is a complex statem ent. I f  we have no epistemic reason n o t to  believe that the 
scenario described by that statem ent is impossible, we might conclude that it is merely 
epistemically possible.
Positive epistemic possibility also differs from  logical possibility, for it allows for degrees : you need 
reasons to believe that s is positively epistemically possible, and these reasons can vary from  very 
weak to  very strong. This is no t the case with logical possibility: “There can be m ore or less 
evidence for a statement, the reasons for believing it can be more or less strong, but a statem ent 
cannot be m ore or less self-contradictory.” (Malcolm 1950: 256)
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Since knowledge states can change, som ething that once was merely epistemically possible can 
become known to  be positively epistemically possible if we find some supporting evidence, or it can 
become positively epistemically impossible if we find som e evidence against it.
2.3 ontological possibility
Traditionally logical and epistemic possibility are distinguished from  ontological possibility. 
Ontological possibility, in general, can be characterized as follows. Something is ontologically 
possible if it does no t violate the laws o f our world. Here, then we have a kind o f possibility of 
which the actual world in which we live is the judge: whether som ething is ontologically possible 
in our world or not, depends on how  our world is and on w hat the laws in our world are. We 
m ight distinguish between two kinds o f ontological possibility: physical and natural possibility. 
The first kind o f possibility depends on the physical laws, the second on both physical and 
nonphysical laws.
Physical possibility
I f  there are only physical laws in our world then ontological possibility is physical possibility. “W hen 
we ask w hether som ething is physically possible, we are relativizing to the set o f physical laws. [...] 
It does no t have to  be a known physical law.” (Barwise 1997: 496)
In explaining the notion o f positive epistemic possibility I used the example o f biologists 
discovering giant living insects as an example. But this scenario can also be used to clarify 
physical possibility, for it is no t physically possible. Biologists have discovered that nowadays 
insects cannot become very big in our world, for their respiratory system would no t be sufficient 
to  transport oxygen to all their organs.1 As Barwise notices, we can combine the physical and the 
epistemic notion o f possibility: certain physical laws are known. This makes that now  it is both 
epistemically and physically impossible for insects to  be gigantic. In a society where the relevant 
laws are n o t known, it still is physically impossible for an insect to  be gigantic, but it would still 
be epistemically possible for all they know. We might pu t it this way: sometimes we have 
knowledge that a scenario is ontologically impossible. We then have conclusive reason to  claim that
1 “T he relation betw een the oxygen consum ption  o f an insect and its tracheal dim ensions is given by the formula: S 
= k(p - p ) A / L  where S  =  ml o f oxygen used per second; p =  partial pressure o f oxygen in the atm osphere [...]; p'  = 
partial pressure o f oxygen at the ends o f the tracheae; A  =  mean cross-sectional area o f the tracheae in sq. cm, L  =  
mean tracheal length in cm  and k  =  the diffusion constan t for oxygen[.] [...] Reference to  the diffusion form ula cited 
above will show  tha t in non-ventilating insects the m axim um  possible body size is lim ited, since oxygen consum ption  
is affected m ore by a linear increase in size than  is the rate o f diffusion. The same effects also operates, though  to a 
lesser extend, in ventilating form s since oxygen passes along the finer b ranches only by d iffusion .” (Richards & 
Davis 1997: 222-223)
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the scenario is positively epistemically impossible. In other situations we m ight have knowledge 
that indicates that a scenario is ontologically impossible. I f  that is the case, then we have probable 
reason to claim that the scenario is positively epistemically possible.
A t t =  0 (before the biologists made their discovery) the evidence supporting the positive 
epistemic possibility was based on the fossil record that contains the remains o f giant insects. 
After the discovery (t =  1) this positive epistemic possibility is nullified, leaving the fossils of 
giant insects as a problem  to be explained. The explanation is simple: when these insects lived, 
the atm osphere contained m ore oxygen, resulting in the fact that the air in the tracheae could 
travel a longer distance before being depleted o f oxygen, hence insects could be big.
Natural possibility
I f  there are both  physical and nonphysical laws in our world then ontological possibility is natural 
possibility. This view is endorsed by Chalmers. Taken together the physical and nonphysical laws 
are the natural laws. “A natural possible situation is one that could actually occur in nature, 
w ithout violating any natural law s.” (Chalmers 1996b: 36) So a natural possibility is a possibility 
that is allowed by both the set o f physical laws and the set o f nonphysical laws.
Suppose that in our world nonphysical (hence causally inefficacious) ectoplasmatic entities exist. 
Say that they do so in virtue o f som e natural, nonphysical, law that describes their dependence 
upon som e broadly physical feature o f our world. H ow  should we evaluate the statem ent “there 
are no ectoplasmatic entities in this w orld”? First, this scenario is a physical possibility, for the 
absence (or presence) o f ectoplasmatic entities does no t violate any physical law. This is a 
som ew hat counterintuitive conclusion, for the notion o f physical possibility is intuitively taken to 
cover only the domain o f the physical. However, if physical possibility is defined by what is 
allowed by the physical laws, then anything that falls outside the domain is physically possible, for 
no nonphysical property can ever violate a physical law (for if it could it apparently was not 
nonphysical).
Secondly, the hypothesis that there are no ectoplasm atic entities does violate some nonphysical 
law, viz. the laws that requires that ectoplasmatic entities exist. This makes the scenario naturally 
impossible, for the nonphysical laws -  again ex hypothesi -  do no t allow for their absence given the 
way the world is now.
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It should be noted that epistemic possibility is n o t nested within ontological possibility, for 
som ething m ight be ontologically possible, while we think we have evidence that it is impossible. 
Hum ans are fallible creatures, and our knowledge states may not always reflect reality 
successfully.
2.4 metaphysical possibility
The last kind o f possibility I will discuss is metaphysical possibility. W hat is metaphysically 
possible is no t restricted by the laws o f our world, but by metaphysical laws (Barwise 1997: 496). 
“The Metaphysical criterion marks possibility by essence. Its says a claim can be true when its 
falsity is no t ensured by the essence o f its truthm akers.” (Sturgeon 2000: 103) Sturgeon argues 
that the statem ent ‘David Lewis jum ps M ount Everest in a single bound’ is metaphysically 
possible, while ‘gold is uncom posed’ is not, for gold essentially is composed. The big problem  is 
that it is n o t always clear w hat is metaphysically possible and w hat not. Is the statem ent that light 
could have traveled at another speed than it does in our world metaphysically possible or is this 
speed an essential property o f light? I am  inclined to  think that metaphysical possibility coincides 
with physical possibility, for I believe that -  for instance -  the speed light has in our world is an 
essential property o f light. I f  this is no t so one could as well claim that gold is only composed in 
our universe and no t in another metaphysically possible world.
Since there does no t seem  to be a conceptual contradiction in the notion o f a different speed o f light, 
one m ight be encouraged to equate logical with metaphysical possibility, as Chalmers does 
(1996b: 42). I think this is no t a good idea, for it confuses the criteria by which we evaluate 
som ething to be logically or metaphysically possible. Furtherm ore, the fact that we are ignorant 
about many essences implies that certain scenarios appear to  be possible on conceptual grounds, 
while in fact they are metaphysically impossible. So, equating metaphysical with conceptual 
possibility is a bad idea.
3. dualists should claim that zombies are physically possible
Having distinguished these kinds o f possibility, we need to answer the following question. If 
dualists want to  show  that physicalism is false by showing that zombies are possible, which o f the 
different kinds o f possibility would do ju st that? Dualists make an ontological claim about our 
world: there are (broadly) physical properties and there are nonphysical properties, like our 
conscious experiences. So, dualism is n o t a claim about logic or epistemology. Hence, dualists 
have to  prove that zombies are ontologically possible. Furthermore, if zombies are used to  show
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that physicalism is false, then they have to be physically possible, for physicalists endorse the 
claim that zombies would violate physical laws, no t nonphysical laws. The starting position is one 
o f ignorance : we do not know whether zombies are physically possible or not, and a conceivability 
argum ent is used to  gain the knowledge about the physical possibility.
This also follows from  our ordinary talk about possibility. Normally, our claims about what is 
possible or n o t are intended to  express what on logical or epistemical grounds we believe to  be 
ontologically possible. Statements like “the m orning star is the evening star and is no t the evening 
s ta r” and “Kennedy survived his assassination” are useful in clarifying the different kinds of 
possibility we can distinguish, but are n o t norm al sentences we use to  express our beliefs about 
w hat is possible. In the case o f the giant insects we hold at t  =  0 that giant insects are positively 
epistemically possible, while at t  =  1, we nullify this and know that nowadays giant insects are not 
ontologically possible in our world. We nullify the epistemic possibility that there can nowadays 
be giant insects in our world, because we gained knowledge about the ontology o f our world.
In a similar way we can say that at t  =  0 (now) we believe that zom bies are logically or merely 
epistemically possible. We do no t see any logical or conceptual contradiction in the claim 
“zombies m ight exist” or have any evidence that shows that they are physically impossible (i.e. we 
have no positive epistemic evidence). This belief in the physically possibility o f zombies is based 
on the conceivability o f zombies: conceivability is dependent on the knowledge and insights o f the 
one who believes the scenario is possible. N ow  the question arises w hether conceivability 
provides a route to  physical possibility (or physical impossibility). In other words: can we gain 
knowledge about physical possibilities using conceivability? I will argue that we cannot.
The main argum ent against conceivability arguments is that they make the step from  either logical 
or epistemic possibility to physical possibility, w ithout any argument. Hence an additional 
argum ent is needed, for it is clear that neither o f these possibilities provide a route to  physical 
possibility. It is logically possible (conceivable on logical and conceptual grounds) that black holes 
are passways to  o ther dimensions, but we need m ore than this to  be able to  confirm  the claim 
that this is a physical possibility. For the m om ent we cannot decide on this issue: we are ignorant 
and logic or conceptual analysis cannot relief us from  this situation. This is true in general: we 
cannot gain any new knowledge about the world around us using logic or conceptual analysis. We 
need to  look at the world itself. Logical possibility, then, is no route to  knowledge about physical
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possibility. (Logical impossibility o f course is a route to physical impossibility.) W hat about 
epistemic possibility?
At t =  0 it was positively epistemically possible that giant insects m ight have been discovered the 
day before in the Am azon rain forest, while at t  =  1 it became clear that this is physically 
impossible, thereby nullifying the positive epistemic possibility. Positive epistemic possibility is 
no t enough then, for having some reason to  believe that A, does no t prove that A indeed is the 
case. Mere epistemic possibility does no t lead to  new knowledge either: if we have no reason to 
claim that A is impossible, we can hold A to be merely epistemically possible. But then we are 
ignorant about the physical possibility o f A, and the mere epistemic possibility does not change 
that.
So, neither logical, nor epistemic possibility provides a route to  physical possibility. W hat about 
the other two kinds o f possibility? The conceivability o f zombies then has to  be used to  establish 
the natural or metaphysical possibility o f zombies, after which an argum ent is needed to show 
that from  the natural or metaphysical possibility follows that zombies are physically possible.
It is clear that natural possibility is a route to  physical possibility, for if no natural laws are 
violated, no physical laws are violated. Proving that som ething is naturally possible, involves 
showing that neither kind o f natural law is broken. In the case o f the ectoplasmatic entities, we 
saw that the nonphysical entities evidently cannot violate any physical law for physical laws do 
no t apply to  anything nonphysical. Hence anything that is no t physical, is physically possible. The 
case o f the zombies is different, though, for dualist cannot start by saying that phenom enal 
consciousness is nonphysical, hence zombies are physically possible, for that would be begging 
the question against the physicalist. T o provide an argum ent against materialism, the dualist has 
to show that zombies are physically possible, i.e. that they do no t violate any physical law, for 
physicalists exactly claim that zombies are physically impossible, because they would violate 
physical laws.
To be sure, Chalmers claims that it is unlikely that zombies are naturally possible in our world 
(1996b: 96) for in our world there are nonphysical laws that determine that creatures with our 
physical m ake-up have phenom enal experiences.
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So, logical, epistemic and natural possibility are nonstarters for an argum ent against monism. This 
leaves metaphysical possibility. Could metaphysical possibility be a route to  physical possibility? 
Here too, the answer is no. Granted that it is metaphysically possible for the speed o f light to  be 
different than it is in our world (which I deem to be highly unlikely), it still is physically 
impossible, for that would violate our physical laws. So, metaphysical possibility is no guide to 
physical possibility either.
In sum, none o f the o ther kinds o f possibility provides the dualist with a route to  physical 
possibility. This means that in an argum ent that starts with conceivability and ends with the 
rejection o f monism, if it makes use o f any kind o f possibility o ther than physical possibility, 
there has to  be a step in the argum ent that shows how this o ther kind o f possibility leads t> 
physical possibility. I f  this step is made w ithout any additional argument, the argum ent is flawed.
4. evaluating the conceivability argument
4.1 Chalmers’ main conceivability argument
David Chalmers asks us to consider another universe that is molecule for molecule identical to 
our world (1996b: 94). In that world no one has phenom enal experiences, everyone there is a 
phenom enal zombie. This zombie world -  according to  Chalmers -  is logically possible. How 
does he argue for this claim? He does not. He merely states that it is hard to  argue for the logical 
possibility o f anything, and that the only thing in favor o f it is the lack o f a conceptual 
contradiction in the description o f the scenario under investigation. Since zombies are 
conceivable -  the description o f zombies does no t contain a conceptual contradiction -  zombies 
are logically possible. “In general, a certain burden o f p roof lies on those who claim that a given 
description is logically impossible.” (1996: 96) Assuming that zombies are logically possible, his 
argum ent for dualism continues as follows.
4.2 In  our w orld, there  are conscious experiences.
4.3 T here is a logically possible w orld physically identical to  ours, in w hich the positive facts about 
consciousness in our w orld  do n o t hold.
4.4 Therefore, facts about consciousness are further facts about our world, over and above the physical 
facts.
4.5 So m aterialism  is false. (1996: 123)
4.2 evaluating the zombie argument
Here we see a clear example o f how logical possibility is used to  provide a step in the route from  the 
conceivability o f zombies to  the rejection o f materialism. This is no t enough, for there has to be 
an additional argum ent that the logical possibility implies the physical possibility o f zombies. As
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we have seen logical possibility alone cannot do the job, no t even if it is interpreted as 
metaphysical possibility. Hence, step three in the above argum ent is unargued for.
4.3 ignorance
Chalmers’ zombie argum ent does n o t do w hat it is designed to do, viz. prove dualism. The 
problem  lies in our capacity to conceive certain scenarios. I f  we say that certain scenarios are 
conceivable, then we believe that they are possible in som e sense. O r as Stephen Yablo puts it: 
“In slogan form: conceiving involves the appearance of possibility.” (1993: 5)
This implies that conceivability is relative to the kind o f possibility one has in mind. As a tool to 
gain knowledge, then, conceivability is o f no value, for it merely describes in other terms what 
one already believes about the possibility o f the scenario. If  som eone claims that zombies are 
conceivable, he is describing his belief that they are logically or merely epistemically possible, 
which does no t provide us with any new facts. So, an additional argum ent is needed to  show  that 
zombies are physically possible. And this is where we get to  the heart o f the matter: we are 
ignorant about whether zombies are physically possible or not, hence there is (at this m oment) no 
additional argum ent.2 But nothing interesting follows from  ignorance.
In sum, conceivability ju st redescribes what one already beliefs about the possibility o f a certain 
scenario. I f  one is ignorant about the physical possibility o f a scenario, conceivability will no t 
help, for that expresses only that one believes that the scenario is possible in another sense than 
physical possibility. I have shown that such other possibility never is a guide to physical 
possibility. Hence, conceivability as an argum ent fails to  prove the physical possibility o f zombies. 
This means that dualism has no t been proven correct.
However, since argum ents can be false while the conclusion is right, the threat dualism poses to a 
scientific solution to  the problem  of phenom enal consciousness has not disappeared yet. W hat 
has been established in this chapter is that there is no route from  the logical, epistemic, natural or 
metaphysical possibility to the physical possibility o f zombies. So, at this m oment, we should be 
neutral about their physical possibility, for only the argument in favor o f zombies has shown to be 
false. In the next chapter I will -  for the sake o f argum ent -  suppose that phenom enal zombies
2 As will becom e clear in the following chapters, I do no t believe we are all that ignorant. I believe that zom bies are 
physically im possible. For the sake o f argum ent, I here accept that we are ignorant, because I w ant to  argue against 
conceivability as an argum ent p ro  or con tra  any position  tha t starts from  scratch.
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are physically possible, showing that the consequences o f this assum ption leads to a reductio ad 
absurdum no t only is the argum ent in favor o f zombies false, the notion itself is incoherent.
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CHAPTER FOUR  
DAVID CHALMERS’ PROPERTY DUALISM
In the preceding chapter we saw that if (tough) property dualism is right a scientific solution to 
the problem  o f phenom enal consciousness cannot be given, for science assumes monism. The 
main argum ent for this kind o f dualism, the conceivability argument, has been shown to be 
invalid. However, the position itself m ight be right even though the argum ent in favor o f it is no t 
sound. In this chapter I will discuss the m ost recent version o f property dualism -  viz. David 
Chalmers’ version -  and show  that it leads to  a reductio ad absurdum. Since the argum ent against his 
position is a complex one, I will start by presenting the relatively sho rt version o f it.
1. the short version of the argument
My main claim is that Chalmers’ theory is inconsistent for the following reason. His correct 
assum ption that we know that we are phenomenally conscious contradicts with the consequence 
o f his theory that we cannot know that we are phenomenally conscious. Since his initial 
assum ption is correct, his theory m ust be false.
I will start by presenting Chalmers’ distinction between logical and natural supervenience. 
According to Chalmers phenom enal consciousness is merely naturally supervenient, which is natural 
supervenience without logical supervenience. This in contrast to  the broadly physical properties 
that are all logically supervenient on the lowest physical subvenient base.
After the discussion o f logical and natural supervenience, I will show  that (1) there can be no 
examples o f mere natural supervenience within the broadly physical domain and (2) that those 
examples that fall outside the broadly physical domain are not interesting for they cannot be 
known. This is no t enough to  show  that Chalmers’ theory is incorrect, for he m ight argue that 
phenom enal consciousness is a very special merely naturally supervenient property, viz. one that 
can be known. This is an exception because we have a special epistemic relation to  it: according 
to  Chalmers we are directly acquainted with our phenom enal experiences (and no t with other 
nonphysical properties). I will argue that this epistemic relation cannot save phenom enal 
consciousness from  the earlier argum ent that we cannot know merely naturally supervenient 
properties, for (1) the relation is mysterious and introducing mysteries does no t solve problems, 
and (2) the argum ent in favor for the acquaintance relation is a decoy: Chalmers tries to  divert 
our attention to  a related problem  (that o f the justification o f phenom enal judgments) and then
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presents a solution to that. I will argue that this m aneuver takes us right back to  the heart o f the 
problem, showing that his decoy has exactly the same problem  as his theory that phenom enal 
conscious is merely naturally supervenient.
As long as Chalmers does no t solve this problem  the argum ent that we cannot know any merely 
naturally supervenient property also applies to  phenom enal consciousness: if a property is merely 
naturally supervenient, then we cannot know it. Since we do know we are phenomenally 
conscious, the conclusion has to  be that phenom enal consciousness is no t merely naturally 
supervenient, hence Chalmers’ property dualism is incorrect.
2. logical and natural supervenience
2.1 logical supervenience
Chalmers characterizes logical supervenience as follows.
[W ]hen B-properties supervene logically on A-properties, we can say that the A-facts entail th e  B- 
facts, w here one fact entails ano ther if it is logically im possible for the first to  hold w ithout the 
second. (1996b: 36)
The use o f the notion o f logical impossibility in this characterization suggests that the notion of 
logical supervenience m ight be viewed as a conceptual rather than an ontological notion. In 
chapter two I distinguished two kinds o f logical possibility: form al and conceptual possibility. 
Chalmers’ notion o f logical possibility belongs to  the latter, since he says that “ [i]n determining 
w hether it is logically possible that som e statem ent is true, the constraints are largely conceptual.” 
(1996b: 35) I also showed that this kind o f possibility is n o t a guide to  what is physically possible, 
and that one o f the m ajor problem s with conceptual possibility is that it clearly depends on our 
conceptual scheme w hether we consider a scenario to  be conceptually possible or not.
Rem ember the giant insect example: at t  =  0, the time we did no t know that nowadays insects 
cannot become gigantic, giant insects were believed to be logically possible for there was no 
conceptual contradiction in this notion. Then we found out that nowadays giant insects are an 
ontologically impossibility, because o f their physical make up and the present day atmosphere. 
Arguably, this new knowledge changes the concept ‘insect.’ If  the concept does not change, then 
there are scenario’s that remain conceptual possible even though we know that the scenario is 
ontologically impossible. I f  this is the case, then conceptual possibility says nothing about 
ontological possibility.
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If  the new knowledge does change the concept ‘insect’ then giant insects become conceptually 
impossible. But we can only draw that conclusion after we gained the new knowledge about the 
insects. Again, conceptual possibility says nothing about ontological possibility.
So, in either case conceptual possibility, Chalmers’ preferred version o f logical possibility, is 
clearly a conceptual notion and no t an ontological one. He uses this notion in the definition o f 
logical supervenience, suggesting that logical supervenience is a conceptual notion. However, 
there are two good reasons to interpret logical supervenience as a ontological notion.
First, Chalmers ju st is no t very clear about what is conceptually possible or not. He explicitly 
allows for identification o f logical with metaphysical possibility or possibility tout court (1996b: 35; 
42). But metaphysical possibility -  as I showed in chapter two -  is a very different kind of 
possibility than logical possibility, for it evaluates w hether a scenario is possible no t by conceptual 
criteria, bu t by essential criteria. It is metaphysically impossible that gold is uncom posed, for gold 
essentially is com posed. But being com posed is a property o f gold, independent o f any concept 
we have o f it. In chapter three I argued that these different evaluation criteria provide a good 
reason n o t to identify logical with metaphysical possibility. Here, I w ant to make another point. 
Since Chalmers allows the identification, his notion o f logical supervenience becomes a 
metaphysical and therefore an ontological notion.
The second reason is that he also uses ontological term s in his characterization o f logical 
supervenience, like “property” and “fact.” So, Chalmers clearly intends to  be saying som ething 
about the real world, no t ju st about our concepts o f properties and facts. This is supported by the 
examples he presents to clarify the notion o f logical supervenience.
A t the global level, biological properties supervene logically on physical p roperties. E ven G od  could 
no t have created a w orld that was physically identical to  ours bu t biologically distinct. There is 
simply no logical space fo r the biological facts to  independently  vary. W hen we fix all the physical 
facts about our w orld -  including the facts about the d istribution o f every last particle across space 
and tim e -  we will in effect also fix the m acroscopic shape o f  all the objects in the w orld, the way 
they m ove and function, the way they physically interact. I f  there is a living kangaroo in this world, 
then  any w orld that is physically identical to  this w orld will contain a physically identical kangaroo, 
and tha t kangaroo will autom atically be alive. (1996b: 35)
So, given the characterization and examples, it is evident that Chalmers’ notion o f logical 
supervenience is an ontological notion that applies to what I call the broadly physical. A good 
example is the supervenience o f shape. If  we take eight cubes and stack them  two by two by two, 
then we get another cube.
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According to Chalmers’ terminology, logical supervenience and reductive explanation (Cf. chapter 
one) imply each other: if a property is logically supervenient it can be reductively explained, and if 
it is reductively explainable, then it has to  be logically supervenient (1996b: 47-50). Since a 
property is reductively explainable if it can be analyzed functionally, which is an analysis in terms 
o f the causal powers o f the property (1996b: 44): logically supervenient properties have causal 
powers. This is no t the case with merely naturally supervenient properties.
2.2 natural supervenience
Chalmers distinguishes logical from  natural supervenience. Just as logical supervenience, natural 
supervenience also is an ontological notion. Chalmers starts by saying that “[t]here can be 
supervenience w ithout logical supervenience“ (1996b: 36). This is natural supervenience, which 
he characterizes as follows.
In  general, B-properties supervene naturally on A -properties if any two naturally possible situations
w ith the sam e A -properties have the sam e B -properties. (1996b: 36)
We can have both logical and natural supervenience at the same time. Given the definition o f 
natural supervenience, we can have a situation that actually holds in our world. Chalmers’ 
position about phenom enal consciousness is that it does no t supervene logically: it supervenes 
only naturally. “W here we have natural supervenience without logical supervenience, I will say 
that we have mere natural supervenience.” (1996b: 37)
Since Chalmers wants to show that phenom enal consciousness is such a merely naturally 
supervenient property, he cannot use it as an example to  elucidate the notion. But we can use it 
to see what Chalmers wants to demonstrate. He uses different thought-experim ents to support 
his claim that phenom enal consciousness is merely naturally supervenient, among which are the 
two scenario’s in which our counterparts in a physical duplicate o f our world have altered 
(inverted) phenom enal consciousness (1996b: 99-101) or (2) have no phenom enal consciousness 
(1996b: 94-99). Let us call the worlds wj, w2 and w3, respectively our world, the inverted world and 
the zombie world. All these worlds are microphysically identical duplicates o f each other, which 
means that all the broadly physical properties are also the same, for they supervene logically in 
every world. In w2 phenom enal experiences are inverted and in w3 they are absent. So, merely 
naturally supervenient properties can be different or absent in another physically identical world.
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(T) B-properties supervene merely naturally on A-properties only if for any three 
worlds wj, w2 and w3 identical with respect to  their A-properties, it is possible 
tha t the B-properties that are present in wj are different in w2 or absent in world 
w3. In other words, merely naturally supervenient B-properties can vary 
independently o f their subvenient A-properties across worlds.
This characterization can be used as a test to  evaluate w hether a property X  is merely naturally 
supervenient. I f  it is, it has to  be a E-property that can vary across worlds, even though the 
properties on which it supervenes remain constant.
The reason that there is variety in phenom enal properties between the three worlds is that there 
are different sets o f physical-phenomenal laws in these worlds. Chalmers calls these laws 
psychophysical laws, but those would be laws between the physical and the psychological. But 
according to  Chalmers the psychological is logically supervenient on the physical, hence 
psychophysical laws cannot apply to phenom enal properties. In other words, Chalmers argues 
that the phenomenal falls outside what I call the broadly physical domain, while he claims that 
psychological features are broadly physical. Psychophysical laws evidently apply to  the broadly 
physical domain. Hence, these laws cannot apply to  the phenomenal. W hat he needs are (broadly) 
physical-phenomenal laws.
In our world there are physical properties, our physical laws and set #  1 o f physical-phenomenal 
laws. In the inverted phenom enal consciousness world this latter set is displaced by set #  2 and in 
the zombie world such a set is absent. These different sets determine how the phenom enal is 
dependent on the physical world. This is where Chalmers differs from  Descartes: according to 
Chalmers the phenom enal world (if it exists in a world w j is always dependent on the physical 
world, so ghosts -  who are totally independent o f m atter -  cannot exist. According to Descartes 
ghost can exist (1642: 91) and m atter can exist w ithout the res cogitans resulting in his substance 
dualism. Since Chalmers makes the phenom enal dependent on the physical, he clearly is no t a 
substance dualist. He calls himself a property dualist, where the two sets o f properties he is 
talking about are ontologically alm ost as different as D escartes’ two substances. The property 
dualism (or better pluralism) I defend is quite different from  this property dualism, for mine is a 
variety o f monism: all different properties belong to  one domain -  the broadly physical Cf- 
chapter one). If  I were to agree on Chalmers’ terminology I would claim that phenomenal 
properties are logically supervenient on the physical, ju st as biological or chemical properties are.
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I will argue that this is w hat Chalmers also should claim if he takes his distinction seriously and 
remains a realist about phenom enal consciousness.
From  Chalmers’ account o f logical and natural supervenience, it follows that merely naturally 
supervenient properties cannot be reductively explained for ontological reasons: the same A- 
properties can be the subvenient base o f different (or no) B-properties. This is w hat (T) 
expresses. A nother way o f putting it is this: since (T) states that similar A-properties can obtain 
across worlds, with or w ithout certain B-properties that supervene on the A-properties, the B- 
properties can neither be reduced to  nor be reductively explained by the A-properties; the B- 
properties are fundam ental properties. Here we have properties that at first sight have a strange 
ontological status: they are both supervenient and fundamental. They are supervenient for they 
are dependent on broadly physical properties and they are fundam ental because they cannot be 
reductively explained. The latter also implies that -  contrary to fundamental properties that are 
no t supervenient -  they cannot have causal powers, for if supervenient properties had causal 
powers they could be reductively explained. So (T) can be extended in the following way:
(T) B-properties supervene merely naturally on A-properties only if for any three 
worlds wj, w2 and w3 identical with respect to their A-properties, it is possible 
tha t the B-properties that are present in wj are different in w2 or absent in world 
w3. In other words, merely naturally supervenient B-properties can vary 
independently o f their subvenient A-properties across worlds. These B- 
properties cannot be reductively explained, hence can have no causal powers.
2.3 two kinds of supervenient properties
According to  Chalmers there is no such thing as mere logical supervenience: logical 
supervenience implies natural supervenience. “If  any two logically possible situations with the 
sam e A-properties have the same B-properties, then any two naturally possible situations will 
also.” (1996b: 37) This means that we seem  to have but two options: either a supervenient 
property is logically and naturally supervenient, or the property is no t logically but merely 
naturally supervenient. Things, however, are no t this simple for Chalmers is no t clear about the 
status o f physical laws.
2.4 an ambiguity concerning physical laws
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There is a problem  concerning the status o f physical laws. Chalmers is highly ambiguous about 
w hether they are part o f the physical facts or not, hence w hether or n o t they are part o f the 
subvenient base o f higher-order properties.
It is also useful to  stipulate that the w orld ’s physical facts include its basic physical laws. O n  som e 
accounts, these laws are already determ ined by the totality o f particular physical facts, bu t we cannot 
take this fo r granted. (1996b: 33)
The problem  is that he som etim es includes them  (as in the kangaroo example, Cf. supra), 
som etim es excludes them  (as we will see in a m oment) depending on w hat suits him. W hat are 
the consequences o f either option for Chalmers’ theory?
If  physical laws like the gas law do belong to  the subvenient base, then the pressure o f a mole o f 
gas with volume x  and tem perature y  in world wj cannot be different from  the pressure o f a gas 
with the same volume and the same tem perature in a duplicate world w2. O n this account the 
pressure o f a mole o f gas is logically supervenient on its volume and tem perature.
As we saw in section 2.1 Chalmers explains logical supervenience using the example o f biological 
properties that supervene on physical properties: if the physical properties are fixed, so are the 
biological. A physical duplicate o f a living kangaroo in a physical duplicate world will be a living 
kangaroo. This presupposes that the physical laws are included in the subvenient base. I f  they are 
no t then the physical duplicate o f the kangaroo m ight well be dead.
If  physical laws like the gas law do not belong to the subvenient base, then the pressure o f a mole o f 
gas with volume x  and tem perature y  in world wj m ight be different from  the pressure o f a mole 
o f gas with the same volume and the same tem perature in a duplicate world w2. Since now  it is 
logically possible for the A-facts to  hold w ithout the B-fact (the pressure in wj), the gas law 
scenario cannot be an example o f logical supervenience given Chalmers’ characterization o f it. 
So, if the physical laws do not belong to  the subvenient base, then the pressure o f a mole o f gas 
can vary independently o f the facts on which it supervenes, hence it passes (T). O n this account 
of physical laws, then, the pressure o f a mole o f gas is a merely naturally supervenient property. 
This is precisely the example Chalmers uses to  explain this notion.
In  the actual world, w henever there is a mole o f gas at a given tem perature and volum e, its pressure 
will be determ ined: it is empirically im possible tha t tw o distinct moles o f gas could have th e  sam e 
tem perature and volum e, bu t different pressure. It follow s that the pressure o f  a mole o f gas 
supervenes on its tem perature and volum e in a certain sense. (In this example I am  taking the class 
o f  A -properties to  be m uch narrow er than  the class o f  physical p roperties, fo r reasons that will
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becom e clear.) But this supervenience is w eaker than  logical supervenience. It is logically possible 
that a mole o f gas w ith a given tem perature and volum e might have a d ifferent pressure; im agine a 
w orld in w hich the gas constant K  is larger or smaller, fo r example. Rather, it is ju s t a fact o f nature 
that there is this correlation.
This is an example o f natural supervenience o f one p roperty  on others: in this instance, 
pressure supervenes naturally on tem perature, volum e, and the property  o f being a mole o f gas.”
(1996b: 36)
In sum, when Chalmers presents us the kangaroo example to explain the notion o f logical 
supervenience, the physical laws are included in the physical facts, when he presents the gas law 
example to explain the notion o f natural supervenience the physical laws are excluded. Chalmers, 
then is ambiguous as to w hether or n o t the physical laws are included in the physical facts. This 
presents him  with the following dilemma.
Chalmers’ first option would be to claim that the physical laws do no t belong to  the physical 
facts. This would imply that the kangaroo example is wrong, for a physical duplicate o f a 
kangaroo m ight no t be alive, ju st as a physical duplicate o f a mole o f gas with temperature x  and 
volume y, m ight no t have the pressure it has in the world that is a physical duplicate our world. 
This would make all broadly physical properties merely naturally supervenient.
Chalmers’ second choice is to  claim that the physical laws do belong to  the physical facts. This 
would imply that the gas law example is wrong, for a physical duplicate o f a mole o f gas under 
the same circumstances would have to  have the same pressure, for duplication o f the physical 
facts would also duplicate the physical laws.
Since physical laws are either physical facts or not, Chalmers has to make a choice. I believe that 
he would choose that the physical facts include the physical laws. There are two reasons for this. 
The first reason is that it only conflicts with the gas law example and does no t give up the 
usefulness o f the distinction between logical and natural supervenience as ontological notions. 
Choosing for the first option would precisely give up this distinction, for in that case all 
supervenient properties are merely naturally supervenient, leaving no room  for logical 
supervenience as an ontological notion. Everyone then would readily agree that phenom enal 
consciousness is a natural supervenient property. (O f course logical supervenience as a 
conceptual notion would still hold for those cases that belong to  the dom ain o f m athematics and 
logic, but that is no t the way these notions are used: Chalmers chooses his examples o f logical 
and natural supervenience in the domains o f the physical, chemical, biological, psychological and 
phenomenal, no t in the domains o f the mathematical and logical.)
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2.5 there are no examples of mere natural supervenience in the broadly physical domain
The second reason is that including the physical laws in the physical facts is coherent with 
Chalmers’ views on reductive explanation, while excluding them  is not. According to  Chalmers 
only logical supervenient properties can be reductively explained (1996b: 48). Including the 
physical laws in the subvenient base is necessary for a reductive explanation o f -  say -  pressure, 
for if one does not, one cannot explain how a certain pressure is realized by its subvenient base, 
for the same subvenient base can exist w ithout the supervenient property. This comes down to 
saying that in the broadly physical dom ain there cannot be any examples o f mere natural 
supervenience, a claim Chalmers seems to be sympathetic to for he says that: “it is hard to  find 
cases o f natural supervenience on the set o f physical properties w ithout logical supervenience.” 
(1996b: 37) Furtherm ore, he suggest that: “[m]odulo conscious experience, all phenom ena are 
logically supervenient on the physical.” (1996b: 76)
In sum, I have argued that Chalmers’ notion o f logical supervenience is no t a conceptual but an 
ontological notion, and that physical laws should be included in the subvenient physical facts, for 
otherwise every supervenient property would become naturally supervenient. This is supported 
by Chalmers’ views on reductive explanation and his remarks on finding examples o f mere 
natural supervenience. Given this, examples o f mere natural supervenience can only be found 
outside the dom ain o f the broadly physical. In the next section I will show that such examples are 
no t intelligible.
2.6 there are no intelligible examples of merely naturally supervenient properties outside
the broadly physical domain
The fact that there are no examples o f mere natural supervenience in the broadly physical domain 
does no t mean that there are no examples o f such properties at all. There m ight be examples 
outside this domain. To be sure, that is exactly what Chalmers wants to prove: phenom enal 
consciousness is a property that is both (1) nonphysical and (2) merely naturally supervenient on 
the physical. Since Chalmers would like to  prove this, he is no t in a position to  use phenom enal 
consciousness as an example o f how a property can be merely naturally supervenient. W hat other 
kind o f properties m ight be used as examples o f this notion? I will argue that there are no other 
examples, for we cannot know them: epistemic access to  a property requires a causal relation 
between the knower and the property known. Merely naturally supervenient properties cannot be 
known, for they have no causal powers. This means that in the following section I will have to 
discuss whether it makes sense that phenom enal consciousness is the only merely naturally
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supervenient property that is epistemically accessible, via som ething else than a causal 
connection. I will evaluate Chalmers answer, that this epistemic relation is acquaintance.
Let us suppose -  for the sake o f argum ent -  that there are ectoplasmatic entities that supervene 
merely naturally on som e physical property, say pineal glands, in a world w2 physically identical to 
our world w1. Furthermore, suppose that ectoplasmatic entities do no t supervene in our world, 
and that in both worlds hum ans are phenomenally conscious. T o pass (T) ectoplasmatic entities 
have to  be fundam ental properties in the sense described above: they are dependent on the 
physical for their existence, bu t can neither be reduced to  nor reductively explained by the 
physical. W hat is im portant here, is that they cannot have any causal influence on the world in 
which they supervene: if a supervenient property has any causal influence on its subvenient base, 
then it has to  be a logically supervenient property, for then a reductive explanation is possible (Cf. 
supra).
This demand has its implications for a theory o f knowledge. I believe that a causal theory of 
knowledge is correct: to  have knowledge about any property there has to  be a causal chain 
between the property known and the person w ho knows that property. A causal theory o f 
knowledge together with the dem and -  in order to  pass (T) -  that the ontologically real 
ectoplasmatic entities o f world w2 are causally inefficacious, implies that the hum ans in the world 
with these entities cannot know that ectoplasmatic entities exist or that they supervene merely 
naturally on some property in their world. So, there has to be another way o f gaining knowledge 
if Chalmers wants to stick to  his claim that phenom enal consciousness is a merely naturally 
supervenient property that is known.
Chalmers indeed explicitly rejects the causal theory for things that we do know for certain (1996b: 
193-196) and claims that we are immediate acquainted with our phenom enal experiences (1996b: 
196-198). This direct acquaintance is a noncausal relation between thing known and the knower. 
Let us for the sake o f argum ent accept that we are able to  have knowledge by means o f an 
immediate, noncausal, acquaintance relation. Is accepting acquaintance a way to  show that 
phenom enal consciousness passes (T)? I will argue that it is not.
In Chalmers’ theory judgm ents and knowledge states belong to t the domain o f psychological 
consciousness (1996b: 26). Psychological consciousness is causally efficacious, logically 
supervenient and reductively explainable. This means that a change in knowledge state cannot
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occur without a change in subvenient base (if it would, that would be passing (T) and the 
knowledge state would be merely naturally supervenient).
Gaining knowledge about a merely naturally supervenient property evidently is a change in 
knowledge state, hence a change in subvenient base. What caused this change? It cannot be a 
phenomenal experience, since all phenomenal experiences are causally inefficacious. The cause 
had to be something else, something physical. This means that in any physical duplicate of the 
world that contains the merely naturally supervenient property, this change would also occur, 
even if the merely naturally supervenient property is not present. This would mean that if our 
physical duplicates of w2 claim to have knowledge of merely naturally supervenient properties like 
ectoplasmatic entities, we should claim this too. However, humans do not claim to have 
knowledge of any merely naturally supervenient properties, with the exception of phenomenal 
consciousness. This implies for all alleged naturally supervenient properties other than 
phenomenal consciousness either that:
(1) they do not exist at all. This would indeed explain that we are not claiming to know that 
ectoplasmatic entities exist. This would render the notion useless.
O r
(2) that they do exist but cannot be known at all. This also renders the notion useless, for we will 
never be able to pick out a property in our world to apply the notion to.
2.7 is there a knowable merely naturally supervenient property after all?
The only option for Chalmers left is to claim that the only nonphysical merely naturally 
supervenient property that can be known is phenomenal consciousness. The way we have 
epistemic access to phenomenal consciousness has to be a special -  noncausal -  way. Chalmers 
indeed claims that this epistemic relation is such a special relation, which he calls acquaintance. 
This way of looking at it, is the only way in which the notion of mere natural supervenience can 
be useful. So far, there is no real problem for Chalmers, for he only needs to show that 
phenomenal consciousness is merely naturally supervenient. The fact that there can be no other 
examples does not really matter: he even seems to agree that phenomenal consciousness is the 
only merely naturally supervenient property (çf. supra). However, this leads to the problem of 
phenomenal judgment.
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2.8 the problem of phenomenal judgment
The problem of phenomenal judgment is the following. We just saw that the alleged merely 
naturally supervenient properties are causally irrelevant to the judgments and knowledge states 
about them. Since the only candidate for a merely naturally supervenient property left is 
phenomenal consciousness, this is only a problem for knowledge states and judgments about 
phenomenal consciousness. “[I]t seems that consciousness is explanatory irrelevant to our claims 
and judgments about consciousness. This result I call the paradox of phenomenal judgm ent.” 
(1996b: 177)
Chalmers frames the problem in terms of explanation. But the idea of course is that since 
phenomenal consciousness is merely naturally supervenient it cannot be reductively explained for 
ontological reasons: it has no causal efficacy, and reductive explanations are only possible for 
properties that do have causal efficacy. The problem with both causal and explanatory irrelevancy 
of phenomenal consciousness for phenomenal judgments is the question: how can they qualify as 
knowledge, for zombies make the same phenomenal judgments, but we would not qualify these 
as knowledge? (1996b: 192)
2.9 the problem ofjustification of phenomenal judgments
Chalmers explicitly puts the problem of the causal irrelevancy of phenomenal consciousness aside 
(1996b: 177) and tries to show how phenomenal experiences are relevant to phenomenal 
judgments: they justify them. In this way Chalmers tries to save phenomenal judgment from not 
qualifying as knowledge in our case. In the case of the zombie of course, their judgments are not 
justified: “But surely his [the zombie’s] judgments are not justified at all. After all, they are utterly 
and systematically false.” (1996b: 192)
There are two problems with this problem of justification of phenomenal beliefs. The first is that 
it functions as a decoy: it tries to divert our attention from the real problem, which is how we can 
have knowledge of phenomenal experiences if they do not have any causal efficacy, while a 
knowledge state belongs to the broadly physical domain, hence has to have a broadly physical 
cause. The real problem for Chalmers then is to show how acquaintance can solve the problem 
of phenomenal judgment. As long as he does not do that, we have no reason to believe that 
phenomenal consciousness is any different from other alleged merely naturally supervenient 
properties: if it exist it cannot be known. Since it exists and we do know it, the theory has to be
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false and will not be saved by invoking a mysterious relationship: introducing a mystery does not 
turn a contradiction into a paradox.
The second problem is that Chalmers cannot avoid the problem, for he tries to push objective 
criteria into subjective epistemology, which is both a fallacy and leads him straight back to the 
problem of phenomenal judgment. I will first show that his account of the justification of 
phenomenal judgments is an objective account, which he then presents as subjective. After that it 
will also be clear that this account leads back to the problem he tried to bypass earlier.
2.10 the fallacy and backfire
What justifies our phenomenal judgments? Chalmers says it is having the experiences that justifies 
the beliefs. “[T]he fact that I have a red experience now provides justification for my belief that I 
am having a red experience.” (1996b: 196) He calls this relation “acquaintance” and claims that it 
is an intimate epistemic relation to the experience (1996b: 197).
I agree that -  seen from an objective point of view -  the having of conscious experiences makes the 
phenomenal judgments true. But justification of one’s own judgments is not an objective matter. 
Let me give some examples. It is the unicorn in Africa that makes my claim that there is a 
unicorn in Africa true. It is the existence of god that makes Descartes’ claim that god exists true. 
These are truth conditions. But in order to use the truth of one’s claims to justify them, subjective 
knowledge that the truth conditions are satisfied is needed. The problem, then, is to know the 
facts that can be used to justify the claims. For me to know that there is a unicorn it is not 
enough that there is a unicorn, but I must also have an epistemic relation to the unicorn. But I 
have never seen a unicorn, nor do I stand in any other epistemic relation to unicorns. So I cannot 
know that my claim is true: I can only state the truth conditions and I do not know whether these 
conditions are satisfied. Similarly, when Chalmers says that it is the having of conscious 
experiences that justifies his phenomenal judgments he is stating the truth conditions. He needs 
to show that he also knows that the truth conditions are satisfied and how he knows this, just as I 
would have to do if I were to claim that I know that unicorns exist.
The implication of the difference between knowing what the truth conditions are and knowing 
that they are satisfied, is that Chalmers does not solve any problem by saying that:
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To note  that in a different case the belief might have been form ed in the absence o f the evidence is 
no t to  say that the evidence does no t justify the belief in this case. I know  that I am  conscious, and 
the know ledge is based solely on my im m ediate experience. (1996b: 198)
At first sight Chalmers seems to get things right here: to justify one’s judgments, one at least 
needs to know that the truth conditions are satisfied. However, this is not the case, for the 
judgment that needs to be justified is “I know I am phenomenally conscious” which can only be 
justified by explaining how one knows that the truth conditions are satisfied. Just stating that one 
knows this is a trick. What happens here is that Chalmers tries to justify his phenomenal 
judgment “I am phenomenally consciousness” with the phenomenal judgment “I am 
phenomenally consciousness.”
Here, the problem of phenomenal judgment comes back to haunt him, for a zombie would make 
exactly the same claim. In order for this phenomenal judgment to be true, knowledge that its 
truth conditions are satisfied is needed. This means we have to know that we are conscious. Now 
we are back were we started: how do we know we are conscious? Chalmers’ alleged solution, then, 
is question begging: The question how we know we are phenomenally conscious, cannot be 
solved by answering that we have knowledge that we are phenomenally conscious. What is 
needed is a specification of how we gain such subjective knowledge. According to Chalmers the 
answer is that we know this by acquaintance. He does not even begin to specify this notion. This is 
not acceptable: the relation should be specified. I do not see how this can be done. If the paradox 
cannot be solved, then the conclusion has to be that it is not a paradox but a contradiction, hence 
that Chalmers’ theory just cannot be right.
The problem with Chalmers’ solution is not the same as the iteration problem. The iteration 
problem is that if one asks how someone knows something, he has to answer the question how he 
knows that, etc. If the problem of the return of the paradox of phenomenal judgment were this 
problem, it would be very unfair to challenge Chalmers on this point. Chalmers’ problem is 
worse. He has no explanation how we might have knowledge of a naturally supervenient property 
in the first place. A theory of consciousness that accepts a causal relation between properties and 
the intentional states about these properties has at least a specified relation that is able to solve 
this problem in principle. Chalmers has to specify the acquaintance relation, for it is presented as 
a relation that is constitutive for knowledge of phenomenal states. At this moment Chalmers has 
not done so. We all should just believe that an utterly mysterious epistemic relation called 
“acquaintance” will solve the problem of phenomenal consciousness.
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2.11 leaving the problem of phenomenal judgment unsolved
However, let us again grant Chalmers all the benefit of the doubt, and keep the A-facts of both 
our world and the zombie world identical. This leaves the problem of phenomenal judgment 
unsolved; it is a challenge Chalmers has to take up at some other time. We know that we are 
conscious, and zombies do not know that. This leads to an even weirder scenario. The zombie 
claims to know that he is conscious, but ex hypothesi he is not. Since -  according to Chalmers -  a 
knowledge state is a physical state, zombies must find out that they are not conscious, in the very 
same way that they (and we) find out they have no knowledge of ectoplasmatic entities or any 
other naturally supervenient property.
Since having knowledge is a psychological state, it can be the cause of an action, like uttering: 
“Hmm! Something strange just happened! I claim to know that I am conscious, that I have direct 
acquaintance with my conscious experiences. What do I mean by that?” I do not see any reason 
to keep the zombies from refraining to asking this question. In answering this question they will 
pretty soon find out that their knowledge claim was false: they do not know that they are 
conscious. Both this knowledge state and the utterance change the A-facts of the zombie world. 
To keep conscious experiences naturally supervenient, our world has to change accordingly. But we 
never find ourselves baffled like the zombies do that we claim to have knowledge of conscious 
experiences that we know we do not have. This leads to just one conclusion: the zombie world is 
not A-fact-identical to our world, hence consciousness cannot be merely naturally supervenient, 
for the subvenient base changes with the supervenient properties: phenomenal consciousness fails (T).
2.12 there are no knowable merely naturally supervenient properties
So, the alleged possibility of knowledge of a particular merely naturally supervenient property 
shows that the property cannot be merely naturally supervenient. This means that the last 
property that might have been known to be so cannot in fact be known to be merely naturally 
supervenient. This leads to the following conclusion. If we have knowledge of a supervenient 
property, it has to be a logically supervenient property. This conclusion has two aspects. The first 
is an epistemic one: since we will never be able to know  that a particular property is merely naturally 
supervenient, the notion of merely natural supervenience is useless, for it would only be useful if 
we were able to attribute it to particular properties. The second part of the conclusion is 
ontological: any property that is known has to be either logically supervenient or fundamental.3
3 T his raises the question  w hether these fundam ental properties might be naturally supervenient. T he answ er is no. 
F irst, all naturally supervenient properties have to  be fundam ental by definition, b u t th is does n o t m ean that 
fundam ental p roperties are naturally supervenient, for I take it that m ost fundam ental p roperties are just
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Known merely naturally supervenient properties do not exist. Since phenomenal consciousness is 
a property that is known, it cannot be merely naturally supervenient. The further implication is 
that it has to be logically supervenient, which in turn implies that it has to be reductively 
explainable, and that it is not a fundamental property of our world.
We are now in a position to say that the most frequently used argument for dualism is false and 
that the most recent version of tough property dualism is incoherent, which provides us with 
good reason not to believe in the truth of dualism, even though most people live in cultures that 
do so. Tough property dualism is no longer a threat to a scientific solution of the problem of 
phenomenal consciousness. This does not mean that we now can go on and try to solve the 
problem, for there are also arguments thought up by agnostic and monist views that purport to 
show that a scientific solution is not possible. I will discuss the agnostic argument in chapter five 
and the monist argument in chapter six.
fundam ental and no t supervenien t in any way. Secondly, if we w ould have know ledge o f a fundam ental p roperty  tha t 
is naturally supervenient, then  this know ledge state changes the A-facts (the o ther fundam ental p roperties on  w hich 
this know ledge state supervenes logically). H ence the fundam ental p roperty  has to  be an A -fact too.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NO  HARSH DEMANDS
In this chapter I will address the related arguments of Thomas Nagel (1974) and Frank Jackson 
(1982; 1986) that both purport to show that a physicalist theory leaves phenomenal 
consciousness out, whether it is at present, as Nagel argues, or permanently, as Jackson claims. 
Evidently these arguments need to be addressed for if physicalism indeed leaves phenomenal 
experiences out, we should either opt for Jackson’s view that a scientific solution cannot be given 
ever, or for Nagel’s view, that we should be agnostic about the possibility of ever solving the 
problem, and that we cannot do this right now.
Nagel’s and Jackson’s arguments are related for they both demand that a theory of consciousness 
should tell us what it is like to have phenomenal experiences such as the experiences of red or of what it 
is like to be a bat. John Locke wrote in his A n  Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) that
A stud ious blind m an, w ho had mightily beat his head ab o u t visible objects, and m ade use o f the 
explication o f his books and friends to  understand those nam es of light and colours w hich often 
cam e in his way, bragged one day, tha t he now  understood  w hat scarlet signified. U pon  w hich his 
friend dem anding, w hat scarlet was? T he blind m an answ ered, It was like the sound  o f a trum pet.
(Book III, C hapter IV, Section 11)
If a theory about consciousness a theory of phenomenal consciousness should tell us what 
certain experiences are like, the theory should be able to tell the blind man what it is to see scarlet 
without invoking sensations of other sensory modules. However, on this point I side with Gerald 
Edelman and Guilio Tononi (2000) that this demand is just too strong.
What is the problem that Thomas Nagel (1974) and Frank Jackson (1982) bring to our attention? 
Basically they argue that a physical theory leaves the most important thing out, viz. what is it like 
to have an experience of a certain kind, or more general what it is like to be an experiencing 
subject. N ot everyone agrees that this should be or even can be the goal of a theory of 
consciousness.
N o am ount o f description will ever be able to  account fully fo r a subjective experiences, no m atter 
how  accurate that description may be. Many philosophers have used the example o f color to  make 
their point. N o  scientific description o f the neural m echanism s o f color discrim ination, even if it is 
perfectly satisfactory, will make you understand  what i t  feels like  to  perceive a particular color. 
(Edelm an & T ononi 2000: 11)
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One might feel that evidently the demand is too strong, and that neither Nagel nor Jackson really 
demand that a theory should give us the knowledge what it is like to be a bat, to see color or to 
hear a trumpet. Yet, the following quote from Nagel really makes this strong demand:
T hough presum ably it w ould no t capture everything, [the goal o f an objective phenom enology] 
would be to  describe, at least in part, the subjective character o f experience in a form  
com prehensible to  beings incapable o f having those experiences. (1974: 449)
Earlier in the same article this strong demand is also expressed by Nagel when he says “I want to 
know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. (1974: 439)4 Since no description can ever meet this 
demand, Nagel’s conclusion is that we cannot understand how physicalism can be true, even if it is 
true: we lack the right concepts to link those that refer to the subjective to those that refer to the 
objective (1974: 446).
M issing every shade o f blue
Once, Jackson went even further. He claimed that based on the fact that a physicalist theory 
cannot meet the demand physicalism has to be false (1986: 295).5 This argument is know as the 
knowledge argument and makes use of the following scenario. Consider Mary, a brilliant scientist 
grew up in a black and white room, which we might call the Jackson-room (Perry 2001: 19). 
Leaving aside practical issues of how to hide the color of her skin and prevent her from bleeding 
when she cuts herself, this thought-experiment assumes that she has never had an experience of 
any color besides white, black and shades of gray. Furthermore, it is supposed that we have a 
complete physical theory of colors, and that Mary knows this theory. So, Mary knows every 
physical fact there is to know about colors, but she still does not know what it is like to experience 
blue. She gains this piece of knowledge when one sunny day she leaves the Jackson-room and 
looks at the sky. Since she already knew all the physical facts about colors, the new knowledge what 
it is like to experience blue cannot be knowledge of a physical fact about colors, hence even a 
complete physical theory of colors leaves something out, viz. the phenomenal feel. Hence, 
physicalism stands refuted (Jackson 1982, 1986; Chalmers 1996b; Gertler 2000). My view on 
Jackson’s knowledge argument is quite simple: the premise that Mary has all the knowledge about
4 A lthough Nagel has made this phrase famous, Brian Farrell actually used the same phrase to  poin t out the essential 
p rob lem  o f consciousness: “I w onder w hat it w ould be like to  be, and hear like, a b a t.” (1950: 183)
5 In  his From Metaphysics to Ethics (1988) Jackson has given up this line o f argum ent, as too  speculative: we should no t 
give our “in tu itions about possibilities too  big a place in determ ining w hat the w orld is like.” (1998: 43-44). T his is 
why Jackson now  has d o u b ts  ab o u t the know ledge argum ent.
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the physical facts is simply wrong: she lacks some of the knowledge of some fact that concerns the 
broadly physical domain. Let us reconstruct the argument schematically:
(1) If physicalism is right, there are no facts other than the physical facts;
(2) Mary knows all the physical facts about colors;
(3) When leaving the Jackson-room Mary gains knowledge about facts concerning colors;
(4) The additional facts are nonphysical facts about colors [from (2) and (3)];
(5) Physicalism is false [from (1) and (4)].
As we have seen Jackson accepts that a physicalist may include in the ontology all the properties 
that supervene on the fundamental level (Cf. chapter one). Hence, we can interpret this as 
follows: physicalism entails the claim that all broadly physical facts can be objectively described 
and then learned by scientist like Mary. It is here that the problem lies. Let me explain by adding 
someone to the scenario. Suppose Mary had a twin-sister, Mary-Ann, just as brilliant as Mary, 
who grew up in an environment where she was allowed to experience colors. Mary-Ann had the 
same interest in colors, and has read everything about colors. There is not a thing about colors 
Mary knows that Mary-Ann does not know (but not vice versa). After having studied every book 
about colors, they gain interest in some philosophical problems about them. They discuss 
Hume’s problem of the missing shade of blue. O f course Mary-Ann knows what it is like to 
experience Hume’s missing shade of blue. Mary-Ann wants her sister to know what that is like 
and writes her a letter (in black ink on a white sheet of paper), describing the missing shade of 
blue, concluding that: “this is Hume’s missing shade of blue.” As we all know, this can’t be done, 
and Mary will still miss every shade of blue. Demanding that a physical theory can do exactly this 
is absurd. It is analogous to demanding from a theory about liquidity not only that it describes 
what it is and when it occurs, but also that it actually constitutes liquidity. So, I agree 
wholeheartedly with Edelman and Tononi as they say that
Scientific explanations provide the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a ph en o m en o n  to  
take place, can explain the phenom enon’s properties, and can even explain why the phenom enon 
only takes place under those conditions. But no scientific description or explanation can substitu te 
for the real thing. (2000: 12)
Trying to explain what it is to experience red to a congenitally blind man, therefore, will never 
work: “objective phenomenology” (Nagel 1974: 449) is a contradiction in terms. Hence Nagel is 
wrong when he says that the development of an objective phenomenology should not start by 
trying to make humans understand bat-experiences, but by trying to explain to a person blind
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from birth what it is like to see. He is right however when he says that the analogy “Red is like 
the sound of a trum pet” is of little use. “That should be clear to anyone who has both heard a 
trumpet and seen red.” (1974: 449)
In sum, both the argument of Nagel and that of Jackson make the demand that a physicalist 
theory should tell us what it is like to be an experiencing subject. Since this demand is too strong 
the consequence that (we cannot understand how) a physicalist theory cannot be right does not 
follow.
Even though the demand that a theory about phenomenal experience should tell Mary or a blind 
man what it is like to see red is too strong, what should we say about real facts that cannot be 
described within a broadly physicalist framework? I believe that the solution lies in the rejection 
of premise two and that we should say that Mary does not know all the facts. She does not know what 
it is like to experience red, which is a (broadly) physical fact. This does not imply that a physicalist 
science cannot study these facts: it just means that they cannot be described in a manner that they 
are constituted in someone’s head by reading the description. That they can be studied within a 
broadly physicalist framework will be shown in chapters six through eleven.
To put it another way: it is a mistake to think that all broadly physical facts are objective. Surely, it 
is an objective fact that you have phenomenal experiences, but it is also an objective fact that 
these experiences have a subjective feel. How  this feels like is something that can never be 
described in objective terms for that would constitute the phenomenal experience, but that is not 
what a theory should do: it should explain in objective terms why you have subjective 
experiences. That is something that is -  in principle -  not a problem for a broadly physicalist 
theory.
Having refuted the main argument for tough dualism, dualism itself and the famous arguments of 
Nagel and Jackson there is just one more argument that needs to be refuted: the argument from 
Colin McGinn, who agrees that there is nothing mysterious about consciousness, that the 
problem of consciousness can in principle be solved, but that we are just not smart enough to do 
so. I will turn to this argument in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX 
T H E NATURAL M ETHO D
In the preceding chapters I argued against dualist and agnostic positions that claim that there is 
no physicalist solution to the problem of phenomenal consciousness. But even within a monistic, 
naturalistic framework there are problems as Colin McGinn (1991) points out, for we might be 
cognitively closed for certain properties and theories. In this chapter I will briefly present McGinn’s 
reason for thinking that the scientific problem of consciousness cannot be solved. After this I 
will present Owen Flanagan’s natural method that is both an explicit answer to McGinn’s 
argument and the way I believe we might -  step by step -  solve the problem of phenomenal 
consciousness.
1. anti-constructive naturalism
McGinn is a noumenal naturalist. That is, he believes that consciousness is a natural phenomenon 
that could -  in principle -  be explained by a naturalistic, scientific theory. But, so McGinn argues, 
our cognitive capacities are too limited to understand this theory, just as a monkey’s cognitive 
capacities are insufficient to understand math, physics, or biology. The theory that describes how 
“technicolor phenomenology [can] arise from soggy gray m atter” (1991: 1) is cognitively 
inaccessible for humans but might be accessible to other beings with greater cognitive capacities. 
Even though he is a naturalist and realist about consciousness, he argues that we cannot 
construct a theory that explains it. This is McGinn’s anti-constructive naturalism. How does 
McGinn defend this position?
McGinn describes cognitive closure as follows.
“A type o f m ind M  is cognitively closed w ith respect to  a property P  (or theory T) if and only if the 
concept-form ing procedures at M ’s disposal cannot extend to  a grasp o f P  (or an understanding o f 
T )” (1991: 3)
For instance, a monkey’s mind will be closed to the property of being an electron. The same goes 
for humans and the mind-body relation: we cannot know the property P  (nor theory T  about it) 
instantiated by the brain in virtue of which the brain is the basis of consciousness.
McGinn argues that there are two ways of identifying P: (1) via introspection or (2) via neuroscience. 
Neither of them will lead to P . First of all, introspection does not reveal that consciousness is
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dependent upon anything physical: “Pure phenomenology will never provide the solution to the 
mind-body problem” (1991: 8). I have no problem with this claim.6
The claim that neuroscience cannot get us to P , starts with the fact that consciousness is not an 
observable property of a brain. McGinn also argues that P  also is an unobservable property of the 
brain. “I hereby invite you to try to conceive of a perceptual property of the brain that might allay 
the feeling of mystery that attends our contemplation of the mind-brain link.” (1991: 11, my 
italics) McGinn thinks we cannot do this, for we are equipped with the capacity to represent the 
spatial world, and spatial properties are the kind of properties that cannot do the job of 
explaining how consciousness arises from the brain. Therefore, he concludes that neither 
consciousness itself, nor P  can be perceived. But does this perceptual closure also lead to the 
cognitive closure of consciousness and P?
It is not true that generally perceptual closure implies cognitive closure, as McGinn rightly 
notices, for we cannot observe electrons, but can understand what they are. Using inference to 
the best explanation, we can come to know things that are unobservable, as long as they belong 
to the same kinds of things that we can observe. So, why should perceptual closure with respect 
to consciousness or P  entail cognitive closure? The answer is: because consciousness is not a 
physical property, and it was the physical properties we were designed (by evolution through 
natural selection) to understand. Since the domain of the physical is causally closed, we will never 
need to introduce the concept of consciousness to explain anything we observe in this domain, 
for everything physical has a physical explanation. This is the homogeneity constraint on concept 
introduction (1991: 12-13). Hence, McGinn concludes, we are cognitively closed with respect to 
how we could introduce the concept of consciousness in the physical domain. The same goes for 
property P: either P  is a physical property and we cannot see how it is responsible for 
consciousness, or we introduce P  as a nonphysical property, in which case we might as well have 
introduced consciousness itself.
The main idea is that the mental and the physical are described by two different registers of 
concepts. McGinn is in fact describing conscious inessentialism (Cf. chapter one): everything in 
the physical domain seems to be explainable without an appeal to consciousness. Hence, there is 
no need to introduce concepts that refer to it into a theory about human action.
6 “Prem ise (1) seem s to  me uncontroversially  right. C onsciousness reveals no th ing  abou t my brain, n o t even tha t I
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2. constructive naturalism
There are several ways to argue against McGinn. I will present three. First of all, McGinn uses a 
conceivability-strategy to convince us of his view. He asks us to try to conceive of a property of the 
brain that would remove the feeling that the mind-brain link is mysterious. This is strategy, as I 
showed in chapter three, does not lead us away from a mystery or an ignorant position: The fact 
that we are ignorant now does not imply that we will be ignorant forever. This point can be stressed 
by using two analogies that have been used to describe our ignorant situation concerning the 
mind-body theory. As just noted, McGinn compares us with monkeys trying to understand 
physics: they will never be able to do that. Thomas Nagel, however, seems a bit more optimistic 
and compares us to the ancient Greek who is told that matter is energy (1974: 447). I prefer this 
optimistic view.
The second argument comes from Owen Flanagan. He argues that McGinn’s homogeneity 
constraint is overly restrictive. How can McGinn claim that we may not introduce the concept of 
consciousness, when it has already been introduced? The mind-body problem precisely exists because 
both facts about brains and facts about consciousness are on the table. We want to explain these 
facts and their relation. If we would accept the homogeneity constraint, then this “would lead us 
back into the dark ages of science.” (1991: 340) Flanagan argues that we need reports of 
conscious experiences to see what has gone wrong in -  say -  blindsight cases. Blindsighted 
patients will claim not to see anything in a certain spatial area, but when forced to guess, their 
guesses show that they have preserved some of the capacity to pick up visual information of that 
area. The fact that they have lesions in area V1 of the visual cortex is a neurological fact that is 
used to explain why the conscious experience of vision is missing. So, it is strange to claim we 
should not use the concepts referring to conscious states when we are searching for scientific 
answers to consciousness problems.
The third argument is also from Flanagan. It starts with a counterclaim to McGinn: McGinn sees 
only two options -  introspection or neuroscience -  to solve the mind-body problem, thereby 
overlooking the method that might lead to a scientific solution: the natural method, which 
combines different methods. To show that McGinn is wrong indeed, Flanagan has to apply the 
natural method, solving the problem of consciousness bit by bit. In Consciousness Reconsidered 
Flanagan writes:
have one!” (Flanagan 1990: 337)
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This book is an attem pt to  make less puzzling the idea that consciousness is a natural phenom enon.
I p resen t a view o f consciousness tha t I call “constructive naturalism .” C onsciousness is a natural 
phenom enon, and we can construct a theory about its nature, form s, roles, and origins by blending 
insights from  phenom enology, psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and evolutionary 
biology. C onsciousness is neither m iraculous no r term inally m ysterious. (1992: xi)
So, all of Flanagan’s work in which he successfully develops his constructive naturalism can be 
taken as an argument to show that McGinn is wrong. As I said in chapter one, I expect that the 
solution to the problem of phenomenal consciousness is not one that can be written down in one 
book. I believe that much of the data about the brain, our psychological life, our behavior 
etcetera have to be gathered and we need to evaluate time and again what the relevance is to the 
problem of phenomenal consciousness. Flanagan’s natural method is an excellent way to evaluate 
these data.
3. the natural method
For the last decade Owen Flanagan has developed and used the natural method (e.g. 1992, 1995a, 
1995b, 2000). I am convinced that if we can solve the problem of phenomenal consciousness this 
method will do the job. The method is a multidisciplinary one: we should use phenomenology, 
cognitive science, and neurology to answer questions about consciousness. Additionally we 
should also make use of philosophy, evolutionary biology, psychiatry, anthropology and sociology 
if these disciplines provide answers to specific questions. I will present the natural method using 
one of Flanagan’s own examples: the splitting auditory attention.
On different occasions Flanagan describes the natural method as follows.
Start by treating three different lines o f analysis w ith equal respect. G ive phenom enology its due.
Listen carefully to  w hat individuals have to  say about how  things seem. Also, let the psychologist 
and cognitive scientists have their say. Listen carefully to  their description about how  m ental life 
w orks and w hat jo b s consciousness has, if any, in its overall econom y. Finally, listen carefully to 
w hat the neurologists say about how  conscious m ental events o f d ifferent sorts are realized, and 
examine the fit betw een their stories and the phenom enal and psychological stories. (1992: 11;
1995a: 1104; 1995b: 7-8)
4. splitting auditory attention
Flanagan uses the following experiment to show how the natural method works. Subjects are 
asked to pay attention to the left channel of a headphone. In this channel a sentence is presented, 
for instance: “the lieutenant put out the lantern to signal the attack.” This is a ambiguous 
sentence, for it might be interpreted either as (1) the lieutenant extinguished the flame of the 
lantern, or as (2) the lieutenant put the lantern outdoors.
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The phenomenology o f  splitting auditory attention
When there is only noise presented in the right channel of the headphone, subjects do not show a 
particular preference for any of these interpretations. However, if among the noise in the right 
channel the sentence “he extinguished the flame” is also presented, a preference for 
interpretation (1) is shown, even though subjects still claim not to have heard anything 
meaningful in the right channel.
Taking the phenomenology seriously, we need to explain how this report can be reconciled with our 
knowledge that we did vary only one condition -  the input of the right channel -  that clearly 
resulted in the preference for interpretation (1).
The psychology o f splitting auditory attention
A psychologist might come up with the following explanation. The sentence in the right channel 
never was conscious, which explains why subjects report that they have no memory of hearing it. 
The fact that the right channel sentence was relevant, then, has to be explained via unconscious 
processes that influence the processing of the target sentence.
An alternative psychological explanation might be that the right channel sentence was conscious, 
but not long enough to be remembered. This would also explain that subjects have no 
recollection of the sentence ever being conscious: they did not store that information. However, 
their recollection would be wrong. In this explanation the information presented at the right 
channel was consciously processed.
Here we have two psychological hypothesis that exclude each other and that are both coherent 
with the phenomenal data. These data then cannot help us in deciding which hypothesis (if any) 
is right. Hence, we need to gather more data.
The neurology o f  splitting auditory attention
How can we find out which one of these theories is right or that they both are wrong? Here 
neurology might help us. Crick and Koch (1990) have suggested that the groups of neurons that 
realize certain conscious states have synchronized 40 Hz firing patterns. I will discuss this 
suggestion in more detail in chapter nine. Suppose for the moment that this suggestion turns out 
to be true, then we can see how neurology plays an important role in this particular 
consciousness problem. Say tha t neurologists find the synchronized 40 Hz firing patterns for a
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very brief period in the brain area that is known to be necessary for processing any auditory 
stimuli coming from the right ear. In that case we would have evidence in support of the second 
psychological explanation of the results of the experiment.
This merely is an example of how the natural method might work: given the phenomenology and 
the two psychological hypotheses, we know what the neurological evidence for either of the two 
psychological hypotheses might look like. Whether or not the second psychological hypothesis 
indeed turns out to be true, an important point is made by what is suggests. The point is that we 
need to add different disciplines to phenomenology, for we might well be wrong about parts of 
our own phenomenal life. In this case we would be wrong about our memories of our past 
phenomenal experiences. We can also be wrong about present phenomenal experiences. If one has 
a pain, then this experience is immune to error: we cannot be wrong that we experience what we 
experience. However, we can be wrong about the source of the pain:
Som e pain is ‘referred pain .’ T he source o f  w hat seem s to  be low er back pain is som etim es no t 
strained or knotted  muscles in one’s back, bu t a grow th or m isalignm ent higher up in the spine, 
shoulder, neck, even in the brain. (Flanagan 2000: 15)
Our phenomenology will not tell us when we are wrong about these things. In order to find this 
out we will need the other disciplines of the natural method. This especially becomes relevant, as 
we will shortly see, in those cases in which something happens that is counterintuitive.
The splitting auditory attention example was presented to demonstrate that the natural method 
can help us solving problems concerning conscious experiences. This, then, shows that McGinn 
is wrong in assuming that there is no method that can solve the mind-body problem: the natural 
method is a method that he did not consider and it is precisely this method that can solve the 
problem. In the case discussed in this chapter there were two rivaling hypothesis, and the natural 
method was used to judge which one was right. O f course, in many cases the method will be used 
to combine data from the different disciplines, without there being different hypotheses: the 
natural method just provides us with new knowledge, or is a method to verify of falsify only one 
hypothesis.
In the chapters seven through eleven I will apply the natural method to a variety of phenomenal 
experiences. Since this method involves a careful study of the relevant scientific data, the readers 
interested in the philosophical problem of phenomenal consciousness sometimes have to bear
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with me when I present these data, but I can assure them: the philosophical conclusions will 
follow.
I will start by applying the natural method to experiences of phantom limbs to demonstrate that 
phenomenal experiences are projected to the (approximate) location of the cause of the sensory 
input.
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
CASE STUDY #  1: EXPERIENCES OF PHANTOM  LIMBS
In the preceding chapters we saw that philosophical positions like those of Frank Jackson, 
Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers and Colin McGinn effectively come down to the claim that 
(contemporary) science cannot solve the mind-body problem. I argued against Nagel, Jackson 
and Chalmers by refuting their arguments against monism. McGinn -  who is a monist -  claims 
that we do not have the cognitive capacities to link concepts referring to the mind to concepts 
referring to the physical. To undermine this position I presented Flanagan’s natural method, 
demonstrating that we can find out more about the relation of phenomenal consciousness to the 
rest of the physical world than McGinn thought possible.
In this and the following chapters I will use the natural method to defend the theory I presented 
in chapter two. Chapters seven through eleven are five case studies, all focusing on different 
aspects of the evolutionary shorthand theory of the phenomenal mind.
Chapter eight discusses synesthesia. The upshot there is that phenomenal experiences are 
presentations that can be used as representations (even as representations of representations). Support 
for this claim comes from the Charles Bonnet syndrome.
In chapter nine the natural method will be applied to dreaming, demonstrating that we have a 
natural inclination that phenomenal experiences usually are interpreted as representations. In 
addition this case study also shows that we are conscious during periods of time common sense 
has it that we are unconscious. To show that I will also take a look at patients under general 
anesthesia.
Chapter ten focuses on color experiences. I will demonstrate that colors are secondary properties.
In chapter eleven I will look at the experiences of beauty of faces and look at the evolutionary 
aspect of the evolutionary shorthand theory. There the upshot is that phenomenal experiences 
are an economic way of representing.
In the present chapter I will discuss the phenomenon of experiences of phantom limbs, mainly to 
show that -  at least in this case -  the phenomenal experiences are projected from within the brain
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to a place outside it. In this way a phenomenal world is generated that is experienced as if it is out 
there, while it actually is located inside the head.
I will compare my views on projectionism with those of Max Velmans, who defends a projection 
theory that is fundamentally different. I will start with the phenomenology of experiences of 
phantom limbs.
1. the natural method applied to experiences of phantom limbs
1.1 the phenomenology of experiences of phantom limbs
Some people have had the misfortune of having one or more of their limbs amputated due to 
illness, an accident or because they got badly wounded in a war. Even though the actual limb is 
missing, many of these individuals still have experiences as if it was still there. These illusory 
limbs are called phantom limbs, a term coined by Silas Weir Mitchell. The term is sometimes used 
to denote a dissociation between the experienced position of a limb and its actual position 
(Ramachandran & Hirstein 1998: 1604). With respect to the location there are two different kinds 
of phantom limbs: the phantom limbs that are experienced as being in the same location as the 
former limb was, and telescoped limbs: sometimes patients experience that their phantom hand is 
directly attached to the stump or even in the stump (Kew et al. 1997: 482) without the rest of the 
arm in between. However, when tricked in trying to reach with their phantom hand for an object 
that is a meter away, they do not stand up and walk over to the object, but their phantom hand is 
zooming in on the object and is no longer directly attached to the stump. This reaching out stops 
at the normal length of the arm (Ramachandran & Hirstein 1998: 42-43).
What are the experiences these patients have with respect to their phantom limbs? It seems that every kind of 
experience that one can have in a normal limb can also be experienced in a phantom limb, even 
though there are important differences between the experiences of individual patients. Most 
patients report that they can move their phantom limb. These movements are both voluntary, like 
trying to pick up an object, and involuntary, like trying to ward of blows with their phantom arm 
(Ramachandran & Blakeslee 1998: 22). There are, however, also cases of patients that do 
experience their phantom limb in a rigid position and are not able to move this arm. I will return 
to this in the section on the neurology of experiences of phantom limbs.
Other experiences reported by patients with phantom limbs are experiences of being touched 
(Ramachandran 1993: 10415; Ramachandran & Blakeslee 1998: 29), feelings of warmth or cold
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(Ramachandran 1993: 10416; Ramachandran & Blakeslee 1998: 34), and itches (1998: 38). The 
most troubling experience for the patients, however, are not these experiences of having a limb 
while they actually do not, but are the experiences of pain in their phantom limb. “One specially 
enigmatic complaint frequently heard from patients is that every now and then the phantom hand 
becomes curled into a tight, white-knuckled fist, fingers digging into the palm with all the fury of 
a prizefighter ready to deliver a knockout blow.” (1998: 52) These pains can become so 
excruciating that some of these patients even contemplate suicide (1998: 22). This has lead to 
extreme measures: in an attempt to relief the patient of the pain, in many cases the stump was 
made shorter, based on the belief that the nerve endings at the end of the stump -  called neuromas
-  were irritated, thereby causing the pain. In most cases this did not work. In the discussion of 
the neurology it will become clear why this radical method indeed cannot relief patients from 
their phantom pains.
These phenomenological data lead to many questions: how can the pain of phantom limbs be explained?, 
can the pain be taken away?, and the big question, why are there phantom limbs at all? To answer these 
questions, we need to apply Flanagan’s natural method, which in this case consists mainly in 
combining the phenomenology with the neurology of phantom limbs.
In discussing the neurology of phantom limb experiences, two further phenomenological features 
of these experiences are important. First, the experiences occur almost immediately after the 
amputation (1998: 23, 34). Estimates vary that between 33 and 75 % of the phantom limb 
experiences start within the first 24 hours after amputation (Ramachandran & Hirstein 1998: 
1605). Secondly, there are reports of patients who were born without limbs that do experience 
phantom limbs (Ramachandran & Blakeslee 1998: 40-41; Ramachandran & Hirstein 1998: 1604).
1.2 the neurology of experiences of phantom limbs
Ramachandran has developed a neurological theory of phantom limb experiences, that does not 
only answer the above questions, but is also a theory that shows the neurology behind the 
projection of bodily phenomenal experiences. The theory has different explanations for the 
different phenomenal experiences. Central in these explanations is the representation of the body 
on the cortex: the body image, as discovered by Wilder Penfield.
Penfield (1950) stimulated patients’ brains with an electrode and asked them what they felt. When 
he stimulated a specific part of the brain, they told him they experienced sensations of the
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different parts of their body. In this way Penfield discovered that there is an upside down 
representation of the body in the brain. This is not an exact 1:1 representation; the lips and 
thumb, for instance, are disproportionately large. Also, the locations of the different 
representations of the different body parts are not always where you expect them: the face area is 
not beneath the neck area, but beneath the hand area. This body image lies in the parietal lobe 
adjacent to the frontal lobe, hence adjacent to the motor area. This body image is also known as 
the Penfield homunculus.
The explanation o f m oving and paralyzed phantom limbs
This body image is both created and maintained by combining information of different sources, 
for instance, the motor command centers, the muscles and the eyes. If you want to move a limb, 
the chain of events starts in the motor cortex. The m otor cortex sends a signal down to the 
muscles, and they move. The command that is send to the muscles is also sent to the body image. 
In this way the parietal lobe (where the body image is located) “knows” that the limb is supposed 
to move. The muscles of the limb also send signals to the body image that the movement is 
actually performed. If the movement is also seen by the organism, then the eyes also send the 
information that the movement has been performed back to the parietal lobe: the body image in 
the parietal lobe, then, monitors both the commands that are sent to the body and the response 
from the moving body that it indeed is executing the commands (or not).
This provides us with an explanation of both the case in which patients experience moving 
phantom limbs, and the case in which the phantom limb is paralyzed. In the former case signals 
from the motor command are sent to the parietal lobe. “The commands continue to be 
monitored by the parietal lobe and are felt as movements. But they are phantom movements 
carried out by a phantom arm.” (1998: 45)
In the latter case the explanation of the paralyzed phantom arm starts with establishing that the 
people who have this experience mostly had a long time prior to the amputation in which for 
example the arm was lying in a sling. The hypothesis is that each time the motor areas did sent a 
command to move to both the arm and the parietal lobe, neither the arm, nor the eyes did sent 
back signals that the arm was moving. If the patient had this condition for a long time, then the 
brain might have learned that the arm was paralyzed and the body image might be revised over 
time. Ramachandran has no exact physiological explanation for this learned paralysis, but
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“[w]hatever the physiological explanation turns out to be, when the arm is later amputated, the 
person is stuck with that revised body image: a paralyzed phantom. “ (1998: 46)7
the explanation o f phantom touch, warmth, cold and itches
The explanation of having a phantom limb that itches, feels warm or cold, or seems to be 
touched also starts with the body image. Tim Pons et al. (1991) did an experiment in which four 
monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) had undergone dorsal rhizotomy. This is a procedure in which the 
nerves are cut that send signals from an arm to the spinal column. After eleven years he opened 
up the skulls of these monkeys and recorded the activity in the body image when different parts 
of the body were stimulated. As expected touching the hand of the paralyzed arm did not evoke a 
reaction in the area that normally represents the hand. However, touching the face of the monkey 
did result in activation of the hand area in the brain (1991: 1859). This suggested that the face 
area -  which lies adjacent to the hand area -  had invaded the hand area of the body image. The 
results were the same for all four monkeys. The question was whether these results could also be 
replicated in human phantom limb patients. Ramachandran used a cotton swab to stimulate 
different points on the skin surface of one of his patients who had a phantom hand. He 
systematically touched the skin of his patients. What he found were two maps -  on the actual 
body -  of his patients: a complete map of the patient’s hand on the ipsilateral side of both his 
face and his upper arm. Pons et al. had only found the facial map and wondered why there wasn’t 
also a map on the trunk (1991: 1859).
W hy w ere there tw o m aps instead o f ju s t one? [...] [T]his sort o f arrangem ent is precisely w hat one 
w ould expect: O n e  cluster o f points on the face that evoke sensations in the phantom  and a second 
cluster on  the upper arm, corresponding  to  the tw o body parts that are represented  on either side 
(above and below) o f the hand represen tation  in the brain. (R am achandran &  Blakeslee 1998: 29­
30)
A strange phenomenal experience can result from stimulating these two maps at the same time. 
For patients that have the middle finger amputated, stimulation to the second and fourth finger 
results also in experiences in the phantom finger. When Ramachandran stimulated the second 
finger with cold water and the fourth with warm water in a patient who missed her middle finger, 
“she volunteered that an unusual sensation was experienced -  a kind of paradoxical “heat-cold” -  
as though the phantom was simultaneously warm and cold.” (Ramachandran 1993: 10416)
7 R am achandran used this in fo rm ation  to trick the brain o f patients w ith paralyzed phan tom  arm  in thinking the arm 
is no t am putated. H e made a box w ith a m irror in it. The patient pu ts b o th  his arm  and his stum p in the box that is 
so designed tha t if the patient looks in the box he or she has the illusion o f having tw o arms. If  the patient then 
makes synchronous m ovem ent w ith b o th  arm s, in half o f the cases the patien t im m ediately experiences m ovem ent in 
b o th  arms.
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Based on these findings, Ramachandran formulated the remapping hypothesis of referred sensations.
The occurrence o f “referred sensations” in the phan tom  limb [...] [is] a direct consequence o f the 
rem apping [. ], w hich in tu rn  is constrained by proxim ity o f  m aps in the brain. The reason that 
there are tw o clusters o f points, for example -  one on the face and one near the upper arm  -  is that 
the hand in the Penfield hom unculus is flanked by one side by the face and on the other side by the 
upper arm, shoulder and axilla [...]. I f  the sensory input from  the face and from  around  the stum p 
w ere to  “invade” the cortical te rrito ry  o f the hand, one w ould expect precisely th is sort o f  clustering 
o f points. (Ram achandran 1993: 10417)
Is there any evidence to support this hypothesis? Yes, there is. The first evidence Ramachandran 
obtained was from the M EG scans from four amputees. The M EG showed that the maps of the 
body image indeed had changed as expected, and that the hand and shoulder area had invaded 
the face area (Ramachandran & Hirstein 1998: 1609).
Further evidence comes from Flor et al. (1995) and Kew et al. (1997). Flor et al. report that of 
thirteen upper-limb amputees they examined all experienced their phantom limb by touching the 
face, which was corroborated by M EG recordings showing that activation of the face area also 
activated the hand area (1995: 482; Ramachandran & Hirstein 1998: 1616). Kew et al. provided 
evidence that there is a precise 1:1 mapping between the map of the body and the felt location of 
the sensation in the phantom limb (1997: 2756-2758; Ramachandran & Hirstein 1998: 1616).
So, the remapping hypothesis is well corroborated. Now the following question arises: How do the 
face and upper arm area invade the hand area? Ramachandrans suggest that either there is actual 
remapping and new connections are made between the invading and invaded area, or already existing 
connections between these areas are no longer disinhibited but activated (Ramachandran & 
Blakeslee 1998: 34). The fact that phantoms often occur immediately after surgery -  estimates 
vary between 33 and 75% within 24 hours after the amputation -  suggest that it have to be old 
routes becoming active and not new connections, because they cannot be formed by that time. 
Ramachandran claims that both mechanisms are at work (Ramachandran & Blakeslee 1998: 35). 
Evidence is now available that at least the first mechanism is at work. Jain et al. (2000) studied five 
macaque monkeys who had undergone amputation of one of their limbs and found that indeed 
new connections are made between the face and the hand area.
The explanation o f phantom pain
Ramachandran gives four conceivable explanations of why phantom limbs can be painful. 
Traditionally the nerve irritation theory was developed. While it is not a good theory for the
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existence of phantom limbs (there are also subjects who are born with phantom limbs) it might 
be an explanation of the experiences of pain. The other three explanations all start from the 
assumption that phantom limbs are (at least partly) experienced due to cortical remapping, and 
that something went wrong. First, new connections might not only be made to the former hand 
area in the body image of the parietal lobe, but new connections might also be made to pain 
centers, so that a touch to the face results in severe pain. Secondly, something might have gone 
wrong with the volume control mechanisms -  the pathways that amplify or dampen input -  in 
the process of remapping. Thirdly, the activity of the touch synapses might not be connected 
very well, so that they generate junk, which might be interpreted by higher brain areas as pain. 
Ramachandran does not have a way of choosing between these explanations: “In truth, we really 
don’t know how the brain translates patters of nerve activity into conscious experience, be it 
pain, pleasure or color.” (1998: 51)
2. what experiences of phantom limbs tell us about phenomenal experiences
The first thing we learn from the existence of experiences of phantom limbs is that phenomenal 
experiences can be present in the absence of the normal physical cause. In the normal situation 
one experiences a pain in one’s thumb if one actually has a thumb and if there is tissue damage in 
the thumb. Phantom experiences demonstrate that the same experience can be present while 
there is no tissue damage, for there is no tissue at all. Still the experienced location is still out 
there: in the phantom  thumb. This of course is also the case in hallucinations, virtual reality, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation of the brain, direct stimulation of the brain and -  as we will see 
in chapters eight and ten -  in synesthesia and in dreams. This shows that when then body image 
in the brain is appropriately stimulated, a phenomenal world emerges which seems to be out there 
(outside the head).
The experience seems to be out there, but is it also the actual location of the experience? Some 
might argue that this question is naïve or that one makes an error of some sort when asking 
where phenomenal experiences are located. To those I answer in the following manner. Granted 
that phenomenal experiences are real, we should say what it means that something is real. In the 
broad physicalist framework it means that something is realized by lower-level (broadly) physical 
entities, or is a fundamental property. I take it that phenomenal consciousness is a biological 
property, hence it is not a fundamental property (Cf. chapter one). This means that it has to be 
(broadly) physically realized. The essence of being physical of physically realized is that one has a 
location in space, hence this also applies to phenomenal experiences: if they are real, they have to
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have a location. Vice versa: if one says that something is located somewhere, it has to be real, and 
therefore either belonging to the lowest level of reality or being constituted by it.
Since in phantom experiences we are absolutely sure that there is no physical realization-base out 
there, phantom experiences show that the experiences actually are located inside the head. Since it seems 
that the pain is located in the phantom limb, the conclusion is that the phenomenal experience is 
projected to the location out there. Extrapolation of this claim to other experiences leads to the 
following view. Appropriate stimulation of those parts of the brain that normally generate 
phenomenal experiences that are used to represent properties of objects, has the effect that the 
subject has these experience. It does not matter whether the stimulus is the normal property or 
something else, the result is the same: a phenomenal world that seems to be out there.
There are other experiments that show that experiences are projected to a location outside the 
head. These experiments involve the projecting of touch to a location that is not occupied by any 
part of the body of the experiencing subject.
The first experiment is not a real experiment, for we all know the experience and no laboratory is 
needed. If you are holding a pencil and touch the surface of a table, where do you experience the 
hardness of the table? As Velmans says “[t]he table feels hard at the point where it is pressed. But 
there are no sensory organs located at the pencil tip!” (2000: 117) The experience of pressure 
immediately is projected to the location where the pencil tip touches the table.
The second experiment yields a similar result. Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen (1998) 
asked a subject to put one arm on a table behind a screen, so the subject could not see it. Then 
they placed a visual rubber arm on the other side of the screen in the same position as the arm of 
the subject. After ten minutes of stroking both the real arm (out of view) and the rubber arm (in 
view) with a brush, subjects experienced the location of the touch on the rubber arm, not on 
their own hidden arm (1998: 756). Again, the experience of touch is projected to a location where 
the subject clearly has no sense organs.
Having said this, my position might seem to be no different from that of Max Velmans (1990, 
2000) who also claims that processing of information by the brain leads to a phenomenal world, 
that is out there. He also agrees that phantom pains are evidence for what he calls “perceptual 
projection,” the psychological effect of unconscious perceptual processing (Velmans 2000: 116).
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However, our views differ fundamentally: I believe that the phenomenal world merely seems to be 
out there, while Velmans argues it really is out there. This indeed, is the main point he makes. To 
show where exactly we differ and why I believe Velmans has got this wrong, I will now take a 
look at his theory, which he calls reflexive monism
3. reflexive monism
Velmans starts his investigation into phenomenal consciousness not by accepting a theory in 
advance, but by taking phenomenology seriously. He polarizes the debate about consciousness: 
either one is a dualist, believing that consciousness is fundamentally different from the physical 
world, or one is a reductive materialist, which risks eliminating consciousness (Velmans 2000: 
108, 172). The first theory, runs against materialist science, the second against our common sense 
views that we are conscious beings. Velmans wants to take both science and phenomenology 
seriously. This means that both dualism and reductive materialism have to be wrong. In my 
opinion this leads to accepting that phenomenal consciousness is a broadly physical property, not 
reducible to lower-level properties, hence to nonreductive physicalism (Cf. chapter one) As we will 
see, Velmans thinks that nonreductive physicalism contains a contradiction.
Having polarized the debate, Velmans argues that both the dualist and the reductive materialist 
share an assumption that is false. The shared assumption is that there is a difference between the 
perceived objects and our percepts of those objects (Velmans 1990:79; 2000: 104 ff. ).
At first sight one might be inclined to agree that the shared assumption is correct, for in our 
everyday linguistic practices we use the phrase “the perceived object” to denote what we might 
call the thing-itself, which evidently is not identical to our percepts of the object. The shared 
assumption, then, amounts to the claim that the perceived object is out there in the world, while 
the percept of the object is in the head (be it the brain or the mind). Furthermore, it follows that 
the perceived objects (the things-themselves) are observer independent, while the perceptions of 
them are not observer independent.
It is against the shared assumption and its consequent claims that Velmans argues. Based on the 
phenomenal fact that we experience a cat as out there in the world, or a pain as located in the 
finger, and that we do not have an additional percept of the cat or the pain in our heads, he starts 
his argument by equating the notions “the object as perceived” and “the percept of the object”: 
both denote the same. These two notions both differ from “the thing-itself” or “the object as-
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described by physical science” (Velmans 1990: 87). Evidently, if one accepts the equation of the 
perceived objects and our percepts of those objects, then an entirely new interpretation of the shared 
assumption is the result, an interpretation no one will adhere to, for the shared assumption 
becomes absurd: something would no longer be identical with itself.
If the perceived object is identical to our percept of the object, the dispute becomes where it is 
located? Assumed that phenomenal experiences do have a location, they either are where they 
seem to be, or they are somewhere else. Velmans distinguishes three experienced locations, out-there 
(e.g. a cat), in the body (e.g. a pain) and in the head (e.g. a thought). (Velmans 1990: 81-82). Let 
us focus on the first two categories, since there is no dispute about the third category -  everyone 
agrees that thoughts and headaches are in the head (though one might argue about specific 
examples, like sounds when one listens to music wearing a headphone). Furthermore, if we 
interpret “out-there” as “not in the head,” then we can ask where the experiences are that seem 
to be out there: are they where they seem to be, or are they somewhere else?
The answer of the dualist is that they are in the mind, while the reductive materialist claims them to 
be in the head (Velmans 1990: 93). Even though I am neither a dualist nor a reductive materialist, I 
agree with both answers, since I believe that the mind is located in the head. Velmans, on the 
other hand, says that if we take phenomenology seriously, we have to conclude otherwise: the
phenomenal world is (out) there where it is experienced (Velmans 1990: 82, 93; 2000: 115; 126; 133).
Though the phenomenal world is (mostly) out there, the neural causes and correlates of this 
world are in the head. According to Velmans this leads to the following picture. The thing itself is 
the initiating entity, on which for example light falls, which is reflected. The light stimulates the 
retina and consequently the occipital cortex is activated. In processing this information a neural 
representation is created (Velmans sometimes calls this a mental representation, which is not to be 
confused with a phenomenally conscious state.) In some unknown way, this is projected on the 
initiating entity whereby the phenomenal object is created out there. The same story goes for 
bodily experiences. The body is stimulated -  say by stabbing the hand with a pin -  and the 
information is processed in the body image. The psychological effect of this information 
processing is the phenomenal experience of pain in the hand. The neurology of phantom limb 
experiences shows that appropriate stimulation of the body image results precisely in this 
projection of the pain. So, whether or not there is an actual hand that is damaged, stimulation of 
the hand area in the brain leads to the projection of the pain.
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Velmans’ main idea is that if we agree that there is a phenomenal world that is experienced as 
being out there or there where the body is, there is no additional phenomenal world in the head -  
there is no internal duplicate of the external phenomenal world.
W hen one gazes at a cat, ou t-there in the w orld, there is no duplicate experience o f a cat “in the 
m ind” [...] or fo r that m atter, “in the b ra in” [...]. Rather, all th a t one experiences is one cat out- 
there in the world[.] [. ] A similar argum ent applies to  one’s own physical body and to  all other 
physical objects ou t-there  in the w orld. (1990: 82)
The reflexive m odel suggests that in term s o f  phenomenology there is no actual separation betw een the 
perceived body and experiences of the body or betw een the perceived external w orld and 
experiences o f  that world. (2000: 111)
To the claim that there is just one phenomenal world I can agree, but I believe that 
phenomenology is wrong about the location: the experienced location of experiences is not the actual 
location of experiences. This is what phantom pain experiences show: there is no physical object 
where the pain seems to be located, hence the pain cannot be located there, even though the pain 
is projected there, hence seems to be there. This is not to change the meaning of the word “pain” 
from its phenomenological interpretation (the experience) to the physical interpretation (the 
tissue damage); I am still talking about the phenomenal experience of pain. Claiming that 
phenomenology shows that experiences of cats and tables are out there is taking phenomenology too 
seriously. If something has a location, it has to have a physical subvenient base (or it has to be a 
fundamental property). The liquidity of water is there where the H2O molecules are located, my 
hand is where the molecules that constitute it are located, etcetera. If the phenomenal world has a 
location out there, then there also has to be a subvenient or constitutive base for it. It is clear that 
in the case of phantom limbs such a base is missing. Even though there appears to be a pain out 
there, there really is no pain out there. So, my objection to Velmans’ reflexive monism is that it 
confuses appearance of reality with reality. This objection is not new and Velmans has responded to 
it (2000: 127-131). What is his reaction to this?
Velmans starts his counter argumentation by quoting John Searle (1992) who also made this 
objection:
C om m on sense tells us tha t our pains are located in the physical space w ithin our bodies, tha t for 
example, a pain in the fo o t is literally in the physical space o f  the foo t. But we know  that is false.
T he brain  fo rm s a body image, and pains, like all bodily sensations, are parts o f  the body image. The 
pain in the foo t is literally in the physical space in the brain. (Searle 1992: 63, quoted  in Velm ans 
2000: 12)
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I agree with Searle, that common sense has got it wrong. Velmans argues that this is not the case. 
Scientific data concerning the body image precisely reveal what he claims: direct stimulation of 
the different parts of the body image do not generate experiences in the head, but tactile 
experiences located in the corresponding regions of the body (Velmans 2000: 129). This, of 
course is not an argument against the appearance-reality objection, for the fact that direct 
stimulation of the brain results in experiences that seem located outside the head, is also coherent 
with the claim that this is mere appearance. As far as this is meant to support the argument that 
we have no evidence for the location of sensations in the brain (2000: 129), hence should give up 
that view, it fails.
Velmans also argues against the appearance-reality objection in the following manner. According 
to Colin McGinn the fact that brains cause the conscious experiences justifies the claim that they 
are in the head -  if they are anywhere at all (McGinn 1995: 152; Velmans 2000: 130). McGinn’s 
claim is partly motivated by the fact that one can experience a hand, while the hand is amputated 
(McGinn 1995: 152). Velmans rightly notices on several occasions in his book that the neural 
causes and correlates of consciousness are not consciousness themselves, and that we should not 
confuse these ontological relations. However, this does not establish an argument against the 
view that conscious experiences are in the head too. In my opinion the fact that both the causes 
and especially the correlates of consciousness are located in the head makes it plausible that the 
effects are there too. If nonreductive physicalism is correct, then the neural correlates of 
consciousness are part of the subvenient base of consciousness, just as the H 2O molecules in the 
glass on my table are part of the subvenient base of the liquidity of the water. If we ask where the 
liquidity is, then the answer is: in the glass. O f course this is an intuitive argument, and in the case 
of liquidity there is no projection involved, hence the analogy doesn’t apply in every detail. 
However, for something to be ontologically real, there has to be a subvenient base, and it is hard 
to see what that might be other than the brain, in the case of phantom limb experiences. This, 
then, supports the appearance-reality objection to the claim that the phenomenal world is out 
there.
Another way to argue in favor distinction between appearance and reality concerning conscious 
experiences is to show that Velmans is wrong in his claim that there is a contradiction in Searle’s 
nonreductive physicalism with respect to this distinction. As we have seen, Searle argues that the 
appearance of the location of pain in the hand is mere appearance: the actual location of the 
experience is in the head. Hence, phenomenology has got it wrong. This seems to be
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contradicted by Searle himself, when he says that “consciousness consists in the appearances 
themselves. Where appearance is concerned we cannot make the appearance-reality distinction because the 
appearance is the reality.” (Searle 1992: 122, quoted in Velmans 2000: 131). This seems to be another 
way of saying that phenomenology cannot be wrong. Velmans argues:
[O]ne cannot bo th  argue that for conscious appearances ‘the appearance is the reality’ and  argue tha t 
pain w hich appears to be in the foo t is really in the brain, as Searle does [...]. In  my view, Searle is 
forced into this self-contradiction by his ‘nonreductive physicalism ’. I f  one takes conscious 
appearances seriously, one has to  accept that pains are not by and large in the brain. But on his 
version o f physicalism, all conscious states are ju s t h igher-order (physical) features o f  the brain, in 
which case they must be in the brain. As far as I can judge, one cannot consistently hold bo th  
positions. (Velm ans 2000: 137)
I believe that Velmans is wrong here: one can consistently defend the claims that (a) 
phenomenology cannot be wrong qua phenomenology, but that (b) phenomenology can be 
wrong about many other things. Phenomenal experiences are in a sense immune to error: e.g. 
experiences of pain are always experiences of pain. Furthermore, if the pain is experienced as 
being localized in the hand, then this also is immune to error, even if there is no hand. More 
general, experienced locations of experiences are immune to error. However, from the fact that 
the experience of the location is immune to error, it does not follow that the experienced location 
of the experience is the actual location of the experience. This is how phenomenology can be 
wrong.
Let me make the same point with another kind of experience. Accept for the sake of argument 
that colors are secondary qualities (I will argue for this in chapter ten). If a normal color seeing 
person under normal circumstances looks at a fire truck she experiences red. No one will deny 
that she experiences the truck as being red: the red seems to be out there, on the truck. On the 
secondary quality view of colors the truck is not red at all, hence even though her experience is 
immune to error, the phenomenology is wrong as far as it represents the fire truck as being red. 
In chapter eleven I will argue that even though the phenomenology has got it wrong in cases like 
this, this kind of phenomenal representations is very useful, for it provides short-cuts to the 
primary properties of objects, in this case those of the fire truck.
In this chapter I have argued that phantom limb experiences show that phenomenal experiences 
that are located in the head are projected outside the head. Velmans is right that the experienced 
objects seem to be out there, and that we should equate notions like “the physical object as 
perceived” with “our percepts of those objects” and not with “objects-themselves.” I disagree, 
however, that from our experiences of the perceived objects as being out there in the external
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world, it follows that our experiences are not in the head. They are in the head: if experiences are 
ontologically real, they have to have a subvenient base, hence there has to be a subvenient base 
for phantom limb experiences. In absence of the limbs it is hard to see what can be the external 
part of the subvenient base, for there is none. This leads to the claim that it is more plausible to 
assume that phenomenal experiences really are in the brain, and merely appear to be out there. 
This can be combined with immunity to error, for the experienced external location is immune to 
error, while the actual location is in the head. Hence, this is no problem for nonreductive 
physicalism.
In the following chapters I will apply the natural method to other phenomenal experiences, to 
show why -  even though they are in the head -  phenomenal experiences seem to be out there.
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
CASE STUDY #  2: SYNESTHESIA
In this chapter the phenomenon of synesthesia is central. Simon Baron-Cohen and John 
Harrison (1997a) define synesthesia as follows:
W e, along w ith o thers [. ], define synaesthesia as occurring w hen stim ulation o f one sensory 
modality autom atically triggers a perception in a second modality, in the absence o f any direct 
stim ulation to  this second modality. (H arrison & B aron-C ohen, 1997a: 3)
I will start by explaining in more detail what synesthesia is and will use psychological experiments 
to show that the phenomenal reports of synesthetes are truthful: synesthesia is a real 
phenomenon that has nothing to do with a mere association of a color with a sound.
The phenomenology of synesthesia suggests that there are two kinds of synesthesia: sensory and 
conceptual. Psychology supports this distinction and suggests that there is also a distinction 
between higher and lower synesthesia, where higher and lower refer to the stages in the 
processing of input by the brain. The neurology of synesthesia shows that the latter distinction is 
one that has to be made in the conceptual kind. In this case study the natural method is used to 
establish that we indeed should make the distinction suggested by the phenomenology. The 
conclusions that follow for the problem of phenomenal consciousness are mainly based on the 
conceptual kind of synesthesia.
These conclusions are the following. Synesthesia shows that phenomenal experiences can occur 
in the absence of the regular stimulus. In other words: phenomenal experiences are presentations. 
Furthermore, these phenomenal presentations can be interpreted and used as representations and 
even as higher-order representations (without becoming conceptual representations). It will 
become clear that in synesthesia the usage of the presentations as representations is reliable. 
From this it will be argued that if synesthetic presentations are used as representations, the 
phenomenal representations are not misrepresentations.
I will also argue that -  at least in the case of synesthesia -  the phenomenal experiences and their 
contents should be located in the head. As we have seen in chapter two (section 2.3) internalism 
and the secondary quality \iew of colors go hand in hand. At least in the case of synesthetic 
experiences, the colors indeed are secondary qualities. From the fact that internalism and the 
secondary quality view are correct in the case of synesthetic experiences, the suggestion follows
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that these views are correct with respect to all our phenomenal experiences. I will argue in 
chapter nine for internalism and in chapter ten for the secondary quality view of colors.
The reaction to the case study of synesthesia might well be that I should have looked at other and 
less exotic phenomena as they can build the same case, like dreaming, normal color experiences, 
direct brain stimulation or drug-induced experiences. First, even though I do agree that there are 
other phenomenal experiences that establish some of the conclusions I draw based on the 
phenomenal and scientific data of synesthesia, these conclusions are much clearer in the case of 
synesthesia. Some of the other examples of phenomenal experiences will be discussed in later 
chapters though. Secondly, I think that even though the set of phenomenal experiences is 
heterogeneous, many experiences have more in common than just a what-it-is-likeness. This 
implies that data about different phenomenal experiences will often lead to the same conclusions. 
Objections to any choice to investigate one type of phenomenal experiences rather than another 
can always be made. Lastly, the case of synesthesia is not as exotic as one might expect, rather it 
is a fairly common phenomenon that is unknown to most people. I will discuss this in the next 
section after a brief introduction of what synesthesia is.
1. synesthesia
Synesthesia (Greek, syn = together, aisthesis = sensation, perception) is a baffling condition to 
nonsynesthetes, where stimulus of a sensory modality evokes more than the usual experience. 
Synesthetes can experiences colors when hearing sounds, or when they smell paint. Some have 
tactile experiences on their hands when they taste their food, or experiences certain tastes when 
looking at a scene. Mostly synesthesia is uni-directional and bimodal: e.g., sounds invoke colors, 
but colors do not trigger sounds, and only colors are the extra qualia. However, sometimes 
unimodal stimulation leads to more than bimodal experience, like in the case of Luria’s famous 
mnemonist Shereshveski, for whom sounds triggered experiences in all sensory modules (Luria 
1986). It should be noted that synesthesia is not a form of association of -  say -  a color with a 
word: if certain words are heard, synesthetes really have experiences of colors.
Synesthesia is a rather unknown phenomenon. It is hardly investigated scientifically, despite the 
fact that there are many synesthetes among us. Estimates of the ratio viry between 1:25.000 
(Cytowic 1995: 33), 1:2.000 (Harrison 2001: 55) to 1:200 (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2000: 6).
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The trait is more common among women than men. Estimates of the women to man ratio vary 
between 2.5:1 (Cytowic 1989b: 850) to 20:1 (Harrison 2001: 178).
There are no reliable estimates of the adult to children ratio. Cytowic reports of three cases in 
which subjects claim that they do no longer have the synesthetic experiences which they had as a 
child (Cytowic, 1995: 35). The disappearance of synesthesia at adulthood supports Lawrence 
Marks’ (1975) claim that “the frequency of synesthesia in children appears to be two to three 
times that in adults.” (1975: 326) The problem with this estimation is that Marks bases it on 
publications of 1881 to 1923, a time during which there were no good diagnostic criteria. This 
means that mere association of colors with words might also be categorized as synesthesia. If 
children are more prone to associate colors with words without noticing that this is strange, then 
synesthesia would seem to occur more in children than in adults while this is not the case: 
association is wrongly taken for synesthesia. The doubt about the correctness of the child to adult 
ratio based on the reports from late nineteenth and early twentieth century is supported by the 
unlikely high estimates of the ratio of synesthetes to nonsynesthetes in this period, between 6:1 
and 8:1 (Révész 1923: 315). Furthermore, at that time synesthesia was also a rather popular game 
amongst artists, who deliberately made connections between different modalities, while they did 
not have synesthetic experiences (e.g. Lemley 1999: 84). Classifying these “invented synesthetes” 
as genuine cases of synesthesia also increased the estimates of the number of synesthetes. 
Synesthesia is common, but not as common as it was thought around the end of the nineteenth 
century.
There are two reasons that, even though synesthesia is rather common, it is unknown to most 
people. Both reasons have to do with how synesthetes evaluate synesthesia. There are two 
groups. The first group holds the belief that everyone has experiences similar to theirs 
(Ramachandran & Hubbard 2001: 4), and do not talk about it for this reason. The second group
-  which seems to be larger given the reports in literature -  finds out at a very early age that they 
have special experiences, which others think odd. “As a child I once mentioned my colors to a 
teacher, who promptly told my parents I was schizophrenic. That ended my telling anyone about 
it for quite a while.” (RP in Cytowic 1989a: 49) Hence, they keep quiet about it, because they are 
afraid that others might think they are mad (Cytowic 1993: 119; Paulesu et al. 1995: 662).
Another reason that today synesthesia is not widely known is the lack of interest of the scientific 
community until quite recently. Synesthesia was a popular topic in artistic circles at the end of the
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nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. At the same time there was a peak in 
scientific publications on synesthesia. With the arrival of behaviorism the scientific attention 
faded, which was at its lowest in the 1960s, after which interest increased again. And it is only 
since the 1990s that we have diagnostic criteria of synesthesia, which allow for clear demarcation 
between genuine synesthesia, drug-induced synesthesia (Cytowic 1993: 128-129), cross-modal 
experiences during temporal lobe epileptic seizures (1993: 135), synesthesia that is acquired due 
to the disease retinitis pigmentosa (Armel & Ramachandran 1999), a heightened association between
-  say -  numbers and colors, and the invented synesthesia of some artists (Lemley 1999). I will 
discuss these diagnostic criteria in the next section, after discussing the phenomenology of 
synesthesia.
2. the natural method applied to synesthetic experiences
2.1 the phenomenology of synesthesia
At first sight one might well expect that synesthesia is a condition in which stimulation of one of 
our five senses would also evoke a sensation in one of the other remaining four, in other words 
one might expect it to be solely an intermodular phenomenon. However, synesthesia is more than 
that. First, there are intra modular synesthetic experiences for the visual system: sometimes visually 
perceived shapes trigger color-experiences.
Secondly, other modules play important roles in synesthesia, for instance, modules that process 
information about numbers, letters, words, or music. I will start the discussion of synesthesia by 
looking at its phenomenology: what are the different extra sensations that synesthetes have 
reported so far, and how can we classify them? I will argue that synesthesia not only comes in 
different varieties, like sounds evoking colors, or tastes shapes, but that there are (at least) two 
kinds: sensory and conceptual synesthesia. Recently Grossenbacher and Lovelace (2001) also argued 
that this distinction should be made.
Sensory and conceptual synesthesia
Let us take a look at our five different senses. At first sight it is conceivable that stimulation of 
any of the senses can lead to an experience in another sense that is not stimulated at that 
moment. Many of these couplings are indeed reported. For instance, sometimes smells invoke 
colors (colored-olfaction): “Muriel still remembers when her father painted the family house. The 
paint was white. But it smelled unmistakably blue” (Motluk, 1994: 33). O ther examples are tactile- 
gustation (Cytowic, 1993) and colored-gustation synesthesia (Cytowic, 1989a). The following
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table shows which of the extra sensations have been reported, and which not. Here, I am 
concerned only with experiences that are triggered by sensory experiences, whether inter- or 
intramodular. The varieties of synesthesia that are induced by letters, words and digits are left out 
for the moment. I should note three things: First, the fact that some conceivable varieties of 
synesthetic experience are not reported does not of course imply that these do not exist. 
Secondly, the choice of publications that mention these varieties of synesthesia is arbitrary: the 
list is longer for each variety that is reported. Thirdly, Sean Day -  the president of the American 
Synesthesia Association -  has made a similar list that contains some varieties of synesthesia I did 
not encounter in the literature. His list is based on interviews with synesthetes that are as yet 
unpublished.8 (Day, S.A. 2002, personal correspondence).
In addition to our five senses proprioception can be regarded as the sixth sense. There is only one 
report of synesthesia that might involve proprioception:
[P]erhaps the strangest synesthesia is “aud iom o to r,” in w hich an adolescent positioned his body in 
d ifferent postu res according to the sounds o f  d ifferen t w ords. B oth E nglish  and nonsense sounds 
had certain physical m ovem ents, the boy claimed, w hich he could dem onstrate  by striking various 
poses. By way o f convincing h im self o f this sound-to-m ovem ent association, the physician w ho 
described it p lanned to  re-test the boy later on  w ithout warning. W hen the docto r read the same 
w ord list aloud ten  years later, the boy assumed, w ithout hesitation, the identical postures o f a 
decade earlier. (Cytowic 1997: 21)
All these varieties of synesthesia are of the sensory kind: the experiences are triggered by sensory 
stimuli. As I just said there is also a kind of synesthesia that seems to be conceptual, for the 
stimuli that trigger the synesthetic experiences are either spoken or written semantic units. In 
both cases synesthetes have reported that numbers, letters, parts of words or words evoke colors. 
This is called grapheme-color synesthesia, and the experiences of color are called photisms. I believe that 
there are two kinds of grapheme-color synesthesia: sensory and conceptual. In the former case it 
is a shape or sound that happens to be a word that evokes the photisms, in the latter case it is just 
the shape or the sound of words that evoke photisms and no other shapes or sounds.
If the grapheme-color synesthesia is sensory, then it is likely that synesthetes might have 
synesthetic experiences when they hear a number, but not when they see it, or the other way 
round. Additionally, if a synesthete has these experiences when she sees letters and numbers, the 
letter O and the number 0 should both evoke the same experience, for it is the shape that
8 T h is lis t can  be  fo u n d  at D ay’s website: h ttp ://w w w .users .m uoh io .edu /daysa /synesthesia .h tm l.
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matters. Also, roman numerals should have the colors (if they have them at all) of the letters not 
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Table 8.1 In  this table only sensory to  sensory  synethesia is listed. (A) T he only case in w hich in trasensory  
synesthesia is reported  is in visual perception. (B) T here are reports o f people hearing voices, that are triggerd by 
their own voice. (C) phan tom  experiences in am upated hands that are triggerd by touching the face. These arguably 
might be called acquired synesthesia, just like the case o f the m an experiencing colors in retinitis pigmentosa. I am not 
aware o f any reports o f  (D) and (E) that m ight be classified as (acquired) synethesia.
(*) A strange condition  is gaze tinnitus, in w hich subjects w ith dam age to  their auditory nerve experience ringing 
sounds w hen they look to  the left (or to  the right). T his might be called a case o f aquired synesthesia, w here visual 
stim uli evoke auditory sensations.
SD: Varieties reported  by Sean Day.
If the grapheme-color synesthesia is conceptual, then hearing or seeing a number should both 
evoke a color. Roman numerals should evoke the same color as their Arabic equivalent. 
Furthermore, if a conceptual synesthete is “tricked” into thinking about a number, for instance 
by asking what the sum of two and three is, he or she should also experience the color that is 
evoked by the number five.
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The features of both kinds of synesthesia show up in the studies of synesthesia. Cytowic reports 
of a synesthete for whom “[r]oman numbers carry the color of the letters that they use” (1989a: 
36). Révész describes Judith, a synesthete in which roman numbers evoke different colors than 
the Arabic numbers (1923: 310). This indicates sensory synesthesia. Révész also reports that the 
letter O and the number 0 have the same color for this synesthete (1923: 319), supporting my 
hypothesis.
Some synesthetes report exactly what one should expect if one had conceptual synesthesia. M. -  
a multimodal synesthete with whom I did some experiments -  clearly has synesthetic experiences 
triggered by concepts of numbers: the Arabic seven has the same color as the roman number and 
the spoken word “seven.” He also told me that upon being awakened by his alarmclock, he does 
not experience any extra colors until he has recognized what the time the digital numbers say it is.
If we indeed can make a distinction between sensory and conceptual synesthesia, then this should 
in the end be based on different neurological causes, not on phenomenology or psychology. I will 
demonstrate that this indeed can be done.
Making a distinction between sensory and conceptual synesthesia might not be enough to classify 
all varieties of synesthetic experiences. How should we classify emotions and pains as triggers for 
synesthetic experiences? Emotions have been reported to evoke colors, for instance that anger is 
purple (Cytowic 1989a: 34). Also, the feeling of pain is reported both as trigger (1989a: 35) and as 
response (1989a: 109). A very strange variety is also reported by Cytowic, viz. food is experienced 
as having numbers. “Food has numbers and falls into “groups,” 3 representing heavy foods, and 
1 representing thirsts and lighter foods.” (1989a: 34) These cases of synesthesia do not provide 
phenomenal data that indicate to which kind of synesthesia they belong, which makes 
classification hard at this moment. Maybe, future neurological investigation will tell us to which 
kind of synesthesia each of these varieties belong.
2.2 the psychology of synesthesia
Combining phenomenology with psychology can help us settle the most important question that 
arises from the reports of synesthetes on their phenomenology: is synesthesia real? There have been 
a number of alternative explanations of the reports of synesthetes, all claiming that synesthesia is 
not real. People claiming to have synesthetic experiences sometimes are supposed to talk
94
metaphorically, like we do when we say that someone wears a loud shirt or that a song is blue. The 
most important alternative explanation of synesthesia is the learned association theory.
W ith respect to  colored vowels, one possible explanation that com es to  m ind is that children’s 
books o ften  p resen t w ords in colors. T hus, by the association o f  sound  w ith the p rin ted  letter, 
prin ted  letter w ith its color, children may tend to  associate sound w ith colors. (Marks 1975: 321)
The learned association theory is a denial of the reality of synesthesia, for it claims that there are 
no extra experiences, only associations at the level of concepts. However, this learned association 
theory is very implausible, for synesthetic twins do experience different colors with the same 
letters and words and publishers of alphabet books make sure that concurrent letters do have 
different colors, while synesthetes’ reports show that concurrent letters are often different shades 
of the same color (Baron-Cohen & Harrison 1997). Furthermore, synesthetic children note that 
colored letters have the wrong color: “My children had a book -  Learn Your Numbers -  but the 
colours of the numbers were all wrong.” (SdeM in Cytowic 1989a: 211)
So, the learned association theory is not plausible. But that does not establish the reality of 
synesthetic experiences. If we take a closer look at the features of synesthetic experiences, we will 
see that some of them can be used to firmly conclude that synesthesia is real.
Cytowic gives us five diagnostic criteria of synesthesia. Synesthesia is (1) durable, (2) involuntary,
(3) projected, (4) memorable, and (5) emotional (1993: 76-79). To have four of these features is 
enough to diagnose that someone is a synesthete.
In my opinion the fifth criterion that synesthesia has to be emotional is highly problematic. The 
idea is that synesthetes are very fond of their extra experiences, and that this points towards a link 
between synesthetic experiences and emotions. However, any experience or cognitive activity can 
be linked in this manner to emotions. It is widely held that doing logic or math is a rational 
process. But this does not mean that the experiences that come with them are not emotional. I 
think that if mathematicians and logicians did not have experiences of beauty and did not greatly 
care about their work, they would not be doing what they are doing: they are emotionally 
involved. But if even these prototypical activities of rationality and the accompanying experiences 
are linked to emotions, it is no wonder that synesthetic experiences are too. So, this criterion is 
one that picks out every experience, and should not belong to the diagnostic criteria of 
synesthesia.
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O f the remaining four criteria three have been investigated in experiments. The fact that 
synesthesia is memorable -  i.e. that it can be used for remembering things -  has not been 
corroborated by experiments. The idea is that synesthetes have an extra way of categorizing those 
phenomena that evoke the extra experiences. This has not been corroborated yet, so the reason 
for adding this to the list of criteria is based on anecdotal evidence: ““She had a green name -  I 
forget, it was either Ethel or Vivian,” says a woman named Diane. She confuses the actual names 
because they are both green, but she remembers the synesthetic greenness.” (Cytowic 1993: 77)
The three remaining diagnostic criteria are confirmed by experiments. I will now turn to these 
features, after which I will discuss the psychological data that support the distinction between 
conceptual and sensory synesthesia.
Criterion #  1: synesthetic experiences are durable
Synesthesia is durable, which is to say that the experiences are consistent over time. Because of 
this, synesthesia can be investigated scientifically since experiments can be repeated. Durability can 
be used to establish the reality of synesthesia. In order to do so, we have to find cases where it 
has been established that people that claim to have synesthetic experiences indeed score better on 
a test than control subjects. This indeed has been done. Baron-Cohen et al. (1993) used a list of 
130 words that was read to synesthetes with colored speech perception and to a non-synesthetic 
control group. Contrary to the nonsynesthetes, the synesthetes were not warned in advance that 
they would be retested at a later date. Both groups had to name the color of the words evoked. 
(The control group had to associate colors with these words of course.) Baron-Cohen et al. report 
that “[o]verall, 92.3% of the responses from the synaesthetic group were consistent one year 
later, whilst only 37.6% of the control group were consistent, even after one week.” (Baron­
Cohen et al. 1993: 422)
criterion #  2: synesthetic experiences are involuntary
The fact that synesthetic experiences are involuntary can also be used to show that synesthesia is 
real. This can be shown with a test derived from the Stroop-test. J.R. Stroop (1935) was 
interested in two questions:
(1) Will there be a difference in performance time between (A) reading words that name colors 
when these words are printed in black ink, and (B) reading the same list of color words
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when they are printed in colors different from the ones they name (e.g. the word “red” 
printed in green ink)?
And
(2) Will there be a difference in performance time between (A) naming the colors of the ink in 
which nonsemantical items like squares are printed, and (B) naming the colors of the ink in 
which color words are printed when there is a mismatch between the color of the ink and 
the color word (e.g. the word “red” printed in green ink)?
The results were that there is no significant difference in the first case: whether the color words 
were printed in black or in a color different than the ones they named made no difference. In the 
second test, however, the subject response time increased by 74 % when they had to name the 
color of incongruently colored color words compared to the list of squares in the same color. 
This is now known as the Stroop-effect.
Mills et al. (1999) and Odgaard et al. (1999) used Stoop-like tests to confirm that grapheme-color 
synesthesia is real. I used a similar test to show that the photisms -  the extra experiences of color
-  M. experiences when he sees numbers are genuine. This test goes as follows.
The subject: M. is a multimodal synesthete, who experiences colors with written and spoken 
numbers and words, shapes and music. This indicates that he has both conceptual and sensory 
synesthesia. He also experiences tastes as colored and shaped. Two nonsynesthetic subjects were 
used as controls.
Stimuli: Prior to the experiment M. was asked which numbers evoked which colors. These are: 0 
white; 1 beige-grey; 2 blue (between Prussian blue and ultramarine); 3 red (deep red but slightly 
lighter than wine-red); 4 yellow; 5 blue (lighter than 2, more sky-blue); 6 red (a bit like 3, but a 
little more dull); 7 purple; 8 dark brown-grey; 9 grey; 10 light yellow. He experiences the color of 
each digit whether it appears alone or n a lager number (with the exception of 10). These 
information was used to make lists of numbers used as stimuli.
Eight different lists of thirteen items were made for six conditions: (a) colored X’s to determine 
the baseline; (b) a list containing normal words to determine whether there is influence of
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semantic items on the reaction time; (c) a list containing incongruently colored color-association 
words (e.g. “sky” printed in green or “grass” in red ink); (d) incongruently colored color words 
(the Stroop-stimuli); (e) a list of numbers printed in colors that are incongruent compared to the 
experiences M. has; and (f) a list like (e), but where each item on the list is printed in the color of 
the experience the preceding item evokes, e.g. “555” evoking a experience of blue, is followed by 
“999” printed in blue. Since in reading a list one tends to look at what is coming next, there is a 
double stimulus to say “blue” when one has to name the color of the ink in which “555” is 
printed. All items were printed in 18-points Arial.
Procedure: All lists were tests in which one had to name the color of the ink of the items. The lists 
were presented face down and in random order. On the commando “one, two, three” the lists 
had to be turned around, after which the colors of the thirteen items had to be named followed 
by “stop”. Time was measured using a stopwatch.
Results: The reaction times of the control subjects were as expected. There was no difference 
between lists (a), (b), (e) and (f). Compared to this baseline reaction time their times increased 
with 19.1 % for list (c) and 38.7 % for list (d).
The reaction times of M. also were as expected. His reaction time was the same for lists (a) and
(b) which is the baseline. Just as in the case of the control subjects his reaction time went up for 
lists (c) and (d), respectively 16.1 % and 51.6 %. His reaction time for list (e) was almost the same 
as his Stroop-reaction: 52.4 %. In the case of list (f) containing incongruently colored numbers 
each followed by a number in the color of the experience, his reaction time even increased with
78.8 %.
From this increase in reaction time, we can conclude that M.’s photisms are involuntary and 
genuine. At least for the part of his synesthetic experiences that come with seeing numbers his 
synesthesia is real.
Criterion #  3: synesthetic experiences are projected
So far we have seen that the first two diagnostic criteria can and have been be used to establish 
by means of psychological experiments that synesthesia is a genuine phenomenon. Recently it has 
been shown by Smilek et al. (2001) that synesthesia indeed is -  as some synesthetes report -
projected.
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W hen show n a digit, the  color o f the pho tism  is n o t experienced “in the m ind ’s eye,” bu t ra ther it is 
experienced as though  the color was “externally p ro jec ted” on to  the digit -  for example, w hen C., a 
digit-color synaesthete w hom  we have studied [...] is show n a black 4, she describes the blue 
pho tism  triggered by the 4 as being seen “out there, on the page, overlaid on  top  o f the 4 .” (2001:
930)
Smilek et al. designed an experiment based on the assumption that if the experiences indeed were 
projected onto the digit, this influences her visual perception of the digits. They briefly showed C. 
a black digit against either a congruent or an incongruent background. C. indeed performed 
better in naming the number in those situations where the background was incongruent to her 
color-experience of the digit. This shows that C.’s experiences are real and that the photisms are 
projected onto the digits (2001: 931). It also shows that in the case of C. first the normal 
information is unconsciously processed and then the extra experience is generated and projected 
onto the target. C.’s conscious awareness of the digit follows this projection. This is contrary to 
M. who first has to recognize the digit and then has the extra experience (Cf. supra). I will later 
argue that these are two subkinds of conceptual synesthesia.
Conceptual synesthesia
The phenomenology of synesthesia indicated that it is plausible that we should distinguish 
sensory from conceptual synesthesia. Though the evidence should come from neurology, a 
psychological experiment indicates too that the distinction should be made. If there is such a 
thing as conceptual synesthesia, then indirect triggering of the concept also should evoke the color 
while this should not be the case in sensory synesthesia. Dixon et al. (2000) indeed found this in 
C. They presented C. with sequences consisting of the following elements: a digit, an operator 
(like plus or minus), another digit and a color patch (either congruent of incongruent to the 
experienced color of the solution to the problem). C. then had first to name the color of the 
patch and then the solution to the arithmetic problem. The hypothesis was that, “[i]f automatic 
photisms can be induced simply by calculating the solution to arithmetic problems, then they 
should interfere with C.’s ability to name the colour of the patch on incongruent trials but not on 
congruent trials.” (2000: 365) This indeed was the result they found, which lead to the conclusion
that an external stim ulus (for example, a physically present numeral 7) is no t required to  trigger a 
photism . Rather, activating the concept o f a digit by a m ental calculation was sufficient to  induce 
the colour experience. Thus, although C .’s photism s are bo th  consistent and autom atic, they do no t 
require a physical inducing stim ulus to elicit them . (2000: 365)
higher and lower synesthesia
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Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) also investigated grapheme-color synesthesia. They believe 
that there are two subtypes which they call higher and lower grapheme-synesthesia, related to the 
higher and lower cortical areas that process sensory input. Visual input is processed in a serial 
manner (though of course that takes place via parallel routes) starting at the retina, then going to 
the lateral geniculate nucleus, to V1 and then to the more specialized areas like V4 (see for more 
details chapter ten). The areas early in the processing of visual input are the lower areas, the areas 
that come later in the process than higher areas. Depending on what area is involved in 
synesthetic experiences, the synesthesia is classified as lower or higher synesthesia.
They did some experiments showing that in two of their grapheme-color synesthetes the induced 
colors are sensory in nature, that is triggered by the shape and not by the concept. They base this 
conclusion on the fact that the induced colors lead to pop-out. If we are presented with a 
computer screen filled with (digitally written) two’s and one five, then it is very hard to spot the 
five. The colors the synesthetes experiences are different for the five and for the two. The five 
pops out for these two subjects. “We measured their performance and found that they were 
significantly better at detecting the embedded shape than non-synesthetic control subjects[...], 
making it clear that they were not confabulating and could not have been ‘faking it’.” (2001: 7)
There is another experiment which supports the thesis that the colors these synesthetes 
experience are sensory rather than conceptually in nature. If a digit is presented in the periphery 
of the visual field it can still be recognized. However, if it is flanked by other digits, this becomes 
more difficult. So, the number five can be recognized in the periphery of our visual field, but if it 
is at the same place in our visual field and if it is surrounded by other numbers we no longer are 
able to recognize it. In this task the synesthetes could not immediately identify the target digit, 
but were able to infer from the color they experienced which digit was flanked by other digits 
(2001: 8).
These experimental results clearly show that the experiences of these synesthetes are triggered by 
the sensory input, not by the concepts correlated with them. These synesthetes did not 
experience the colors of the numbers, when confronted with roman numerals (2001: 8), 
suggesting the same.
Ramachandran and Hubbard also encountered grapheme-color synesthetes that did experience 
the same colors for the Arabic and roman numerals. This leads them to postulate a distinction
100
between higher and lower grapheme-synesthesia. At first sight the distinction between higher and 
lower synesthesia seems to be the same as the distinction between sensory and conceptual 
synesthesia. As it will become clear in the next section the former is a distinction between two 
subkinds of conceptual synesthesia.
2.3 the neurology of synesthesia
Before demonstrating that the suggestions from phenomenology and psychology are indeed 
correct and that we should distinguish between sensory and conceptual synesthesia and between 
lower and higher synesthesia, I first will discuss the controversy between the different 
neurological theories that are supposed to explain synesthesia in general.
There is a dispute between (1) the theory that states that synesthesia is a normal limbic feature 
that surfaces only when the cortex does not inhibit it, and (2) the theory that says that synesthesia 
is caused by cortical cross-wiring -  a breakdown of the modularity of the brain. Cytowic defends 
the former theory, while Baron-Cohen and Harrison, Ramachandran and Hubbard, and Smilek et 
al. defend the latter theory. Though these theories initially seem incompatible, I believe that both 
may be right.
Neural theory #  1: synesthesia takes place in the lim bic brain
Richard Cytowic (1993) tells the story of his discovery of synesthesia in Michael Watson. Cytowic 
was invited to dinner, and when Watson tasted some of the food he was preparing he said that 
there weren’t enough points on the chicken. Watson tasted shapes. Furthermore, Watson always 
drank some coffee in the morning, which resulted in his synesthetic experiences being less vivid 
than normal. Drinking beer made his experiences more vivid. Since caffeine is a cortical 
stimulator and alcohol a cortical inhibitor, Cytowic concluded provisionally that Watson’s 
synesthesia had its origin in the limbic system.
Cytowic places synesthesia in the limbic system of the left hemisphere; to be precisely in the 
hippocampus. For this, he gives two reasons. First, “there are persons with hippocampal 
epileptogenic foci who have synesthetic experiences relatable to a seizure, but who are not 
synesthetic otherwise.” (1989a: 174)
The second reason, an anatomical one, is that the hippocampus is a place in the brain where 
signals come together “from functionally different and geographically independent areas.” (1989a:
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175) I think these reasons indeed support Cytowic’s hypothesis. I take it that hippocampal 
epileptogenic foci causing synesthetic experiences clearly point to the hippocampus as playing an 
important role. The second reason, however, is quite controversial. It is intuitively very appealing 
that we should look for a place in the brain where different kinds of information come together, 
so information can be combined into one informational state or experience. As we will se in 
chapter nine, it is by no means clear that there is such a place (even though the hippocampus is a 
place where signals come together it is not the place where binding occurs.)
The evidence for Cytowic’s theory comes from brain imaging. A PET-scan of Watson’s cerebral 
blood flow (CBF) was made and it showed something very unusual. The baseline CBF was so 
low that his cortex looked almost dead. While experiencing synesthesia, this got even worse. 
Instead of an expected increase in blood flow, the average blood flow in his left hemisphere was 
eighteen percent less than his baseline. When given amyl nitrate (the drug poppers) Watson’s 
synesthetic experiences were enhanced: instead of feeling just one glass column while tasting 
spearmint, he now felt there were hundreds of them. What amyl nitrate does, is to cause a shut­
down of the cortex for about ten seconds, thereby enhancing the relative activity of the limbic 
system. This, then, is Cytowic’s direct evidence for his claim that synesthesia is a normal feature 
of the limbic brain, which is normally inhibited by the cortex (Cytowic 1989a; 1993).
Neural theory #  2: synesthesia is caused by cortical cross-wiring
N ot everyone is convinced that Cytowic’s theory is correct. Baron-Cohen says in an interview 
with synesthete Alison Motluk that “[w]e would be cautious about generalizing about that [the 
single case study of Michael Watson.” (Motluk, 1994: 36) I do not think this is a reason to dismiss 
Cytowic’s direct evidence: even if just one man has such strange CBF, it is highly relevant, for it 
shows that synesthesia is physically possible without cortical activity. Harrison and Baron-Cohen, 
on the other hand, seem not convinced and present an alternative theory. This theory also comes 
with some direct evidence.
In short, Harrison and Baron-Cohen claim that “where as in nonsynaesthetes audition and vision 
are functionally discrete, in individuals with synaesthesia a breakdown in modularity has 
occurred.” (1997b: 119) This means we have to look for neural connections between known 
visual and auditory areas (in the case of colored-hearing). There are two theories of how this 
crosswiring might work: the local crosswiring theory and the disinhibited-feedback or reentrant 
theory.
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The local crosswiring theory
The local crosswiring theory says that there are extra connections between modules that lie 
adjacent to each other, which normally are not directly connected. In the case of grapheme-color 
synesthesia the theory goes as follows. The fusiform gyrus in the left hemisphere contains the 
lower color-processing areas V4, V8 and the visual grapheme area. The latter lies adjacent to V4. 
Nobre et al. (1994) found out that the posterior fusiform gyrus is active when subjects process 
words and groups of letters forming nonwords. The anterior portion of the fusiform gyrus is only 
activated by words that do have semantic content. Neither parts are active when processing other 
stimuli like faces or butterflies.
The angular gyrus of the left hemisphere is necessary for abstract numerical calculation. Damage 
of this area leads to acalculia : the patient cannot do arithmetic anymore. Adjacent to the angular 
gyrus lies the superior temporal gyrus, which contains the higher cortical color-processing areas.
Ramachandran and Hubbard believe that local crosswiring can explain synesthetic experiences. 
Their hypothesis is that there are extra neural pathways between (1) the visual grapheme area and 
the lower color-processing areas in lower grapheme-color synesthetes and (2) the angular gyrus 
and the superior temporal gyrus in higher grapheme-color synesthetes.
If there indeed are such extra pathways between normally separated areas, this might be 
explained by failure of pruning (Ramachandran & Hubbard 2001: 11). There is evidence (Maurer 
1993: 111) that the cortex of young infants is not so specialized as in the adult. For instance 
sounds evoke responses in the temporal cortex (which is normal), and in the occipital cortex 
(which in adults is the visual area). This suggests that neonates are synesthetes. The idea is that 
certain pathways are pruned during development. In synesthetes this pruning might fail, leaving 
pathways between two brain areas intact, leading to synesthetic experiences.
The disinhibited-feedback or reentrant theory
Grossenbacher and Lovelace (2001) do not think that synesthetes have local crosswirings 
between -  say the angular gyrus and the higher color-processing areas -  but instead they believe 
that the neuroanatomy of synesthetes is the same as that of nonsynesthetes. The difference can 
be explained by looking at how their brains work. In normal brains some multi-modal sensory 
areas receive signals from different pathways and then send them on to the area the signal came
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from (feedback) or to another area. If inhibition of this convergence area does not work properly, 
signals (say from a shape-processing area) that were not meant to be send forward to another 
area (say a color-processing area) activate that area, resulting in synesthetic experiences.
Grossenbacher and Lovelace do not say what specific brain areas they have in mind, for they 
propose a general theory of the neurology of synesthesia. Smilek et al. present a similar theory in 
which they do address the specific neuroanatomy of grapheme-color synesthesia (in what I 
believe to be a conceptual synesthete). In conceptual grapheme-color synesthesia, the mechanism 
might be the following. First a number is presented in black ink.
Inform ation  regarding form  activates shape-processing areas in the primary visual cortex [...] as well 
as the extrastriate areas in the lingual and fusifo rm  gyri (hum an V4). Form , com prised  o f the line 
segm ents in a digit, is then  processed by anterior fusiform  and P IT  areas w here the fo rm  activates 
the m eaning o f tha t digit[.] [...] W e believe tha t fo r synesthetes like C, P IT  activation o f  the m eaning 
o f a digit influences color processing in V4 via feedback connections. (2001: 933)
This disinhibited-feedback theory or reentrant model differs from the crosswiring of 
Ramachandran and Hubbard, in that crosswiring occurs via normal pathways that are not 
inhibited, while Ramachandran and Hubbard postulate extra neural pathways between brain areas 
that normally are not connected.
There is evidence that might show that either one of these cross-wiring theories is right. Again, 
the direct evidence comes from brain imaging. The only problem is that the direct evidence is not 
evidence of the existence of any pathways, but of the fact that synesthesia is a cortical process. 
The direct evidence presented here, is indirect evidence for the occurrence of these pathways, 
hence we cannot decide which of the two cross-wiring theories is correct (Cf. Harrison 2001: 15­
19).
Paulesu et al. (1995) made PET scans of six synesthetes who experienced spoken words as 
colored.
In  b o th  groups [six synesthetes and six nonsynesthetic controls] w ord stim ulation com pared w ith 
tone stim ulation activated the classical language areas o f the persylvanian regions. In synaesthetes, a 
num ber o f additional visual associative areas, including the posterior inferior tem poral cortex and 
the parieto-occipital junctions, w ere activated. [...] Synaesthetes also show ed activation in the right 
p refrontal cortex, insula and superior tem poral gyrus. [...]T hese results suggest tha t colour-w ord 
synesthesia may result from  the activity o f brain areas concerned w ith language and visual feature 
integration. (1995: 661)
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Here the evidence is undeniably in favor of the theory that places the cause of synesthesia in the 
cortex as opposed to Cytowic’s theory that places it in the limbic system. Given the results the 
synesthetes involved are likely to be all conceptual grapheme-color synesthetes. This is supported 
by the report of Paulesu et al. that these synesthetes did not experience colors with nonsemantic 
sounds (1995: 663).
Sensory and conceptual synesthesia
There are many varieties of synesthesia if we classify the synesthetic experiences by triggering 
module and extra quale. These varieties are often treated as varieties of the same kind. I believe 
that this is mistaken, and that this mistake lies at the root of the dispute between the cortex 
theory and the limbic system theory. I believe that the evidence on both accounts is strong, 
which leads me to conclude just one thing: there are (at least) two kinds of synesthesia, one that 
has its cause in cortical cross-wiring, and one that has its cause in the limbic system in 
combination with cortical inactivity.9 Furthermore, I believe that this classification corresponds to 
the distinction between sensory and conceptual synesthesia.
If we look at the two brain imaging studies, Cytowic clearly investigated a sensory kind of 
synesthesia: tasting shapes. It seems undeniable that his limbic theory is correct here. In any case, 
it cannot be a cortical phenomenon.
Paulesu et al. investigated a cases of grapheme color synesthesia, which suggest that they 
investigated conceptual synesthesia. I believe that we should (at least) distinguish three varieties 
here. First of all there is the variety in which forms are the trigger of colors. These forms are only 
forms that are associated with semantic content, hence it is not merely a variety of form to color 
synesthesia, which would be a variety of sensory synesthesia. The explanation could be that there 
is crosswiring between (a) the posterior fusiform gyrus, which is activated by only these kind of 
forms, whether they do have semantic content or not and (b) the lower color processing areas. 
This then is a variety of lower grapheme-color synesthesia. A similar account should be given for 
the kind of grapheme-color synesthesia that has spoken language as trigger, which seems to be 
the variety Paulesu et al. investigated: “[o]ur subjects did not have synaesthesias during reading, 
unless they subvocalize what they read.” (1995: 666)
9 There even might be a third kind o f synesthesia. Som e people report seeing bright colors w hen they heard sudden 
loud sounds. T his might be related to  specific nuclei in the hypothalam us and brainstem . “N eurons belonging to  
these nuclei appear to fire w henever som ething im portant or salient occurs, such as a loud noise, a flash o f light, or a 
sudden  pa in .” (Edelm an and T ononi 2000: 46) It might be that if there is som e crosswiring in these systems w ith 
som e parts o f the visual cortex, one might experience colors w hen a loud noise is heard.
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For both the second and third variety of conceptual synesthesia the trigger is the semantic 
content, either of words or of numbers. The explanations might be that there is either a 
crosswiring between (a) the anterior fusiform gyrus, which processes only those words that do 
have semantic content, and (b) the lower color processing areas (the second variety), or that there 
is crosswiring between (a) the angular gyrus, which processes numbers, and (b) the higher color 
processing areas (the third variety). These would then respectively be varieties of lower and 
higher grapheme-color synesthesia.
sensory synethesia conceptual synethesia
Explanation: N orm al limbic 
feature, w ith failure o f 
cortical inhibition.
For further classification 
see table 8.1.
The form  o f the graphem e 
is the trigger.
T he concept o f  the graphem e is the trigger.
low er graphem e-color synethesia higher graphem e-color 
synethesia
Explanation: crosswiring 
between posterio r fusiform  
and low er color processing 
areas
Explanation: crosswiring 
betw een anterior fusiform  
gyrus and low er color 
processing areas
Explanation: crosswiring 
betw een angular gyrus and 
higher color processing 
areas
table 8.2 Suggestion fo r classifying synesthesia in kinds and varieties, based on phenom enology, psychology and 
neurology.
3. the relevance of synesthesia to the problem of phenomenal consciousness
What is the relevance of synesthesia to the problem of phenomenal consciousness? First of all, 
synesthesia shows that the content of (at least) these phenomenal experiences is located in the 
head. I will present the argument for this in a moment. This argument will lead to other 
important conclusions: since it is evident that concepts are not colored the synesthetic experience 
that is evoked by a concept does not directly represent any primary property of the concept. This 
might be seen as a case of misrepresentation. I will argue that synesthetic experiences are not 
misrepresentations, but that they are merely presentations. Furthermore, since these 
presentations are time and again evoked by the same concepts, the presentation can reliably be 
used by the synesthete to represent the concept. If this is done, the presentation is used as a 
representation of a representation, for a concept itself is already a representation. This, in turn, 
shows that a first-order theory of phenomenal consciousness cannot be right, for it cannot 
account for all phenomenal experiences.
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3.1 externalism about intentional content
Synesthesia shows that externalism about intentional content cannot be correct. Adam Wager
(1999) also argues for this conclusion. He takes representationalism (whether it is concerned with 
wide or narrow content) as the claim that phenomenal character is identical to representational 
content. This is the strong version. The weaker version of representationalism expresses a 
supervenience relation: phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Wager 
rightly argues that Tye adheres to the strong interpretation (Cf. chapter two, section 2.7). We also 
have seen that Tye combines this with an externalist view of content. I also defend the strong 
version of representationalism (for those phenomenal presentations that are used as 
representations) but combined with internalism.
Wager argues that synesthesia poses a problem for Tye’s externalist theory for his
theory  locates the phenom enal con ten t o f experience in the w orld, ra ther than  in states internal to  
the individual. It is because o f this that Tye’s theory cannot account for cases o f extra qualia, cases 
in w hich subjects w ith d ifferent internal states have experiences w ith d ifferent phenom enal con ten ts 
though  their env ironm ent is held fixed. (Wager 1999: 268)
Let us take the following example. A nonsynesthete has an auditory phenomenal experience 
when he hears middle C. A synesthete has a different phenomenal experience consisting of the 
auditory experience in combination with an experience of -  say -  red. Based on the 
phenomenology of synesthesia Wager takes it that these two experiences should be treated 
together (1999: 270) because for color-hearing synesthetes experiences of colors are part of what- 
it-it-is-like to  hear. Hence, there is a difference between the synesthetic and nonsynesthetic 
phenomenal representation of middle C. If both a synesthete and a nonsynesthete represent the 
same external feature -  middle C -  and the phenomenal content lies in the external world, then 
externalists like Tye have a problem. According to externalism the intentional content is middle C 
in both cases, which would imply (according to strong representationalism) that the phenomenal 
character should be the same. This is not the case, if we take the synesthetic experience together 
with the auditory experience.
I do not believe that this is the way to show that externalism is false, for it is based on what I 
believe to be a false supposition viz. that the phenomenal representations of middle C are 
different for a synesthete than for a nonsynesthete. Even though I agree with Wager that 
externalism about phenomenal content is incorrect, I believe that separating the synesthetic from
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the nonsynesthetic experience seems to provide a way out for the externalist: the auditory 
phenomenal experience of middle C of both the synesthetes and nonsynesthetes have the same 
content. The externalist now only has to give an additional representational account of the extra 
red-experience the synesthete has when hearing middle C. However, I believe that in the end this 
is no solution for the externalist, for the account of what is represented by the extra experience 
has to be an internalist account, which then conflicts with the externalist account of the auditory 
experience. Let me explain.
If we treat the two experiences of a synesthete separately, and we claim that the synesthetic 
experience is not a representation of the direct cause of the regular experience, we need to answer 
the following questions.
1. Is the extra experience a representation? If so, what is it then, that is represented by 
the extra experience?
2. If the extra experiences is not a representation, why does the phenomenology tell us 
that it is (e.g. a color is evoked by a number, hence the number seems to be 
represented as being blue)?
3. If answers to these questions can be given, why do these answers imply that 
externalism about intentional content is incorrect?
I will answer that (1) synesthetic experiences are presentations that can be used as 
representations, (2) that transparency explains the phenomenology, and (3) that externalism about 
intentional content is incorrect in the case of synesthesia for the extra experiences evidently show 
that the secondary property view of colors is correct (which implies internalism, Cf. supra).
Those who defend both the claim that all phenomenal experiences are representational and that 
externalism is correct seem to have a way out: synesthetic experiences are misrepresentations. In 
order to defend my answers to the first three questions then, I have to answer a fourth question:
4. Why are synesthetic experiences not misrepresentations?
Question 1: is the extra experience a representation?
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Let us take a look at conceptual synesthesia and assume that some synesthete experiences blue 
when hearing, seeing or thinking about the number four. The options we seem to have are the 
following:
(a) The synesthetic experience is not a representation at all;
(b) The synesthetic experience is a representation representing (a property of) the 
number four;
(c) The synesthetic experience is a misrepresentation that seems to be representing 
(a property of) the number four.
Suppose (b) is the correct view. What then is the synesthetic experience of blue a representation 
of in the case of the conceptual synesthete experiencing blue when she sees, hears or thinks 
about the number four. We have seen that for conceptual synesthesia the cross-wiring theory is 
the best explanations: in conceptual synesthesia there is an extra neural route from the brain area 
that is necessary for the conceptual representation to a color area in the brain. For example, the 
conceptual representation of the number four in the angular gyrus also activates the color area in 
the higher color processing areas resulting in the experience of blue. This suggests that it is the 
entire concept “four” that in turn is represented by the experience of blue. The same conclusion 
follows from the phenomenology of conceptual synesthesia.
What is evident (both to synesthetes and the rest of the world) in the case of conceptual 
synesthesia is that the number four is not blue in the sense that a car can be blue. In the case of a 
blue car, common sense has it that being blue is one of the many properties of the car. If the 
synesthetic experience is representational, then it does not represent a property of the number 
four, but rather represents the rumber four itself. This is supported by the fact that for 
conceptual synesthetes two plus two might equal yellow (Dixon et al. 2000) where yellow then can 
be used as a synonym for four.
If we take synesthetic experiences as representations, then we should say the following in the case 
of conceptual synesthesia. In a synesthete a concept (e.g. “four”) triggers an extra experience (e.g. 
blue). This extra experience then is a representation of that concept. The concept itself is a 
representation, hence the synesthetic representation is a representation of a representation.
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The first consequence of this is that -  at least in this case -  colors are secondary properties, since 
concepts evidently are not colored. Since internalism and the secondary view of colors go hand in 
hand, this also supports internalism, suggesting that internalism might also be correct in other 
cases.
Secondly, the synesthetic experience is a higher-order representation since it is a representation of 
a representation. Synesthetic experiences are phenomenal experiences, hence they are also 
nonconceptual representations. So, synesthetic experiences are both higher-order and 
nonconceptual representations at the same time. This has a major implication fbr theories of 
phenomenal mind: first-order representational theories that take higher order representations as 
conceptual -  like those of Tye or Dretske -  cannot be right for it will leave out synesthetic 
experiences.
Normally (phenomenal) representations are not represented again. What happens in the case of 
synesthesia, then, can also be put as follows. A representation of a number triggers an unusual 
activation in a synesthete, causing her to experience a color. This experience is merely a presentation, 
just as a drug-induced experience would be, or one induced by an epileptic seizure or migraine. It 
is evident that in none of these cases there is a property that the phenomenal experience is a 
representation of. A synesthete knows that the number four is not colored (at least not in the way 
cars are colored).
This leads just to one conclusion: the phenomenal experiences in these cases are not 
representational in nature. By this I mean that they are not necessarily or intrinsically 
representational. That does not mean that these presentations cannot be used as representations. 
(Just like a stone is not a tool in nature, but can be used as a hammer.) Synesthetic experiences 
can be used as representations. Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) did the following experiment 
(Cf. supra). If one is presented with a number on a piece of paper in the periphery of one’s visual 
field, one can see the number. However, if it is surrounded by other numbers this becomes very 
hard. Synesthetes can use their extra phenomenal experience in this particular experiment to infer 
which number is surrounded by other numbers. If a synesthete experiences the number four as 
blue she knows that it is a four that is in the periphery of her visual field when she experiences 
blue. Here, the extra phenomenal presentation is used as a representation: blue represents four. A 
synesthetic experience of a color then is a presentation that is used to represent the whole
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concept, and not just a property of it, as is the case in which a car is represented as blue. In that 
case blue represents a property of the car, not the whole car.
Evidently, synesthetic presentations that are used as representations are indirect representations: 
four is not represented as four by the synesthetic experiences, but as blue. This then, shows that 
even though (a) is in principle the right view, (b) is correct as soon as synesthetic experiences are 
used as representations. (I will refute (c) in an moment.)
I believe that this theory applies to most phenomenal experiences. Phenomenal experiences are 
merely presentations: they are not representational in nature. However, they can be used as 
representations. Synesthesia, then, provides a very clear example of this claim. Before I turn to 
the objections I will first answer questions two and three.
Question 2: why are synesthetic representations projected through the represented
representation?
Now, what about the second question? If phenomenal experiences are representations of 
representations, why is it that middle C seems to be red, and not some brain state, concept or 
other phenomenal experience? Put metaphorically, I would say that since phenomenal 
representations are transparent, the projected redness goes right through the auditory property 
and gets projected on the middle C out there.
We do not experience the location of our phenomenal experiences inside the head (with the 
exception of headaches and the like). If we see an apple, its redness seems to be out there. This 
also goes for the other experiences evoked by the apple: the experience of something round, hard 
and sweet out there. If one of these phenomenal representations in turn would trigger another 
phenomenal experience, and this experience is interpreted as a representation, then evidently one 
will not interpret it as the representation of a representation, for one is not aware of the 
representation it is an representation of: hence one will interpret the extra experience as a 
representation of the object that evoked the normal experiences.
Question 3: how does this amount to internalism?
How does synesthesia show that externalism is false? At first sight synesthesia seems to be in 
support of externalism. First, we already saw that the externalist might claim that the intentional 
content of the auditory experience in both the synesthete and the nonsynesthete is the same (e.g.
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middle C.) The phenomenal auditory experience in both cases is also the same, so there is no 
problem here: both the representations and their contents are the same.
Secondly, the intentional content of the extra phenomenal experience of the synesthete is the 
auditory phenomenal representation of middle C, which -  in principle -  is an externalist account of 
the content of the representation. (Even though the representation of middle C is in the head, it 
is not part of the synesthetic representation itself: the content of this extra experience is external 
to the representation.) This then, here is an externalist account of the two representational states 
and their content.
The problem for the externalist account of representational content is that it goes hand in hand 
with a primary view of (e.g.) colors (Cf. chapter two, section 2.3). In normal cases such a view 
seems to be plausible: it seems that it really is the ripe tomato that is red and that sugar really is 
sweet. But I already argued that this is not true that the auditory representation of middle C is 
red. The same goes for every other phenomenal representation that is phenomenally represented 
by a synesthetic experience. The most evident case is that of the higher subkind of conceptual 
synesthesia. Concepts do not have any properties like being colored, tasteful or smelly. How 
then, can an externalist give an account of this within a primary view of color, tastes and smells? 
How can one say that the concept “four” has the primary quality of being blue? I think the only 
way to do this is to regard synesthetic experiences as misrepresentations. This brings us to the 
objections to my answers. They all can be summarized as follows: if synesthetic experiences are 
misrepresentations, none of the above follows. Before addressing this problem, let us look in 
more detail at the possible objections to my answers.
3.2 possible objections
First I will present three objections. These objections stem from different positions but lead to 
the same conclusion: if it can be shown that synesthetic experiences are misrepresentations, then 
none of the above conclusions follow. Secondly, I will give two criteria that have to be met for 
something to be a misrepresentation. Thirdly, I will answer all three objections at once, by 
showing that synesthetic experiences do not meet these criteria. This leads to the conclusion that 
these extra phenomenal experiences can be viewed as presentations or as representations but 
never as misrepresentations.
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Objection #  1
I have argued that synesthetic experiences are presentations that can be used as representations: 
they are not representational in nature. This then goes against radical representationalist theories 
that claim that every phenomenal experience is a representation.
Radical representationalists have to argue that the synesthetic experiences indeed fall in the same 
category as the color experiences evoked by drugs and artificial stimulation of the brain. They 
should claim that in all these examples there is something that seems to have a color. Since there 
either is no object at all (e.g. the hallucination of a pink elephant) or the object does not have the 
experienced property (e.g. the number four printed in black ink evoking an experience of blue), 
these representations are misrepresentations. In this way a representational theory of phenomenal 
consciousness could stick to the claim that phenomenal experiences are representational, without 
having to accept that there are experiences that are not representational in nature but merely 
presentational.
Evidently, if synesthetic experiences are misrepresentations the secondary property view does no 
longer follow. Nothing about the ontological status follows from misrepresenting a four as blue: 
there simply is no property that is represented by the experience, hence no argument in favor of 
the secondary property view of colors can follow (nor for the primary quality view).
Objection #  2
Those in favor of FOR theories might object in a similar way to my claim that synesthetic 
experiences can be used as higher-order nonconceptual representations. They might claim 
experience of blue is not a representation of a representation, but of the thing out there: the 
number four printed in black ink. Again, since the number four is printed in black ink, 
representing it as being blue is a misrepresentation.
Objection #  3
If synesthetic experiences would misrepresent the thing out there, then the conclusion that 
externalism is incorrect does not follow. First, we already saw that the secondary property view 
does not follow if synesthetic experiences are misrepresentations. If the secondary property view 
does not follow, evidently it cannot function in an argument against externalism.
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Secondly (the argument is similar to that showing that the secondary property view does not 
follow), if the experience is a misrepresentation, then there is no property or object out there to 
which it reliably corresponds, hence nothing follows about properties out there (or properties in 
here).
So radical representationalism, first-order representationalist theories of the phenomenal mind, 
and externalism about phenomenal content can be defended against my conclusions based on the 
data of synesthesia if synesthetic experiences are misrepresentations. It is time I address this 
problem.
Tw o criteria for misrepresentation
For me, representation is the same as reliable tracking. If I represent a square object as being 
square, I reliably track this property of that object. This is direct representation, for it represents 
the primary property of being square as it is. The same goes for the representation of whole 
objects. If I represent a cat as a cat, then I reliably track this particular animal. In both cases it is 
evident that successful tracking only can occur if there actually is an object a property of an 
object. Furthermore, these representations are reliable because they represent the property or the 
object as it is, resulting in appropriate actions of the representing organism.
The same goes for indirect representation: this also is reliable tracking, implying that there is 
something that is tracked and that is done reliably so, resulting in the appropriate action of the 
representing organism. Suppose for the moment that colors are secondary properties (I will 
demonstrate this in chapter ten). On the secondary property account of colors, ripe tomatoes are 
represented as red but are not really red. There is a primary property (or a set of primary 
properties) that is responsible for the experience of red in us. This property is indirecty 
represented, and it is also a reliable representation. That it is a reliable representation of course 
does not lie in representing the property as it is, as is the case in direct representation. It is a 
reliable representation, for the combination of the following reasons. First of all, under most 
normal circumstances tomatoes with this property always evoke experience of redness in us. 
Secondly, we do not get into trouble when action upon it: eating red tomatoes is the appropriate 
reaction to experiencing red when seeing a tomato in normal circumstances.
For reliable representation, the circumstances have to be normal. If they are not normal, one 
might make mistakes, for instance when one is almost blind or if there is almost no light, a cat
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may be mistaken for a rabbit, or a rotten tomato may seem to be red instead of brown. These are 
cases of misrepresentation. O f course, in normal situations one might also make mistakes, for 
instance when one thinks one sees someone familiar in the street in broad daylight, when this 
actually is a stranger.
If representation is reliable tracking, then misrepresentation is unreliable tracking. In other words: 
if something is misrepresented, it is tracked, but not reliably so. This brings us to the two criteria 
of misrepresentation. First, there has to be something either an object or a property of an object 
that is misrepresented. The second criterion is that the tracking is unreliable: a rat is represented as 
a cat. The fact that it the tracking is unreliable, surfaces when one acts upon the experiences, for 
instance when one tries to stroke the rat -  because one thinks it is a cat -  and it bites, or when 
one takes a bite of the rotten tomato. These two criteria give us a tool to show that synesthetic 
experiences are not misrepresentations.
In short, to misrepresent something A  as b, there has to be (a feature of) something that is 
misrepresented in a particular case. The same goes for indirect representations, which are not 
misrepresentations: It does not follow from the representation of A  as b that A  is 
misrepresented. Something is an indirect misrepresentation only if it does not represent A  as b, 
but as c, e.g. the grass is not being represented as green but as blue.
Synesthetic experiences are not misrepresentations
Synesthetic experiences meet the first criterion. We have seen that a synesthetic presentation is 
used as a representation, it is used as a representation of a representation. Hence, it is used to 
represent -  say -  the concept four as represented in the brain.
Synesthetic experiences fail the second criterion. An important feature of synesthesia is that the 
extra experiences are consistent through time. Furthermore, synesthetes do not experience any 
problems that might be the result of synesthesia in dealing with the world. This contrary to cases 
of misrepresentations, like the case where a rat is misrepresented as a cat. Even if someone would 
always misrepresent rats as cats, he would find out that he is, for he would have problems in 
dealing with the (natural) world: he would try to stroke a rat, which will be reprimanded by the 
rat. Typically, synesthetes do not have any problems dealing with the world as a result of their 
extra experiences. O n the contrary, synesthesia seems to provide an extra way of (correctly) 
categorizing the world, synesthetes mostly claim to benefit from their experiences as it comes to
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dealing with the world. It is precisely because their extra experiences are consistent through time, 
that they can reliably use their extra experiences as representations. Many synesthetes that 
experience sounds also as a color can tell tones apart by tone, but also by color. This might help 
them in tuning a musical instrument: the experience of red tells that this is an E. Synesthetic 
experiences, then, fail the second criterion, for if they are used as representations, this is done 
reliably so.
In conclusion, synesthetic experiences -  when used as representations -  are not 
misrepresentations. These experiences are presentations that can be used as indirect, 
nonconceptual representations of representations. These experiences are projected onto the 
cause of the normal representation, resulting in the interpretation of that cause as having the 
extra secondary property. I argued that it actually is a secondary property of the normal 
representation.
This might seem a very bold conclusion, but I believe it is not. If I am right, all phenomenal 
experiences are indirect, nonconceptual representations. Hence, this should also be the case for 
synesthetic experiences. And if all phenomenal representations are representations that 
represented secondary properties, so will synesthetic experiences.
Two suggestions following from synesthesia
The implication for externalism about phenomenal content is that -  at least in the case of 
synesthesia -  it is wrong: the normal representation has a secondary property. As shown in 
chapter two, this is inconsistent with externalism, hence it has to be incorrect. If the conclusions 
about synesthesia can be shown to follow from normal phenomenal experiences, then 
externalism about phenomenal content in general would be incorrect. So, the first suggestion that 
follows from the discussion of synesthesia is that externalism and the primary quality view of 
colors are incorrect in general. In chapter ten I will show that this indeed is the case.
First I will apply the natural method to dreaming in chapter nine. This case study also leads to the 
same suggestion that internalism and the primary property view of colors is correct. Furthermore, 
this case study proves a second suggestion that follows from the discussion of synesthesia: we 
have a natural inclination to interpret presentations as representations even in those cases we 
know that the presentations are not representations. Synesthetes know that numbers are not
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colored, still they claim that numbers are experienced as being colored. In the next chapter I will 
argue that we all have this natural inclination.
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CHAPTER NINE  
CASE STUDY #  3: DREAMS
In this chapter I will apply the natural method to dreaming, mainly to show that we have a 
natural inclination to interpret phenomenal presentations as representations as suggested by the 
prior case study. Our mind-brain is a device to interpret the presentations caused by sensory data 
and it just is not turned off during sleep. This results in what we call dreams: we interpret all the 
phenomenal noise that is generated during sleep as representations. If it is indeed the case that 
our interpretation device is not shut off during sleep, then we have to be conscious during the 
whole period of sleep. This is a counterintuitive claim: most people will say that they do not 
dream constantly during sleep. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that we only dream during 
Rapid Eye Movement or REM sleep.
Owen Flanagan himself has applied the natural method to dreaming in his book Dreaming Souls
(2000). Parts of this chapter draw on this book. I will apply his method to demonstrate that his 
claim that we are always conscious during our life is more plausible than one might expect at first 
sight. At least in the case of sleeping he seems to be right. That is enough for my purposes. 
Flanagan’s claim is stronger: we are conscious during all our life, hence also in cases of general 
anesthesia. I will demonstrate that there are patients that were conscious during general 
anesthesia, but that we cannot conclude that every patient is.
The claim that we have the natural inclination to interpret all phenomenal presentations as 
representations is also supported by the Charles Bonnet Syndrome, a phenomenon that will be 
briefly looked at in this chapter.
A conclusion following from the natural inclination claim is that phenomenal experiences and 
their contents are located in the head. Since internalism and the secondary property view of 
colors go hand in hand, this cases study suggests the same as the case study of synesthesia: colors 
are secondary properties. This issue will be addressed in chapter ten.
1. the phenomenology of dreams
The investigation of dreams starts with its phenomenology. We all dream, and dreams seem to 
come in two different kinds. To help classify these two kinds of dreams, we can use Flanagan’s
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distinction between (1) single mental events and (2) mental episodes (2000: 55). Single mental 
events are events that do not have a theme or a plot, while mental episodes do. Seeing a coin on 
the pavement, or a error message on your computer screen are single mental events. Within the 
class of mental episodes Flanagan distinguishes between (2a) narrative structures, and (2b) 
narratives. The experience of fixing a flat tire, giving someone directions have a long enough 
narrative structure to be called mental episodes. However, for mental episodes to be a narrative 
something more is needed than simply having a narrative structure. What also is needed is that 
episodes are connected to each other into a larger story.
“Some dreams are narratives.” (2000: 57) These are the first kind of dreams: the bizarre dreams 
containing vivid imagery in which for instance people might change into other people or even 
plants, while apparently remaining their identity. Dreams that are narratives are always about 
people and things you know or about fictional persons and objects, never about real people or 
things you do not know. (I cannot dream about your friends that are unknown to me.) To this 
extend dreams are self-expressive. The phenomenal fact that dreams often are narratives is 
important, for this already shows that during the night our brains go on doing what they do 
during the day: make sense of our experiences. This will be relevant in the discussion of the 
evolution of dreams.
The second kind of dream is the worrying dream. Dreams belonging to this kind are not 
narratives, but are more than single mental events. We can experience dreams that do not seem 
to end: in your sleep your are constantly worrying about some futile thing, like did I  put my shoes 
under the table or under the chair? You keep repeating this question, and for some reason this 
problem is very troublesome: the dream usually is a nightmare. These kind of dreams are less 
vivid than the bizarre dreams and have a more thought-like structure. (Note that phenomenology 
might differ from person to person, in this case resulting in different experiences of dreams. 
Some people seem to have no familiarity with the second kind of dream.)
A phenomenal aspect about both kinds of dreams is that we mostly do not remember what our 
dreams were about or even that we have dreamed at all. This phenomenology gives rise to the 
following suggestion: if we are so extremely bad at remembering that we did dream, then maybe 
we’re dreaming all the time while asleep. Flanagan believes that there is good reason to believe that 
we are always conscious while alive, hence always conscious while asleep, hence constantly 
dreaming while asleep.
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The view I am going to assume is that we are always, while alive, conscious. If it is true that while 
alive we are always conscious to some degree, and if it is true that we are always alive and not dead 
when we are asleep, then it is true that we are always conscious while asleep. We are always 
dreaming while asleep. (2000: 68)
Taken together, the questions that rise from this phenomenology of dreams are the following.
1. Can we explain why dreams seem to come in two different kinds?
2. Can we explain why we are so terribly bad at remembering dreams?
3. A re we always dreaming while asleep? (Are we always conscious while alive?)
Before I will see how Flanagan uses the natural method to answer the questions, I will add 
another question he poses.
A philosophical-biological question about dreams
In philosophy of mind we are interested in the relation of the mind to the body and the 
environment in which it evolved. How are mental states realized? How do mental and other 
broadly physical states influence each other? Why did they evolve? In discussing Flanagan’s 
application of his method to dreams I will not only focus on the questions that arose directly 
from the phenomenology, but also on the following question which Flanagan categorizes as a 
problem of philosophy of mind and biology (2000: 20).
4. Is dreaming functional?10
Answering these questions can only be done if we use the extended version of the natural 
method. In turn I will discuss the neurology and evolutionary biology of dreams. These provide 
most of the data that we need to answer the above questions. Furthermore, in answering these 
questions an important aspect of the evolutionary shorthand theory of phenomenal 
consciousness results: we have a natural inclination to interpret presentations as representations, 
even if there are no objects that are represented.
2. the neurology of dreams
10 Here, 'function' has to be understood in an evolutionary context: dreams have no evolutionary function. This does 
not imply that dreams are epiphenomena tout court for they clearly are not: we report about them, interpret them, 
write books about them. Dreams do have causal powers.
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The neuroscientific data can provide us -  in combination with the phenomenology -  with the 
answers to the first three questions. I will address these in turn. To answer the first question, we 
will have to take a look at our sleeping cycle and at which parts of the brain are stimulated during 
the different stages of this cycle.
The usual EEG records frequencies of 30 Hz and an amplitude of 50 microvolts in awake 
persons. This changes when one falls asleep. A typical night of sleep starts with an episode of 
nonREM or NREM sleep. This is followed by an episode of REM sleep. In a normal adult this 
cycle takes between 90 and 100 minutes, after which it starts again.
NREM sleep is divided into four stages. Stage one is characterized mainly by its brain wave 
pattern, which is in the theta frequency band (4-8 Hz). In this stage the eyes make slow rolling 
movements, mostly just before the alpha (8-12 Hz) and beta waves (12-18 Hz) change into the 
theta waves. This stage is mostly very brief (ten to fifteen minutes for normal young adults). The 
theta rhythm is irregular and slow; the voltage of these waves slowly increases. In this stage one is 
easily awakened.
Stage two is characterized by the appearance of two distinct wave forms. (The background 
activity of stage two is similar to the activity in stage one: theta waves). The first of these wave 
forms is called the sleep spindle. In normal young adults the frequency is between the three and 
eight spindles per minute. The second wave pattern is the K-complex. These are sharp negative 
spikes followed by a little slower positive component. The frequency is about three per minute. 
They can either occur spontaneously or they can be provoked by stimulation of the senses, for 
instance with a loud bang. Even though one is not as easily awakened such a loud bang can of 
course wake a person.
Stage three and four form what is called the slow-wave sleep, characterized by delta waves, which 
have a higher amplitude than the waves of the first stages (between 75 and 200 microvolts), but a 
slower frequency (0.5-4 Hz). Stage three is a deeper stage of sleep that stage two (a louder noise is 
needed to wake one up). In this stage the spindles and K-complexes may also occur, but the stage 
is characterized by the high amplitude and the slow frequency. Stage four NREM sleep also is 
characterized by the slow-wave sleep, without the spindles and K-complexes. This is a deeper 
sleep than stage three. So, the brain waves pattern of the awake state (high frequency and low
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voltage) is reversed (low frequency and high voltage). After stage four we rapidly go back through 
the third and the second stages of NREM sleep, after which we enter REM sleep.
REM sleep is the state in which most of our vivid dreams occur. This stage is characterized by (1) 
rapid eye-movement & (2) ponto-geniculo-occipital waves (PGO waves). These PGO waves 
originate in the pons. Just as in the waking stage the brain waves of the REM sleep are low 
voltage fast-activity waves unlike those of NREM sleep, which are high voltage and low-activity. 
The REM stages takes between 20 and 30 minutes.
When we are awake the lateral geniculate body of the thalamus (G) receives input form our retina 
after which these go further to the visual processing areas. When we are in REM sleep stimuli 
originate in the pontine brainstem (P) that are send to the lateral geniculate body and the occipital 
cortex (O), which is the main visual processing area of the brain. Flanagan concludes that “This 
much accounts for the saliency of visual imagery in the dreams of sighted people. [...] This 
strongly suggests that dream imagery operates on the same anatomical areas as does awake 
perception.” (2000: 82) So, here we encounter a stage in the sleep cycle that correlates with our 
vivid and bizarre dreams, where neurology provides us with an explanation of why the dreams in 
this stage are so vivid.
This also supports Flanagan’s claim that we dream during NREM sleep. If the dreams that occur 
during REM sleep are vivid in imagery and we can explain this via the activity of the visual areas 
in the brain, then it is plausible that the dreams that are not vivid occur during some other 
stadium of sleep, which has to be NREM sleep. O f course the claim that we dream during 
NREM sleep is highly controversial.
If we take a look at the firing rate of the individual neurons and not at groups, then there is not so 
much difference between waking and both REM and NREM sleeping. It is not the firing rate but 
the firing pattern that makes the difference between sleeping and waking. While asleep the 
neurons in the brain fire in large numbers at the same time. This in contrast to the waking states 
where different groups of neurons “dynamically assemble and reassemble into continuously 
changing patterns of firing.” (Edelman & Tononi 1999: 72) This implies that during NREM sleep 
the number of neural states is drastically reduced. If one believes that we only dream during REM 
sleep this might indicate -  as Edelman and Tononi think it does -  that for conscious states neural 
activity is required “that changes continually and is thus spatially and temporally differentiated.”
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(1999: 73) This is not Flanagan’s conclusion, he argues that dream scientists focus too much on 
the vivid imagery of the REM dreams, thereby ignoring the thoughtlike NREM dreams.11
Flanagan presents another reason for believing that we dream during NREM sleep, viz. that 
sleepwalking and sleeptalking occur during NREM sleep (2000: 84). These phenomena indicate 
that the sleeping subject has conscious experiences.
I will present some evidence in the last section of this chapter that might make Flanagan’s claim 
that we are always conscious while alive more plausible. For the moment, I will address the issues 
about dreams and accept that we indeed do dream during both REM and NREM sleep. The 
neurological explanation of the two kinds of dreams, then, is that they occur during different 
stages of sleep, in which different brain areas are activated, corresponding to the dream- 
experiences one has.
The second question that arose from phenomenology can be answered via neurology: why is it 
that we are so bad at remembering dreams? The answer lies in the chemicals that are either 
produced or not produced during sleep. Flanagan uses Alan Hobson’s AIM model to show what 
happens during sleep with the activation level of our brain waves (A), the input source (I) and the 
modulation level (M), which says what neurotransmitters are active in the brain. In the case of 
sleeping and waking two kinds of neurons and neurotransmitters are of interest: cholinergic and 
aminergic neurotransmitters. Cholinergic neurons synthesize the neurotransmitter acetylcholine, 
which plays a key role in the generation and regulation of REM sleep. Aminergic 
neurotransmitters synthesize amongst others serontonin and norepinephrine. These both are 
important for attention, learning, memory and reasoning.
When we are awake (A) there is high activation of the brain, (I) the most important input comes 
from external stimuli, and (M) aminergic neurotransmitters like serontonin and norepinephrine 
dominate over acetylcholine (2000: 80; 89).
11 “O ne hypothesis I have for why many researchers underestimate NREM  dreaming, even to the point of thinking it 
is not dreaming, has to do with overrating the importance of robust sensory imagery, especially visual imagery in 
dreams. Once sensory imagery is taken as definitive of dreaming, then dreaming is equated with mentation during 
REM sleep, and the sensory dull, but thoughtlike, m entation of NREM  sleep is ignored. This then leads to the 
mistaken conclusion that NREM  sleep, especially stages 3 and 4 NREM  sleep, is a period of unconsciousness.” 
(Flanagan 2000: 83)
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During NREM sleep (A) brain activation is low, (I) the stimuli of brain regions comes from other 
regions, and (M) there is a balance between the aminergic and the cholinergic systems (2000: 80).
In REM sleep (A) the activation of the brain again is high, (I) the stimuli are just as in NREM 
internal and (M) cholinergic takes over from aminergic. Neurons releasing serontonin and 
norepinephrine turn off during REM sleep, while acetylcholine is on (2000: 89).
So, what happens during sleep is that the release of some of the neurotransmitters that are involved 
in memory is turned off. “This helps explain why memory for dreams is degraded.” (2000: 89-90)
We have now the answers to the first two questions: (1) there are two different kinds of dreams, 
for there are (roughly) two different kinds of brain states during sleep corresponding to the 
different types of dreams, and (2) we are so extremely bad at remembering dreams, for during 
sleep the levels of neurotransmitters needed to store information are too low.
Though I am skeptical about the truth of Flanagan’s claim that humans are always conscious 
while alive, it can be shown to be more plausible than we might think at first sight. The answers 
to the preceding questions support -  but do not prove -  this claim. If the widely held belief that 
we dream only during REM sleep was correct, then obviously Flanagan’s claim would be wrong. 
Furthermore, the fact that we are bad at remembering our dreams shows that we dream more 
than we can remember, which suggests that Flanagan’s claim might be right.
It is an unproblematic claim that during the moments that we are awake we are conscious. We 
have experiences. However, we tend to forget most of them. You might recall what you did have 
for breakfast yesterday and what program you watched on television, but you probably do not 
know that for the same day a year ago. So, forgetting what we were conscious of is not such a 
strange thing when large periods of time are between the conscious event and the day one tries to 
remember things. Furthermore, it helps that the fact one tries to remember is a relatively 
unimportant one that occurred on an average day. One is more likely to remember things that 
were special itself or occurred on a not so typical day.
Not only long periods of time make it hard to remember what one was conscious of: just try to 
remember a complete sentence of the previous page. Even though you were conscious of this a 
moment ago, recollection is impossible.
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This should at least make it plausible that we forget or do not explicitly store many of the things 
we were conscious of, a claim which is implicit in the claim that contrary to our common sense 
beliefs we are always conscious during our lives. This should take away the intuition that 
Flanagan’s claim is evidently false. In the following section I will present neurological data that 
show that this claim can even be supported. The idea is the following. First, we need to establish 
a plausible neural marker of consciousness. Secondly, we should find this marker during NREM 
sleep (in accordance with NREM dreaming). Furthermore, this marker should be found during 
other periods of which common sense believes that these are periods of unconsciousness, like 
general anesthesia. In this way neurology might tell us something about our phenomenology.
3. the 40 Hz thesis
Francis Crick and Christof Koch (1990/1997) have suggested that the neurons involved in 
conscious experiences fire synchronously at a rate of 40 Hz. These oscillations, called gamma 
rhythms, actually range from 35 to 75 Hz, but are commonly referred to as 40 Hz oscillations. 
“We shall refer to these neuronal oscillations as the 40 Hz oscillations, though the frequency on 
any one occasion is not very precise and can vary between 35 and 75 Hz.” (1990/1997: 286) The 
hypothesis is that
neurons which represent the same object or event might fire their action potentials in temporal 
synchrony with a precision in the millisecond range. However, no such synchronization should 
occur between cells which are part of different representations, or cell assemblies. (Engel &  Singer 
2001:18)
Crick and Koch presented their 40 Hz thesis as a possible solution to the problem of binding 
visual experiences. If we take a look at just the visual cortex, then we see that different areas 
process different features:
neurons in the area MT are mostly interested in motion and depth, those in area V4 in color and 
shape, and those in 7a in position in space relative to the head or the body. So far no single area has 
been found whose neurons correspond to everything we see. (1990/1997: 282)
Why do we not experience a red blob, a movement, and a certain shape, but do we see a red car 
in front of us?
It seems likely that at any moment any individual object in the visual field is represented by the 
firing of a set of neurons. This would not cause any special problem if the members of the set were 
in close proximity (implying that they probably interact somewhat), received somewhat similar 
inputs and projected to somewhat similar places. But because any object will have different
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characteristics (form, color, motion, orientation) that are processed in different visual areas, it is 
highly reasonable to assume that seeing any one object involves neurons in many different visual 
areas. The problem of how these neurons temporally become active as a unit is often described as 
“the binding problem .” As an object seen is often also heard, smelled, or felt, this binding must also 
occur across different sensory modalities. (Crick & Koch 1990/1997: 284; Crick 1994: 208)
The suggestion of Crick and Koch is that the solution to the binding problem lies in gamma band 
synchronous oscillations.
Koch and I [... suggested] that this synchronized firing on, or near, the beat of a gamma oscillation 
(in the 35- to 75-Hertz range) might be the neural correlate of visual awareness. (1994: 245).
They based their assumption on experiments done in cats where synchronous oscillations were 
found in he olfactory cortex and in the visual cortex and wide apart as 7 mm. These were found 
both in cats that were lightly anesthetized and cats that were alert.
At the time that Crick and Koch presented their hypothesis, there was not much experimental 
evidence that supported their speculative proposal. Is there now evidence that gamma band 
synchronous oscillations indeed are closely correlated with consciousness? Kevin Sauvé (1999) 
presents a brief overview of experiments that show that this indeed is the case. I am not 
concerned here with the question what the exact relation is of these oscillations to consciousness: 
are they identical to consciousness, are they the cause or are they the supervenient base of 
consciousness? What we want to know is whether there is a strong correlation, which might 
indicate any of these relations. If we find this correlation, then we have a good reason to consider 
GSO to be the neural marker of consciousness.
Sauvé presents the recent evidence from microscopic recordings: recordings that do not record 
large groups of neurons as is done in EEG or MEG (where at least one million neurons are 
needed, and one cannot be sure whether there is a synchronous firing of 40 Hz or that the 
measurement is a result of other collective firings). He reports for in stance that a cat performing 
a task in which it had to look at a cue before some action had to be performed (which was 
rewarded) the correlated firings “displayed highly correlated firing among pairs of neurons in 
both hemispheres of the visual cortex, as well as in parietal cortex and frontal motor areas.” 
(1999: 214)
Also binocular rivalry experiments have been used to see whether the 40 Hz thesis is right. In 
binocular rivalry a different stimulus is presented to each of the eyes, for instance lines moving 
up to the left eye and lines going down to the right. The phenomenal experiences are either of
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lines going down or of lines going up. These percepts switch in a manner similar to our 
perception of the front or back of a necker cube. Increases in synchrony and regularity of gamma 
band oscillations were found in the visual areas of cats when one particular visual percept 
dominated. During that domination the suppressed stimulus exhibited a decrease in synchrony 
and regularity in the gamma band oscillations (1999: 214).
Not only are synchronous gamma band oscillations found in visual areas during a visual task, they 
were also found in the motor areas during bimanual manipulations where synchronous activity 
occurred between neurons that even were 8 mm apart (1999: 215).
Sauvé also presents additional evidence based on EEG and MEG recordings. GSO were found 
in (1) the auditory thalamocortical region during experiments where subjects had to distinguish 
between one or two auditory presented “clicks”, (2) the somatosensory cortex during 
experiments where subjects had to distinguish between one or two “taps” presented to a single 
index finger; (3) the visual cortex during experiments where subjects had to distinguish between a 
left- or right-facing Dalmatian in a black-and-white speckled picture; (4) the left hemisphere in 
experiments where subjects had to distinguish between real and pseudowords, where activity 
decreased in the latter case; (5) the motor cortex contralateral to the finger used in a task where 
subjects intentionally had either to move their finger as fast or as slow as possible (1999: 217­
221).
This body of evidence leads Sauvé to conclude the following: “these experiments strongly suggest 
that GSO are causally related to stimuli discriminations and motor outputs that typically occur as 
part of our paradigmatic cognitive state: consciousness.” (1999: 222)
Andreas Engel and Wolf Singer (2001) also present a list of recent evidence for the same claim. 
After evaluation of this evidence they conclude that
By far the largest proportion of investigations have been devoted to the visual system of either cat 
or monkey [...]. [P]recise synchronization [...] occurs in a large number of different neural systems 
and across a wide range of species. It has been observed in all sensory systems, in the motor system 
and in memory/association structures. Species include primates, carnivores, lagomorphs, rodents, 
birds, reptiles, amphibia and insects. Also shown is the fact that, in many studies, synchrony 
between separate neurons is accompanied by gamma-band (> 20 Hz) occurs. (2001: 20)
While this does not prove the 40 Hz hypothesis beyond any doubt, it does corroborate it well 
enough to justify further investigation. So, let us assume that 40 Hz oscillations indeed indicate
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conscious experiences. Can we find these oscillations in deep sleep, which should be the case if 
both (1) Flanagan’s claim that we are always conscious while alive, and (2) the 40 Hz thesis are 
correct? Indeed, we can.
Rodolfo Llinas and Urs Ribary report that “40-Hz activity occurs in an organized fashion [...] 
during the dreaming state.” (1993: 2078) They also report that during deep sleep these oscillations 
are reduced but not absent, meaning that “the amplitude of these oscillations differs from that of 
wakefulness and REM sleep.” (1993: 2080) Also Steriade, Amzica and Contreras (1996) have 
found that GSO are present during slow-wave sleep in cats: “far from exclusively characterizing 
the brain-states of waking and REM sleep, fast oscillations are also present during the behavioral 
state of resting sleep or under general anesthesia with ketamine and xylazine.” (1996: 425) So, 
here we have the first neurological evidence that points in the direction of Flanagan’s 
psychological hypothesis that the phenomenological reports of thoughtlike, worrying dreams 
occur during NREM sleep.
The fact that we have found support for the thesis that we might have conscious experiences 
during NREM sleep, does support the thesis that we are always conscious during sleep. It does 
also support -  but to a lesser extend -  the stronger thesis that we are conscious during all our 
lives. Common sense has it that besides (deep) sleep there are also other states in which we 
believe that we are not conscious, like general anesthesia. If Flanagan’s stronger claim has any 
credibility, we should also find evidence that we are conscious when we are under general 
anesthesia. As follows from the quote of Steriade et al. above, GSO have been found in cats that 
where anesthetized with ketamine and xylazine. The interesting question is whether we can 
correlate such findings back to the phenomenology and psychology of general anesthesia in 
humans.
The normal phenomenology of anesthesia is that we are not aware of anything during general 
anesthesia. This of course, is what the anesthetic agents are supposed to accomplish. However, it 
is not unusual for patients to recall aspects of events that occurred during surgery. Moerman et al. 
(1993) report of twenty-six patients that had conscious experiences during general anesthesia. 
The most frequent experiences were auditory, followed by experiences of paralysis and pain.
Since, auditory experiences are the most common, the auditory area’s in the brain might be best 
to look for the GSO during general anesthesia if we want to correlate phenomenological with
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neurological data. This is what Schwender et al. (1994) did. They tested both specific and 
nonspecific anesthetic agents.12 A tape was played during the operation.
The tape had a duration of approximately 10 min. The text contained mainly positive suggestions 
for postoperative recovery. In this context a short version of the story of “Robinson Crusoe” was 
told. It gives an example how a person overcame a very difficult situation in his life. The story was 
meant to be a parable for the patients of how to deal with their present difficult situations and to 
facilitate postoperative recovery. (1994: 131-132)
During the operation activity of the auditory cortex was recorded. Three to five days after the 
surgery they were tested for implicit and explicit memory. The results were that in the case of the 
nonspecific anesthetic agents during surgery the 40 Hz oscillations were either reduced or 
completely suppressed. No implicit or explicit memory of the tape was found.
In the case of the specific anesthetic agents, the “40-Hz oscillatory activity is preserved during 
general anesthesia.” (1994: 136) However, none of these patients had explicit memories of the 
contents of the audiotape. When control subjects -  who did not hear the tape -  were asked for 
their association with “Friday” none of them reported anything about Robinson Crusoe, while of 
the 30 patients who did get to hear the tape seven replied “Robinson Crusoe.” Looking at the 
brainwaves in the auditory parts of the brain patients without implicit memory did not show the 
40 Hz oscillations while the tape was played during their operation, while patients with implicit 
memory did show 40 Hz oscillations at that time.
This proves that sometimes patients are conscious during general anesthesia and that this is 
correlated with GSO in the auditory cortex. However, patients do not explicitly remember that 
they were conscious. In other cases neither the experiences nor the GSO were present, which 
suggests that anesthetic agents can do what they are supposed to do: eradicate consciousness. 
This would imply that Flanagan’s claim that we are always conscious while alive is too strong. It 
might be the case that the patients without the explicit memory of auditory conscious experiences 
did have other kinds of experiences and GSO in the relevant areas. However, for the moment it 
seems more prudent to adhere only to the weaker claim that we can have conscious experiences 
during periods that are commonly regarded as periods of unconsciousness.
12 The specific anesthetic agents that bind to receptors or defined brain regions were: benzodiazepines, midazolam, 
diazepam, flunitrazepam, fentalyn and ketamine (1994: 135-136). The nonspecific anesthetic agents were: isoflurane, 
enflurane, thiopentone, etomidate, and propofol (1994: 133).
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So far the natural method has proved itself useful. We now know why there are two different 
types of dreams, why we are bad at remembering dreams and that we do have many more 
conscious periods in our lives than we remember. Furthermore, the 40 Hz GSO are a reliable 
marker of consciousness.
4. the evolutionary biology of dreams
Do dreams have an evolutionary function? Flanagan argues that dreams are the spandrels of sleep. 
“Spandrel [...] is an architectural term that refers to the triangular space left over when arches are 
placed next to each other at right angles [...]. Spandrels are inevitable by-products of arch and 
column design.” (2000: 104) The evolutionary analog holds for dreams Flanagan claims: they are 
evolutionary by-products of sleep, which was selected for. Dreaming is just as much a by-product 
as the sounds hearts make or the color of our bones. Having a heart that functions properly also 
means that one has a heart that throbs. However the throbbing of the heart is not why it was 
selected.
Sleep clearly has functions that are selected for. During the night -  when in our original 
ecological niche there is nothing much to do for humans -  it makes sense to replace and repair 
old or damaged cells and tissue, to save energy and to restore the levels of chemicals we need 
during the day. This indeed happens while we sleep.
During NREM sleep pituitary growth hormones peak. These hormones are involved in the 
growth of children and in the making of new cells and repair of damaged tissue in both children 
and adults. Also, the metabolic rate is slowed down, which conserves energy and lowers the 
amount of food that is needed. While we sleep the levels of the chemicals we used during the day 
are also restored. Two of these chemicals, as we, as we already saw, are serontonin and 
epinephrine which are needed during the day for attention, learning en memory.
Dreaming does not seem to be of any assistance to those functions. It is more likely that our 
brains are evolved -  amongst other things -  to make sense of our experiences while awake: “The 
mind-brain’s day job, one of its important jobs at any rate, is to make sense out of experience so 
that we can negotiate the world successfully.” (Flanagan 2000: 140) During our sleep this system 
simply is not turned off, so it tries to make sense of our experiences. This also is the position of 
Rodolfo Llinas and Denis Paré (1991). They argue that the difference between the sleeping and 
the waking state is that in the waking state sensory input is processed by the thalamocortical system.
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However, this processing of sensory input is just a small part of the activity of this system and 
there is no further difference between the activity during waking and sleeping. This leads them to 
claim “ that wakefulness is nothing other than a dreamlike state modulated by the constraints produced by specific 
sensory inputs. ” (1991: 525) The fact that the processing of sensory input is just a small part of the 
activity of the thalamocortical system also means that the “the thamalocortical network appears 
to be a complex machine largely devoted to generating an internal representation of reality that 
may operate in the presence or absence of sensory input.” (1991: 525). This places the 
phenomenal experiences firmly inside the head.
At least in the case of dreams phenomenal presentations are internal and interpreted as 
representations. Even if the phenomenal experiences are not representations -  but mere 
presentations -  the brain will still interpret the experiences as being representational and try to 
come up with the best story about what happens, which in the case of dreaming is the least 
incoherent story. When we are awake there are sensory inputs, which place restrictions on the 
interpretation, for there will be a constant flow of information about the situation the subject is 
in. In dreams one can fly, for there is no sensory input that contradicts this interpretation of the 
presentations. In normal life one will not have the sensation that one is flying, for the sensory 
input shows that we are for instance walking in the street.
The conscious mind then functions as an interpretation device that constructs a representation 
out of the experiences in a way that fits the world best. If the presentations are indeed also 
representations, the interpretation is restricted by the properties of the world.
The thesis that the phenomenal mind is an interpretation device that is selected to generate a 
representation of the environment that is as coherent as possible is also supported by the 
phenomena of the Charles Bonnet syndrome. The Charles Bonnet syndrome is a condition in which 
patients have vivid hallucinations in combination with normal visual perceptions of the 
environment. In general,
(1) the visions occur in a state of clear consciousness and are not accompanied by another disorder 
of sensory-deception; (2) they coexist with normal visual perceptions and the individual retains the 
ability to differentiate them from  the latter; (3) the visions appear suddenly and unexpectedly and 
tend to disappear on closing the eyes; (4) they are not accompanied by any particular emotional 
reaction. (Damas-Mora et al. 1982: 252)
Part of the cause of Charles Bonnet syndrome is bilateral reduction of the visual input (White 
1980; Teunisse et al. 1995), mostly due to a bilateral cataract. The brain receives some input from
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either the retina or another part of the visual system and interprets this input. But since the input 
is unspecific, no adjustment takes place, when the interpretation is incorrect, since the minimal 
input is coherent with the representation that is generated. Geoffrey Schultz and Ronald Melzack 
(1991) argue that the hallucinations of the Charles Bonnet syndrome should be explained as 
follows.
[T]he complex visual experiences of the Charles Bonnet syndrome are generated by neural-impulse 
patterns, originating in those brain areas subserving vision. These patterns of neural impulses may 
be initiated by nonspecific input of the ascending reticular formation, activity of intact visual 
receptors, or hyperactivity of cells central to the damaged visual areas. This theory emphasizes the 
inherent capacity of the brain to generate, or construct, meaningful experience without direct 
correspondence to sensory stimuli. (1991: 823)
In sum, dreams show that we have a natural inclination to interpret presentations as 
representations, a claim that is supported by the Charles Bonnet Syndrome. Furthermore, this 
interpretation device is not turned off during sleep, and might even be active when we try to turn 
it off deliberately as in the case of general anesthesia. Dreaming also places the phenomenal 
experiences and their content firmly inside the head, thereby showing that internalism about 
phenomenal content has to be right.
This latter suggestion also followed from the application of the natural method to synesthesia. I 
will now show that in the case of colors a secondary property view has to be right.
132
CHAPTER TEN  
CASE STUDY #  4: COLOR EXPERIENCES
In chapter eight the question was raised whether in normal situations phenomenal color 
experiences represent the world as it is or not. Color realism is the view that colors exist 
independently of us: fire trucks and ripe tomatoes are really red. In this chapter I will argue in 
favor of color anti-realism: there are no colors independently of us. If there are no organisms that 
experience the world like we do, fire trucks and tomatoes are no longer red. Our experiences of 
colors are caused by primary properties of the objects we believe to be colored. In other words, 
there are no colors, only color experiences and their causes. Talk about color, though, is very 
convenient, for things indeed seem to be as color realism tells us they are. I will use the natural 
method to show that colors are secondary properties. In this case the natural method consists in 
combining phenomenology with the psychology and physics of colors.
We can argue that something is a secondary property in two ways. The first one is to show that 
the property has to be dependent upon the observer. Secondly, one can argue that it is impossible 
to identify the property in the absence of the observer. I will use both strategies, respectively in 
sections three and four of this chapter. I will start by saying something about my own 
phenomenology of color experiences and present John Locke’s description of primary and 
secondary properties which I think still holds.
1. the phenomenology of color experiences
For most people the phenomenology of color experiences will be pretty straightforward: ripe 
tomatoes are red, the sky is blue, and bananas are yellow. However, things are not so easy for 
people like me who are colorblind (I am a deuteranope). Contrary to what noncolorblind people 
often think, there are very few people that experience only black and white: most colorblinds 
experience many colors, but mix them. For instances, when my brother, who is not color blind, 
drives me home from a visit to my parents we have to take a road full of traffic lights. This road 
is lit with -  as he says -  yellow neon lights. The problem for me is that I do not experience any 
difference between the yellow lanterns, the red traffic lights, and the taillights of cars in front of 
us: the road is a sea of red lights to me, which would cause problems if I were driving, for I might 
take a red traffic light for a yellow lantern. However, I do experience lemons as yellow and 
tomatoes as red. This is typical for the most common form of color-blindness, called
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deuteranopia or green-blindness, where the eye lacks the cones that are sensitive to the middle 
wavelength. Though colors like reds and greens are confused, all colors are experienced 
(McIntyre 2002: 36).
Since it is clear that there is something wrong with the cones in my eyes, this seems to indicate 
that I structurally misrepresent the properties of the lanterns. The property yellow is represented as 
red. According to the criteria for misrepresentation described earlier, this would indeed be a 
misrepresentation, for (1) there really is a property of a object that is represented; and (2) this 
property is not presented as A as it should be, but as B. However, for me my deviant color 
experiences always have been a strong basis for the intuition that colors are dependent upon 
humans, and not only upon the properties of objects that are still present in the absence of 
humans. This does not mean that I do not misrepresent a property of the lantern, but if it is a 
misrepresentation, it would be a very special one, since I could not have detected it without help 
from noncolorblinds (Cf. the example of the rat that was misrepresented as a cat in chapter eight: 
this kind of misrepresentations can be detected without the help of conspecifics). In other words: 
colorblinds do not have any trouble in their normal life with their interaction with the natural 
world, only with their noncolorblind conspecifics. It is only according to the latter that someone 
is colorblind. What if everyone had the same cones as I do? What would happen to the color of 
the lanterns? Intuitively I would say that we all would agree that they are red (hence should be 
replaced as soon as possible with white lights).
I will return to this “planet of the colorblind” scenario shortly, for a version of it is not as 
fictional as it might seem at first sight. First I will say something more about the discussion about 
primary and secondary properties.
2. John Locke on primary and secondary qualities
Traditionally, it is John Locke (1690) who made the distinction between primary and secondary 
properties famous. In making this distinction he followed his mentor Robert Boyle. At the end of 
chapter eight of the second book of A n  Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke describes the 
three different sorts of qualities bodies do have. I believe these descriptions are still entirely 
correct.
The qualities then that are in bodies rightly considered, are of three sorts:
First, the bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion or rest of their solid parts. Those are
in them, whether we perceive them  or no; and when they are of that size that we can discover them,
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we have by these an idea of the thing as it is in itself, as is plain in artificial things. These I call 
primary qualities.
Secondly, the power that is in a body, by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to 
operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas 
of several colours, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. These are usually called sensible qualities.
Thirdly, the power that is in any body, by reason of the particular constitution of its 
primary qualities, to make such a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and m otion of another body, as 
to make it operate on our senses differently from what it did before. Thus the sun has the power to 
make wax white, and fire, to make lead fluid. These are usually called powers, (section 23)
The debate on whether Locke was right is still going on. The program for the rest of this chapter 
is the following. In the next section I will discuss the scenario in which we supposedly are all 
color-blind. I will do this in order to show that we can conclude that colors are indeed secondary 
properties without thinking about what the properties out there might be that we call “red,” 
“yellow,” and “blue.” After that I will present Frank Jackson’s primary view of colors and will 
discuss some data collected by Edwin Land that show that this primary view of colors cannot be 
right, for there are no properties out there that we can call “red,” “yellow,” and “blue.”
3. the planet of the colorblind
At the beginning of this chapter I asked the question what we would think about colors and color 
realism if everyone had my color experiences. In the planet of the colorblind scenario everyone 
would be colorblind. I believe that a version of this scenario might actually be true, so this is not 
meant as the starting point of a conceivability argument, which -  as I argued in chapter two -  will 
never provide us with new knowledge.
In this section I will start by saying something about the neurology of color experiences, which 
makes it easier to explain the different kinds of color vision among humans. I will give an 
overview of the differences, where I explain how the neurology of colorblind people differs from 
those with normal color vision. After this, I will turn to the genetics of anomalous trichromatic 
color vision, which suggests that most humans with normal color vision can be considered to be 
colorblind too. Some evidence for this latter claim will be presented.
This leads to the conclusion that a version of the scenario of the beginning of this chapter is not 
that farfetched after all.
3.1 the neurology of color vision
Even though signals are processed in a parallel manner, the brain also works in a serial way. If we 
take a look at color vision, this serial process starts at the retina. The retina consists of several
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layers, of which the first contains of two kinds of photoreceptors: rods and cones. In subjects with 
normal color vision the rods and cones in the first layer of tie retina are stimulated by the 
different kinds of light falling on the retina. The cones are located in the center of the retina, the 
fovea. Cones are usually thought to come in three kinds. “There are three types of cones[...]. 
Their collective sensitivity covers the range of the electromagnetic spectrum from a little less than 
400 nm to a little more than 700 nm.” (Hardin 1993: 26) The three types of cones are named 
after the wavelengths they are sensitive to. The first type is the short-wave-cone, which is 
maximally sensitive at 426 nm (blue). The second and third are the middle wave-cones and the 
long wave-cones, respectively maximally sensitive at 530 nm (green) and 560 nm (red). Normally 
the fovea is used to see things in detail. The rods are located in the periphery of the retina.
Below this layer of photoreceptors is a layer of ganglion cells of which the axons form the optic 
nerve, sending the signals from the rods and cones to the layers of the lateral geniculate nucleus 
(LGN). The LGN has six layers of cells: the upper four layers are the parvocellular or P layers 
and they consist of small cells that have some wavelength specificity. The other two layers are the 
magnocellular or M layers and consists of lager cells that have no wavelength specificity (Zeki
1993: 180).
From the LGN the signals go further to the primary visual cortex, also known as area V1 or the 
striate cortex, which lies in the occipital cortex. Lesions in this area lead to cortical blindness, 
either completely or in one part of the visual field. There are four routes from the LGN to 
different layers in V1.
First, there is the pathway that starts in the M ganglion cells of the retina to the M layers in the 
LGN and from there to layer 4B in the visual cortex. From there the signals travel further to area 
V5. Lesions in this area show that this is the part of the prestriate cortex where visually perceived 
motion is processed. A second pathway travels has a similar route from the M ganglion cells in 
the retina to the M layers in the LGN to layer 4B of V1. After this the signals are relayed to area 
V3 of the prestriate cortex, which is a form processing area. The ether two pathways are 
pathways that have their origin in the P ganglion cells of the retina and go to the P layers of the 
LGN. From there the signals are send to layers 2 and 3 of the visual cortex. The route from these 
layers further goes in both cases to area V4, which contains cells that are form-selective and cells 
that are wavelength specific. So, here color and form are processed in the same area (Zeki 1993).
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3.2 cerebral colorblindness
Colorblindness comes in two kinds: cerebral and retinal. Most cases of cerebral achromatopsia are 
cases in which there is damage in area V4 (Zeki 1993: 268). O f course, when the pathway to V4 is 
damaged, subjects cannot experience colors either. This was probably the case with Jonathan I. A 
painter who became an achromat after he was hit by a truck. Oliver Sacks (1995: 31) suggested 
that this man had damage to the pathways from V1 to V4, because the CAT and MRI-scans of this 
area were normal. Another explanation might be that these scans were not accurate and that a 
PET scan would have shown that it indeed was V4 that was damaged. I. Died before this 
technology was available. Interestingly, this nan was a synesthete who experienced music as 
colored prior to his accident. After the accident he also lost his synesthetic experiences, as well as 
colored dreams and colored hallucinations during migraine.
Most cases of colorblindness, however, are not cerebral but retinal. The varieties of 
colorblindness discussed in the following section are all varieties of retinal colorblindness.
3.3 retinal colorblindness
Retinal colorblindness roughly comes in two kinds: total and partial colorblindness. Total 
colorblindness, evidently, comes without varieties. Partial colorblindness comes with different 
varieties, and even in normal color vision there are anomalous cases that are closely related to the 
varieties of partial colorblindness.
Achromats /m onochrom ats
Less than 1 in 33.000 people are achromats. These individuals have no or no working cones at all. 
This results in having no color experiences. Since the cones are located in the fovea, they also are 
unable to see things in detail without magnifying glasses. Furthermore, they are extremely 
sensitive to light, which means that they have to wear sunglasses every time they leave their 
houses.
Dichromats
The most commonly found varieties of colorblindness belong to the category of dichromacy: 1 in 
every 20 white males has this kind of colorblindness (it is exceptionally rare in females or 
noncaucasian males). There are three varieties depending on which cone is missing (or not 
functioning). Those who are missing the long wavelength sensitive cones are called protanopes.
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Those who are missing the middle wavelength sensitive cones are deuteranopes and those who 
are missing the short wavelength sensitive cones are called tritanopes.
In addition to the problem of color discrimination protanopes also have a reduction in brightness 
as to the point that some colors (e.g. red) might be experienced as gray or black (hence a traffic 
light might seem not to work). Protanopes have trouble making distinctions between red, orange, 
yellow and green, or between violet and blue. Phenomenally, protanopes and deuteranopes are 
very similar. Both groups of individuals know that they do have a color deficiency and they have 
trouble distinguishing the same kinds of colors. Together protanopia and deuteranopia are also 
known as red-green colorblindness.
Trichromats
Contrary to dichromats, trichromats are able to spot ripe (red) fruit at once. Many animals that 
eat fruit though are colorblinds: “Man and apes and monkeys of the Old World are the only 
mammals with tree-colour vision.” (McIntyre 2002: 33) The other mammals lack the cones 
sensitive to the long wavelength (“red”), hence they cannot distinguish between reds and greens, 
and will have the same trouble as protanopes and deuteranopes spotting ripe fruit among the 
green of the environment.
Anomalous color vision
Besides missing cones or having cones that do not work, there are also milder forms of color 
deficiency, known as color anomalies. Protanomaly is also known as red-weakness. In the case 
red, orange, yellow, yellow-green, and green, are somewhat shifted in hue towards green. Even 
though a protanomalous individual is a trichromat, this might result in a well-known 
phenomenon, viz. that of a discussion about the color of an object that lies close to another color 
for all trichromats (e.g. is the book cover blue or purple?). For a normal trichromat there is some 
red in an object that is said to be purple. For the protanomalous observer, however, the red is 
shifted, and might therefore just be missing in the color of the object. This means that to him or 
her the color of the object seems to be blue. Protanomalous observers also have a loss in 
brightness of colors compared to normal trichromats.
Deuteranomaly, or green-weakness, is similar to protanomaly, only in this case red, orange, 
yellow, yellow-green and green are somewhat shifted towards red. Contrary to the former case, 
deuteranomalous observers do not have a loss in brightness. Protanomalous or deuteranomalous
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individuals mostly do not encounter any problems in everyday life, though they perform very 
differently from normal trichromats on color vision tests. Most of the time they do not even 
know that they have a color deficiency.
3.4 the genetics of protan and deutan color deficiency
Combining the phenomenology and neurology of color vision and color blindness with the 
genetics of protan and deutan color deficiency shows that most people are in fact color blind, 
hence that the planet of the colorblind scenario is not just a conceivable scenario but an actual 
one. If we take a look at the genetics of anomalous trichromacy, then we get the following 
picture. If a son has a protan or a deutan color deficiency, then the mother will be a carrier of this 
deficiency, since the relevant chromosome is the X chromosome. The genes responsible for the 
development of the long wave and middle wave sensitive cones are located of the X- 
chromosome. Normally the deficient gene is recessive, meaning that a woman having both a 
normal and a deficient gene has normal color vision, and a man with the deficient gene will 
always be color-blind. If a son is an anomalous trichromat, then the mother is heterozygous for 
the color deficiency: she has two X chromosomes, of which one is responsible for deviant cones 
to develop, and the other for normal cones to develop. (The story for tritan color deficiency is 
different, for the gene is located on the seventh chromosome, which is an autosome.)
However, sometimes the dominance of the normal chromosome over the recessive one is 
cancelled. In a fertilized egg that contains two X chromosomes both chromosomes are active. 
Early in the embryogenesis one of these X chromosomes becomes inactive in each cell. This is a 
random process, that is called X  chromosome inactivation. If a cell divides then the persecutors 
contain the same active X chromosome.
O n average approximately one-half of the cells have a specific active chromosome. But chance 
might favor one or the other X chromosome in a particular tissue. For this reason females who are 
heterozygous for an X-linked recessive trait show some expression of the trait. At the cellular level 
each cell is found definitely to express one or the other allele, but not the other. (Sutton 1997: 609)
This seems to suggest that mothers of men with a particular color deficiency express this 
deficiency to some extend themselves. But there is also another suggestion, and this is the one I 
am interested in, for it might show that the planet of the colorblind scenario is not that fictional 
after all.
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The suggestion is the following. There should be some women which have four different cones: 
tetrachromats. If, in addition, their brains would be able to make use of the fourth cone, then 
they should have even more color experiences than normal trichromats. This would imply that 
they would be living on a planet inhabited with conspecifics they consider to be colorblinds.
This scenario might seem somewhat speculative: can there be a tetrachromat, or is this just a 
logical possibility but not a physical one? There are two main reasons to think this is a real 
physical possibility.
First, there are animals that have four or more cones. Many birds do have tetrachromatic vision, 
and so do goldfish. There is even a variety of shrimp that has ten different kinds of color 
receptor, though as McIntyre notes, it is not clear what this means to the shrimp (2002: 29). The 
same question remains for a species of desert ants that has four types of photoreceptors and a 
butterfly that has five (2002: 30).
Secondly, it is already known that all males of the squirrel monkey are dichromats. Two thirds of 
the females, however, are trichromats. These females are able to make discriminations in the red- 
green range that their dichromatic conspecifics cannot. It is precisely due to X chromosome 
inactivation that they gain an extra cone, and apparently they do have brains that can make use of 
these extra cones (Mollon et al. 1984; Jacobs 1984; Toveé et al. 1992).
So, tetrachromats do exist on our planet and X-chromosome inactivation is able to produce 
trichromacy in females of an otherwise dichromatic species. Why then should X chromosome 
inactivity not be able to create human female tetrachromats?
3.5 Mrs. Tetrachromat
Gabriele Jordan and John Mollon (1993) asked how they could find a tetrachromat. Their starting 
point was to look for mothers of men with anomalous trichromacy, since these men do have 
three cones, but the peak intensity of one of them is slightly shifted to either the green 
(protanomaly) of the red (deuteranomaly). This means that their mothers might have four cones: 
the three normal cones and one of the slightly changed cones. X chromosome inactivation can 
account for having both the deviant cone and its normal variety.
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Now, in addition to having four cones a strong tetrachromat should also have the brain structure to 
actually use the extra cones. If not, then these women are called weak tetrachromats, and it has been 
determined that they indeed exist (Nagy et al. 1981). Since most man with a color deficiency are 
either protanomalous or deuteranomalous, Jordan and Mollon used a test in which the short­
wave cones become useless, by using bundles of light in the middle- and short-wave range. 
Normal trichromats become dichromats for this test, for there is no wavelength that excites the 
S-cones.
If a trichromat looks at a chromaticity diagram then there are three corners of it that are blue, 
green and red. All other colors are in between. For a dichromat one can draw confusion lines or 
pseudo-isochromatic lines in this diagram (McIntyre 2002: 42). All points on this line have the 
same color to a dichromat. These point all look different to a color normal, for a normal 
trichromat will be able to see the part of the spectrum the dichromat is blind to. (Consider the 
following analogy: in a normal three dimensional diagram one cannot distinguish whether a line is 
coming towards one, or moving away if one has only the X- and Y- coordinates. All lines with 
the same X- and Y-coordinates appear the same, even though they might be different to 
someone who also knows the Z-coordinate.) This fact is used in the Raleigh test for color 
blindness. For a protan or a deutan any mix of red and green light can be matched to a 
monochromatic yellow light (providing the brightness of the yellow light may be adjusted). Color 
normals have just one match (and the brightness does not matter).
So, using a mix of green and red light normal trichromats can create a colored light that is 
phenomenally similar to a monochromatic yellow light. If normal trichromats are asked to make a 
match for -  say -  an orange light, they can make create multiple matches using mixtures of either 
green and orange or yellow and red lights. The prediction was that a strong tetrachromat would 
have an extra cone that has its peak sensitivity between green and red, hence they become 
trichromats in this experiment and should be able to distinguish between the various mixes of 
light, resulting in finding just one combination for the target light. (By analogy: the trichromats 
only have access to the X- and Y-coordinate, while the tetrachromat also has access to the Z- 
coordinate.) O f the 31 carriers of either protan or deutan color-deficiency one women indeed 
showed the predicted results. Jordan and Mollon are careful and do say that this does not 
conclusively prove that this women is a tetrachromat, but the result strongly suggest that she is. 
What adds to the evidence, is that the woman herself reports that her color vision is different,
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that “People will think that things match, but I can see they don’t.”“ (Mrs. M. quoted in Zorpette 
2000).
3.6 conclusion
Tetrachromats then, may well exist and would have more color experiences than normal 
trichromats. To them normal trichromacy is just a mild variety of colorblindness. If we would be 
color realists, this would mean that most humans are colorblind and are misrepresenting the colors 
objects actually have. The evidence presented in this chapter shows that this is not the case: 
colors of objects depend both on the primary properties of the surface of the object and on the 
observer. Colors are experienced and immediately projected back onto the cause of the 
experience. That is why the tomato seems to be red even though it actually is not. Since we do 
not know what the primary properties of the tomato (and its surroundings) are that cause the 
experience of red in us and it is a phenomenal fact that it is the tomato that seems to be red, it is 
a useful matter of speech to say that the tomato is red. This then is not a misrepresentation: as far 
as we can use the manner of speech, this is what we should say.
Having shown that colors are dependent both on the primary properties of an object and on the 
observer, I have shown that colors are secondary properties of these objects. As I said at the 
beginning of this chapter, there is also a second way to argue for the secondary property view of 
colors: we can show that there is no (type of) property in the world that can be identified with a 
(type of) color. E.g. there is not one property that all red objects do have in common. This is 
what I will do in section five. First I will present the primary quality view of color in section four.
4. the Australian view
Frank Jackson (1996) defends “the ‘Australian’ view that colors are physical properties of 
objects.” (1996: 199) He describes colors as primary properties: “[Colors] are identical with 
complexes of the properties the physical sciences appeal to in their causal explanations.” (1996: 
199) In chapter two I used this criterion to mark the difference between primary and secondary 
properties: only primary properties can function in the causal scientific laws.13 So, I agree with 
Jackson, that if colors are primary properties, they should be identified with what I believe to be 
the external cause of the colors. Jackson’s defense of the primary quality view of color depends 
upon our common sense view of color: the grass really is green and fire trucks really are red. He 
calls the intuition that objects are colored the prime intuition (1996: 200).
13 I take it that experiences are primary properties of experiencing beings. These experiences are projected onto the 
object that caused them, creating secondary properties.
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Jackson discusses a problem for this view: looking close at a surface that is red from a distance, 
one may see that the surface is build up from small spots of yellow and magenta. Can the primary 
quality view of color determine what the real color is? Yes, it can. Jackson does this by 
introducing viewing conditions.
What we need to say [...] is that the color something has in [...] one circumstance may differ from 
the color it has in another, where the viewing distance is part of the circumstances and that each 
color is equally ‘real.’ (1996: 205)
I think this is the right thing to say for a proponent of the primary quality view of color. Even 
though primary qualities are independent of an observer, it depends on the level at which an 
observer is looking which primary qualities can be observed. Consider the primary quality of 
shape. If a circle is made up of sugarcubes, then the viewing distance determines whether one sees 
a circle, or a cube. This just is an implication of the mereological model of the world, and it 
implies that all the properties of each level are equally real. If colors are primary properties, then 
this would also be the case for colors. This then is not a problem for the primary quality view of 
color, and Jackson rightly defends this as a part of that view.
4.1 the psychology & physics of color experiences
Arguing against the view that colors are out there, we should consider the following two options. 
Either colors are properties of light or of (surfaces of) objects. In either case, there are two 
further options: either there is one property that objects or light of a certain color have in 
common, or this color is a disjunctive property. If it is a disjunctive property, then it should not 
be excessively disjunctive, for then we would be talking about different kinds of properties. This 
analysis of the different options for the primary quality view of color provides us with a strategy 
to show that it is wrong. The first step is to show that both in the case of light and of objects the 
possible candidates for identification with color results in the acceptance of excessively 
disjunctive properties. This implies that the hypothesis that each color can be identified with 
either one property of an object or one property of light is refuted as well. The conclusion would 
then be that the proponent of the primary quality view of color has to accept different kinds of -  
say -  redness. Step two will be to show that this is not a defensible position. Before applying this 
strategy to show that the primary quality view of color is false, there is a question that should be 
addressed first: when are disjunctive properties excessively disjunctive?
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Jackson agrees that a disjunctive property should not be excessively disjunctive, for then we 
would have not one disjunctive property, but of two (or) more separate properties:
Consider, for instance, the sentence ‘Either arsenic administered by Harry or cyanide administered 
by Mary caused the death’. Surely we only make sense of this sentence by reading it as ‘E ither 
arsenic administered by Harry caused the death or cyanide administered by Mary caused the death’. 
(Jackson 1996: 212-213)
What might be the nonexcessively disjunctive properties that can be identified with the different 
colors? Jackson himself seems to think that wavelengths of light are the best candidate:
[T]here is some reason to hold that triples of integrated reflectances correlate closely with perceived 
color. [...] [R]oughly a triple of integrated reflectances is the result of taking the reflectance -  that is, 
certain properties of reflected light to incident light -  over three bandwidths, scaling, and then 
summing. [...] We causalists must think of the value of the triple for a given color, red, say, as what 
unifies the possibly highly disjunctive basis that is responsible for the disposition to look red in 
normal circumstances. It is what prevents the basis counting as excessively disjunctive. (Jackson 
1996: 215)
Semir Zeki (1993: 228) notices a paradox in the common sense and primary quality view of color. 
On the one hand the intuition is to identify colors with wavelengths, but on the other hand there 
is color constancy.
And here enters the paradox. When we view objects in different conditions of illumination, the 
wavelength composition of the light reflected from  them changes. If, for example, one were to view 
an orange or a banana in a room  lit by tungsten light, and then in a room  lit by fluorescent light and 
then, successively, in daylight on a cloudy day and on a sunny day, and at dawn and at dusk, one 
would find that the orange will continue to look orange in colour and the banana will continue to 
look yellow. There may be some changes in the shade of yellow and orange, but the colour will 
remain the same. Yet, if one were to measure the wavelength composition of the light reflected 
from  these surfaces in these conditions, one will find profound variations. In natural viewing 
conditions there is thus no specified wavelength composition, or code, that leads to a particular 
colour and to that colour alone. (Zeki 1993: 228)
Though I believe this shows that the view that colors are identical to wavelengths is excessively 
disjunctive, these different triplets of wavelengths are what Jackson seems to accept as a proper 
disjunctive properties.
Excessively disjunctive property o f  light
If this argument from color constancy is not enough to reject the primary quality view of color, I 
believe that there is also another way to show that there can be no such thing as a disjunctive 
property of blueness (or any other color). The argument has the following structure. The 
property has to be a property of an object or of light. If we can show that such a property can be 
part of both blueness and redness -  without altering the viewing distance -  then the primary
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quality view of color has a problem, for the disjunctive property contains too much: it might not 
be excessively disjunctive to take X  and Y  (where X  ? Y) as two parts of one disjunctive 
property, but it is clearly incoherent to take X  also to be a part of a totally different property, for 
that would nullify the distinction between -  say -  blueness and redness. This then provides us 
with the direction in which we should be looking to disprove the primary quality view of colors: 
if Jackson’s suggestion that triplets of light are colors then the same triplets are not allowed to 
identify different colors, for then blue would be red.
This is exactly what an experiment by Edwin Land shows. Land made a display which looked like 
a painting of Mondrian: rectangular pieces of paper of different colors and of different sizes were 
placed in the display. Such a display is referred to as a “color Mondrian”. Three projectors are 
used to illuminate the display, projecting long-wave, middle-wave and short-wave light.
A normal subject looks at this display and is asked which color a certain patch has. The display is 
illuminated in such way that it reflects 60 units of long-wave, 30 units of middle-wave and 10 units 
of short-wave light. This can be done by using a telephotometer: first only the long-wave 
projector is switched on, and the intensity is varied until the telephotometer says that 60 units of 
light are being reflected by the patch. The same is done with the middle-wave and short-wave 
projector, after which they are all three switched on at the same time. The subject reports a 
designated patch to be green. The experiment is repeated with other patches, each made to reflect 
60 units of long-wave, 30 units of middle-wave and 10 units of short-wave light. By doing this, the 
triplets of light reflected by each patch are the same. Subjects report that the patches are blue, white, red, 
etcetera.
This is a serious problem for the primary quality view of color. Each patch was made to reflect 
the same triplet of light, but the phenomenology of the color-vision did change with each patch. 
The conclusion that follows is that “when a surface forms part of a complex, multicoloured, scene there is no 
simple and obvious relationship between the wavelength composition of the light reflected from that surface and its 
colour” (Zeki 1993: 231). So, if triplets of light are to be identified with color, then the same triplet 
is part of the disjunctive property redness, greenness, blueness, yellowness etcetera. This shows 
that colors cannot be identified with triplets of light, for if that would be so, then we could not 
make any difference between colors.
Excessively disjunctive property o f  objects
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If one still tries to defend the primary quality view of color, then there has to be another primary 
property that can be identified with color. It seems obvious to look at the properties of the 
surface of -  in this experiment -  the patches in the color Mondrian itself. However, an extension 
of the Land color Mondrian experiment shows that this is no option either. If we do not change 
the illumination of one of the patches of the former experiment, but look at this patch in 
isolation (the void condition) the phenomenology changes: instead of experiencing green, 
subjects experience white or very light gray. If one brings the surround into view again, the patch 
immediately is experienced as green. It does not matter where the green patch is placed on the 
display: varying the surround has no influence on the experienced color. Each time the surround 
is illuminated, the reported experience is that of greenness. The experiment can be repeated with 
other colors, which all lead to the same results. These experiments show that: “the colour of a surface 
is determined not only by the wavelength composition of the light reflected from it, but also by that from surrounding 
surfaces.” (Zeki 1993: 232) So, if the surrounding surfaces are causally effective in creating the 
color, there cannot be an intrinsic property of the surface of the designated patch that is colored, 
for if that would be the case, the surround would not make any difference.
In sum, we cannot identify colors with either triplets of light, nor with specific surface properties, 
for the same triplets of light might induce different color experiences in us, and the same surface 
properties might induce different color experiences in us even when the surface properties of the 
patch, the light source and the observer are kept constant. Trying to identify color with a 
property of light or with a property of surfaces leads in both cases to accept that property A and 
property B belong to the disjunctive property of both -  say -  red and green. This lead to two 
problems. First of all, at the level of the alleged primary properties we are no longer able to 
distinguish between red and green. Secondly, the triplets of light or the surface properties that 
constitute the disjunctive property of red are so different that it is hard to see how this can be 
regarded as one disjunctive property instead of as a disjunction of totally different properties, for 
instance the surface of a fire-truck has totally different properties than that of a tomato. This 
means that the primary quality view of color needs to accept more than one kind of -  say -  
redness. This is what Jackson does: “Indeed, I think that we could live with considerably more 
than two rednesses.” (Jackson 1996: 216)
I believe that this is no solution, for the problem for then we have to distinguish between what is 
red, and what is not red but only looks red; ‘fools’ red, as Jackson himself calls it. In the case that 
there are more than two rednesses, there would be several kinds of ‘fools’ redness and only one
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kind of redness. The case is analog to the H20-XYZ case: X Y Z  is not water, for water is H2O. If 
we say that K  is the only kind of redness, then all other kinds have to be kinds of ‘fools’ redness, 
which will be the huge majority. But if something is not red, but only looks red (and does so all 
the time, say ripe tomatoes are ‘foolishly’ red), then what is it that causes the experience of red in 
us if it is not the redness of the tomato? Surely, we don’t experience a difference between the 
redness of a fire truck and that of a tomato: both are the same kind of experience. But, this would 
imply that the red experience caused by a tomato is caused by some other property of the tomato 
than its being red, hence by another primary property. In other words the ‘foolish’ redness of the 
tomato has to be a secondary property. And since most kinds of redness are fools red, this will be 
the case for most of them. That would mean that most experiences of red are caused by things 
that are not red at all. This, evidently, is contradictory to the primary quality view of color, which 
then has to be false.
4.2 conclusion
So, starting both from experience and from the properties of light and objects, it can be 
demonstrated that colors cannot be primary properties and have to be secondary properties. But 
this leads to a further question: what good is it to think objects are colored? We have 
representations of primary properties that are indirect representations: e.g. the experience of red 
is used as an indirect representation of the primary properties of a ripe tomato, and we do not 
know what these properties are. In the case of primary properties and a direct representation the 
way of representing makes good sense: a hard object is represented as hard, and a square is 
represented as a square. But why should we use phenomenal representations and project them 
back as if they were properties of the object? This seems to come very close to misrepresentation, 
for A is represented as B and not as A. What good is it to think that a tomato is red? Why use 
primary properties of surfaces to create experiences, which in turn are projected back on the 
cause of the experiences, leaving the representing creature under the illusion that the object does 
actually have these properties? This is a question I will answer in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CASE STUDY #  5: EXPERIENCES OF BEAUTY EVOKED BY FACES
Earlier I claimed that phenomenal consciousness is a heterogeneous set of (re)presentational 
states, which are either selected for in evolution, or are spandrels such as dreams and afterimages. 
In this chapter I will focus on the evolutionary aspect of phenomenal consciousness and will 
demonstrate that they are evolution’s shorthand by applying the natural method to experiences of 
beauty evoked by faces. Why do we experiences faces of other humans as being beautiful? Does 
beauty lie in the eye of the beholder? And if so, is the experience of beauty a matter of subjective 
preferences, or are there people that have faces everybody finds beautiful, regardless of sex, 
sexual preference, race or culture? If there are certain face-types everyone experiences as 
attractive, can we explain this?
Just as in the four other case studies I will use the natural method to search for answers to the 
problem of phenomenal consciousness. In this case this means combining phenomenology, 
psychology and biology. The data I will present in this chapter show that beauty does indeed lie 
in the eye of the beholder, but that experiences of beauty are also intersubjective. Experiences of 
beauty come in different varieties, depending on what it is that evokes these experiences. We can 
experience beauty when we look at natural phenomena such as other people or landscapes. But 
we also experience beauty when we perceive cultural phenomena, such as music, paintings or 
poetry. I will mainly focus on the first example in the natural category, for in this case we can be 
sure that the represented objects were part of the environment in which we evolved. This means 
that mostly the feeling of beauty is also a feeling of attractiveness, which is not, of course, the 
case if we would be looking at landscapes or art.
1. the phenomenology of experiences of beauty evoked by faces
Being beautiful is something that is highly appreciated in our society as well as in others. We want 
to have partners that are beautiful, and some individuals really have become models for others: 
persons requesting plastic surgery often want to have the physical features of famous people. In 
the United States of America, where over two million people have cosmetic surgery each year 
(Haiken 2000: 83), the models that are requested the most are movie stars like Winona Ryder, 
Johnny Depp (eyes), Sandra Bullock, Harrison Ford (jawline), Salma Hayek and Mel Gibson 
(body) (Simpson 2001: 3). Some famous people -  like Michael Jackson -  go through considerable 
length themselves to change their facial appearance. Subjects do have very specific demands
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when they want to change their appearances. For example, the performance artist Orlan wanted 
plastic surgery so she would end up having a face with “the chin of Botticelli’s Venus, the 
forehead of the Mona Lisa, the eyes of Gérome Psyche, the mouth of Boucher’s Europa, and the 
nose of a Diana from the school of Fontainebleau.” (Bruce & Young 1998: 127-129) Even 
though not everyone wants to look like Harrison Ford or Sandra Bullock, nobody will have 
plastic surgery to have the eyes of Marty Feldman or the chin of John Goodman. This indicates 
that there might be an intersubjective standard of facial beauty. If this is true, then most people 
are not aware of it and even think this claim is false, since it belongs to the realm of general belief 
that beauty lies in the eye of the beholder and that one’s opinion of what and who is beautiful is 
largely culturally determined. In the above case the requests for cosmetic surgery would be 
determined by Hollywood.
If there would be no intercultural and intersubjective standards of beauty, then one should expect 
very different requests for plastic surgery, which is not the case. Can we indeed show that we all 
judge the same faces to be beautiful, and if so, can we explain why there is some universal 
standard? If we can do this, what does this tell us about phenomenal consciousness? To answer 
these questions, we have to apply the natural method and combine phenomenology with the data 
provided by psychology and (chemical) biology.
2. the psychology of experiences of beauty evoked by faces
Victor Johnston has done research into the question which faces are experienced as being 
beautiful. Being an evolutionary psychologist he is interested in average and ordinary features of 
humans.
For evolutionary psychologists [...] questions about the average and ordinary are of paramount 
concern. The average often reflects what is, or was, most adaptive for biological survival, and 
individual variations are best regarded as potentially important explorations around this successful 
theme. (1999: 131-132)
Now the interesting question rises: are average faces beautiful? If this is so, then beautiful faces 
might reflect properties that are beneficial to survival. Judith Langlois and Lori Roggman (1990) 
demonstrated that the average face indeed is beautiful. They used a software program to create 
average faces: pictures were scanned into the computer, which averaged the different features of 
the faces. In this manner images of male and female faces were generated by using 4, 8, 16, or 32 
pictures of real faces. Subjects found the faces of both men and women increasingly attractive the 
more faces were used to create the image. Their conclusion was that average faces indeed are
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beautiful (1990: 119). Also Johnston (1999) has used image-generating software to generate 
average faces. Using many different faces as input, he generated pictures of faces that had average 
features. These faces were indeed evaluated as being more beautiful than the faces of the real 
persons that were used to generate the pictures of average faces (1999: 145-146).
Having established both what the average face looks like and that this face is considered to be 
beautiful, Johnson did another experiment, to see whether these faces were the most attractive. He 
used a program called FacePrints, which makes use of our recognition abilities. Humans are very 
good at recognizing people. Recall, on the other hand, is not one of our best capacities. That is 
why sketch artists often draw pictures of wanted persons that do not look like the criminals the 
police are after. How does the FacePrints program work? Say you have been witness to a crime 
and you want to generate a picture of a suspect you saw. This program shows you a face on a 
computer screen. You can rate it between 0 and 9 depending upon the likeness to the man you 
saw. The program then shows you another face, and another, and another, and each time you 
press a key from 0 to 9. The computer program makes use of algorithms that mimic gene 
transmission, in this case the genes that encode for the different facial features. Each time you 
evaluate someone not as 0, there is some information about the face that is used in one of the 
next faces you see. “The fittest faces would be given a higher rating, and their “children” would 
inherit their genes.” (1999: 43) In the end a picture is generated that is rated 9, which indeed 
looks more like the wanted suspect, than a sketch based on recall (1999: 50).
Johnston used the FacePrints program to generate beautiful female Caucasian faces. The ratings 0 
to 9 now were used to indicate the beauty of the face. The faces that were created were not 
average at all. Men and women generated faces with very specific features that significantly 
differed from the features of the average female face (1999: 146). What are these differences? The 
two most profound differences are that for the more attractive females the lower jaw was smaller 
than in the average face and that -  while the width of the mouth is smaller -  the lips are fuller- 
than-average. Other differences are that the eye-hair distance is larger, while the eye-chin, the eye- 
nose, the eye-mouth and the mouth-chin distances are smaller in the more beautiful faces than in 
the average faces (Johnston & Franklin 1993: 190-191).
Two concerns about these data
One might be concerned about the intersubjectivity of these findings: is beauty not culturally 
determined? Is it not the commercial industry and Hollywood that tell us who we should find
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beautiful? The requests for plastic surgery surely seem to suggest so. This was a serious problem 
for those who searched for universal standards of beauty, but it has been proven wrong. First of 
all, Johnston’s experiment has been replicated in other cultures with the same results (Perrett et al. 
1998: 884-885; Johnston 1999: 146). Furthermore, two related studies yield the same results.
The first of these related studies concerns experiences of beauty evoked by the female body 
figure. The female waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) that is considered to be the most attractive is 0.7 
(Singh 1993; Singh & Young 1995). Again, these results were replicated in other cultures.
Evidence comes from judges of both sexes, different age groups, and different social classes, and it 
has been replicated in different countries like the USA, the island of Azore, Germany, Great Britain, 
Guinea-Bissau, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia [...]. It appears that Singh has found a morphological 
feature which is [...] universally regarded as attractive in women. (Henss 2001: 502-503)
A second study that also shows that (facial) beauty cannot be culturally determined concerns the 
experiences of infants ranging form three to six months of age. Langlois et al. (1991) have shown 
that children in this category prefer attractive faces to nonattractive faces. These results were 
obtained by first selecting pictures of faces that are beautiful and those that are not. The judges, 
of course, were adults. Subsequently, these pictures were shown to young infants (a picture of 
both categories at the same time, one left, one right). The looking time at these stimulus pictures 
was measured, and the result was that young infants looked significantly longer at the attractive 
faces than at the nonattractive faces (1991: 80-82). These results are interpreted as showing that 
young infants prefer attractive faces. It is evident that children of this age cannot have been 
subjected to a lengthy period of cultural indoctrination and have had little or no encounters with 
media telling them who or what to regard as beautiful. So, the widely held view that it takes 
exposure to cultural norms and media to learn what is considered as beautiful in the society you 
live in, is just not true as far as experiences of beauty of other humans are concerned.
A second concern about these results is that the facial features of the most beautiful women 
might be taken to be all neonate features, and that this might provide an explanation why we 
judge them as more beautiful. The idea, then, is that we are programmed by evolution to take 
care of children and it helps if we regard them as being cute. Neonates typically have larger eyes, 
smaller noses, smaller chins and larger lips. At first sight these seem to be precisely those features 
of the most attractive female faces (Cunningham 1986: 925), suggesting that this might suggest 
that the judgment of the most beautiful women is a side effect of our natural tendency to think of 
little children as being cute. However, Johnston has shown that there are important differences
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between youthful and beautiful faces. “Faces that were rated as very beautiful possessed a longer 
eye-nose distances, slightly smaller eyes, and a wider nose and jaw than youthful faces.” (1999: 
156)
In the case of female faces, then, we can conclude the following. Female faces that are judged as 
the most beautiful do have specific features, such as a smaller-than-average chin and fuller-than- 
average lips. Though these features are similar to features of young children, they are not exactly 
the same. These facial features are interculturally judged as being beautiful.
For men, the case is somewhat different, for women judge different kinds of male faces to be the 
most attractive depending on the point in their menstrual cycle. So, paradoxically there are two 
kinds of most attractive male faces. If women use hormone-based contraception or are in a low 
conception risk phase of their cycle, they prefer men with facial features that are a little more 
masculine than the average male face (which also is experienced as attractive). However, if they 
are in a high conception risk phase, their preference changes from a face that is just a little more 
masculine, to a face that has exaggerated masculine traits (Penton-Voak & Perrett 2000: 44). 
These features include a longer and broader lower jaw, more pronounced cheekbones and brow 
ridges, and a darker skin than the average male face. Some research has shown that women that 
are not ovulating prefer a slightly feminized male face, so the results are not consistent here. For 
my present purpose, however, this does not matter.
3. the biology of experiences of beauty evoked by faces
If we take a look at the biology behind experiences of the beauty of faces, we have to consider 
both the biological features of the person having the beautiful face and those of the person 
having the experiences. Since both are closely related, I discuss them simultaneously.
During puberty the human body changes. The growth of the body is controlled by androgens -  
mainly testosterone -  and growth hormones. In females the amount of androgens that is released 
by the adrenaline glands is smaller, which explains why in general women are smaller than men. 
This not only goes for the length of the body, but also for the lower jaw: during puberty the 
lower jaws of men grow more than those of women: “so a lower-than-average androgen 
exposure at puberty would lead to the shorter lower jaw found in attractive female faces.” 
(Johnston 1999: 148)
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A similar explanation can be given for the fuller lips. The fullness of the lips depends upon 
estrogen-controlled fat deposits during puberty. More estrogen results in higher fat deposits in 
typical places like the mouth. Full lips, then, indicate a more-than-average estrogen exposure 
during puberty.
The facial features of the beautiful female face, then, are markers of exposure to low androgen 
and high estrogen levels during puberty. Since, testosterone inhibits and estrogen stimulates fat 
deposits in the gluteofemoral region (buttocks and thighs), while testosterone stimulates and 
estrogen inhibits fat deposits in the abdominal regions (Singh 1993: 294), the same mixture of 
hormones is responsible for the facial features of the most beautiful women and also for their 0.7 
WHR.
So, both the facial features of the more beautiful women and their WHR are makers of the low 
androgen and high estrogen levels during development. The hormones that determine the bodily 
and facial features I just discussed, also determine a women’s fertility. Very fertile women 
typically have this mix of high estrogen levels and low androgen levels. So, the markers of this 
mix are also high-fertility markers (Johnston & Franklin 1993: 183; Perrett et al. 1998: 884). 
Furthermore, Singh notes that the 0.7 WHR also indicate health status (Singh 1993: 295). This is 
corroborated by the evidence that a high WHR (0.85) is correlated with -  amongst others -  
gallbladder disease, heart disease and stroke (Johnston & Franklin 1993: 195).
Can we say a similar thing about the masculine traits? The fact that there is a change in 
preference when women are in a high conception risk phase suggests that women are attracted to 
men that have some particularly good features for reproductive success. This indeed is the case. 
Again, testosterone exposure during puberty plays an important role. As described above, the 
typical male traits, like the large lower jaw are determined by the testosterone level (which is good 
for reproductive success as we will see in a moment). Hence, the two kinds of most beautiful 
male faces (the one slightly more masculine, the other with exaggerated male features) have 
markers that indicate high and very high testosterone levels.
These data are supported by scientific investigation into male body bilateral symmetry and the 
preference of women for male odors. The findings are strikingly similar. Women that use 
hormone-based contraception or are in a low risk conception phase of their cycle have no 
preference for the scent of males. There are two pheromones in the male scent that play an
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important role, androstenol and androstenone, of which the latter is the more prominent odor. 
Androstenol promotes the female attraction to men, while androstenone does not. In contrast, 
when women are not ovulating, androstenone induces negative attitudes towards men. When 
they are ovulating their attitude shifts towards neutral (Grammer 1993). Overall, the evaluation of 
male scent shifts towards attractive when women are ovulating. Furthermore, women that are in 
a high conception risk phase do prefer the scent of men that are relatively symmetrical (Thornhill & 
Gangestad 1999: 191). It is this latter result that supports the results of the facial research, for 
body symmetry is also a marker of high levels of testosterone. So, attractive men do have certain 
facial features, are relatively symmetrical and have an attractive scent, which are all markers of 
high levels of testosterone.
High levels on testosterone are associated with good health, both phenotypically and 
genotypically, i.e. high levels of testosterone are correlated with “good genes” (Johnston et al. 
2001: 262-263). Furthermore, high levels of testosterone are also positively associated with 
growth rate, longevity, fecundity, and health status (Thornhill & Gangestad 1999: 177; Johnston 
et al. 2001: 263).
As I noticed earlier, there is some discussion about how to interpret the other most beautiful 
male face, because results differ on whether this is a slightly masculinized face or a slightly 
demasculinized face (Penton-Voak & Perrett 2000: 39). Further research will have to be done to 
determine whether the difference in hormonal status of individual women who are not ovulating 
influences the preference for a slightly masculinized or a slightly demasculinized face. In either 
case the evolutionary explanation will shift towards the following account. When women are not 
ovulating they are not interested in good genes; they are interested in a good provider, a man who 
will help raise the children. Hence, they are looking for a reliable man, and a man with extremely 
high levels of testosterone is not a good co-parent. “Indeed, increasing testosterone levels in 
males is associated with more troubled relationships (including increased infidelity, violence and 
divorce).” (Perrett et al. 1998: 886)
What we have seen so far is that combining phenomenology, psychology and biology -  i.e. 
applying the natural method -  shows that the facial features of men and women that evoke 
experiences of beauty in us are markers of fertility, good health and good genes. What does this 
tell us about phenomenal consciousness?
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4. experiences of beauty evoked by faces are evolution’s shorthand
Combining the above data with previous conclusions, the following follows. Feelings of beauty, 
like all other phenomenal experiences are presentations. These presentations can be used as 
representations. When these feelings are evoked by the physical features of a potential mate, 
these feelings are nature’s way of telling us that this mate is a good candidate for reproduction, 
that he or she is very fertile, or in very good phenotypic and genetic health. In other words: 
experiences of beauty evoked by facial features track fertility, health and good genes. A 
phenomenal experience that is used as a representation, then, has a double representational 
content. First, it represents the secondary property of the represented object (the object is 
beautiful). Secondly, it represents the primary property of the represented object (the object is 
fertile or in good health). Usually the representing organism interprets the presentation as the 
former representation and is oblivious to the content of the latter.
Explicitly expressing the nonphenomenal content o f  phenomenal representations
Humans nowadays are linguistic creatures. This means that we might find out what our indirect 
phenomenal representations represent. In the case of experiences of beauty evoked by faces we 
have done so. We now are able to explicitly describe the implicit content of the phenomenal 
representation, viz. in the form of linguistic statements like: “this man has good genes” or “this 
woman is very fertile.”
Since it is possible to express the nonphenomenal content of phenomenal representations 
explicitly, why then did this indirect manner of representing evolve? It seems that indirect 
representation takes an unnecessary detour. There are two reasons why evolution did not go for 
the direct representation: (1) direct representation requires more than indirect representation, and 
(2) even though it seems to make an extra step, indirect representation is much faster than direct 
representation.14
Direct representation requires more than indirect representation
In order to directly express the knowledge that a conspecific has good reproductive features, the 
representing creature has to have been developed in such a way that it is capable of language. 
Being able to develop and understand a language is such a complex ability, that the ancestors of 
the creatures must have had another way of recognizing the most fertile and healthy partners, 
either directly or indirectly. This happens when one recognizes a conspecific that is fertile,
14 Again, talk of “reasons”, “intentions” etcetera when discussion evolution has not to be taken teleologically.
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because one recognized the conspecific that is beautiful: if one experiences beauty when seeing 
another creature, one selfdom thinks “this person is a good candidate for reproduction.” Even 
though the recognition is successful, the nonphenomenal content of the representation is not 
necessarily known. Most of us will recognize beautiful people, while just a small part will believe 
that these beautiful people are the most fertile people or the ones with the best genes.
Furthermore, the content of the direct linguistic representation is also complex, one has to know at 
least something about reproduction at the level of transmitting genes before one can understand 
the sentence “this woman is very fertile.” An information pickup system that has to be endowed 
with all kinds of complex information before it can find its way in the world surely is something 
that could not have been evolved without prior evolutionary stages in which the ancestors of the 
system had to get their information in another way. So, a complex information pickup system can 
only develop from systems that require less to pick up the information that is relevant for their 
survival and reproduction.
Indirect representation is faster than direct representation
The second reason why the indirect way of representing evolved and not the direct way is that 
the indirect way is much faster. As argued before phenomenal experiences are immediate 
presentations. Even though qua representation they are indirect, qua presentation they are direct 
and it cannot get any faster than that. Deducing that someone has good reproductive features 
from the perception of -  say -  a symmetrical face takes much longer than seeing that one is 
beautiful.
Evolution’s shorthand
Natural selection does not care about direct representation, nor about getting to know what 
actually is represented by a given phenomenal experience. Natural selection only is interested in 
what works: a quick representation of a face as beautiful works better if it is linked to the 
appropriate reaction, than any direct representation of fertility, since it requires less background 
knowledge and is an immediate presentation. Those who did not respond in the appropriate 
manner evidently did not pass on their genes. Phenomenal consciousness then (at least in the 
case of experiences of beauty evoked by faces) works fast and contains sufficient information for 
the organism to survive and reproduce, even though the represented properties are not directly 
represented and leaves out any explicit information about the reproductive features of a 
conspecific. Phenomenal experiences, when used as representations, provide us (and other
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animals) with a fast way to pick up highly complex information in a glimpse. This is why I call 
phenomenal consciousness evolution ’s shorthand.
4.1 two other examples
One can imagine all other kinds of examples where phenomenal representation of the 
environment (including the organism itself) is preferred by evolution over another, slower but 
maybe more precise way of representing. Other empirical studies have to show whether these 
examples are indeed correct. I will discuss three unsupported but what I believe to be plausible 
examples to clarify the evolutionary shorthand theory of phenomenal consciousness.
Predators
In the environment in which humans evolved it would be a good thing to directly represent a 
predator as something that is threatening. A direct recognition and an immediate response are 
essential to this. This does not mean that there are no other ways of representing a tiger coming 
out of the woods. One can linguistically represent the situation and the response as follows: “that 
moving thing over there coming out of the woods, is an animal that is probably a feline, and if it 
is hungry it will try to eat me, which is bad for the survival for my genes and myself, hence I 
should run, hide, or kill it.” By the time the observer is halfway his reasoning, he will be the 
tiger’s dinner. Here too, the fact that phenomenal representations are evolution’s shorthand is 
evident: it is much faster and therefore evolutionary more advantageous than a complex linguistic 
representation.
Gathering food
The fact that phenomenal experiences are evolution’s shorthand of representing complex 
information can also be made plausible by considering how we gather our food. We do not 
wander around with our mouths open hoping an apple or a piece of meat gets in. In order to get 
our food we cannot just interact in a passive manner like some single-cell organisms can. In order 
to get our food we have to actively explore our environment. But our environment is a complex 
system and everywhere we go huge amounts of information are available. In chapter ten we saw 
that the color of an object is partly determined by the reflective properties of its surroundings. 
This might give us a hint of how food detection based on experiences of color works. Suppose 
we are confronted with an environment in which many different kinds of vegetation are present. 
It makes very good sense that we then can distinguish the ripe tomatoes from those that are not 
ripe yet, and that we can do this from dawn to dusk, i.e. that we can do this under different kinds
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of lumination, which in laboratory conditions do change the color of an object placed out of a 
context. Since in natural circumstances the lumination changes for an entire scene, the 
phenomenon of color constancy plays an important role in distinguishing the ripe tomatoes from 
the unripe and the background. But we are not aware of the properties neither of the light nor of 
the reflectance properties of the surface of the tomatoes and their surroundings. We use our 
experience of color: the ripe tomato pops out and immediately draws our attention (that is, for 
color normals under every natural light condition).
There is some supported for this example. The popping out of red objects in a green 
environment is a recent phenomenon by evolutionary criteria. Most animals are dichromats, 
lacking long-wave sensitive cones. Their system consists of short- and middle-wave sensitive 
cones. This is commonly referred to as the ancient system. Some 30 million years ago there was a 
co-evolution of fruits in trees that became big enough for primates to be worth eating (and too 
big for birds) and the trichromatic color vision of those primates. The genes that are responsible 
for coding both the long- and middle-wave sensitive cones have 96% of their code sequence in 
common and are located close to each other on the X-chromosome. This makes it both very 
plausible that the long-wave sensitive cones were split into long- and middle-wave sensitive cones 
and that this split is a recent one (McIntyre 2002: 31-33).
Proprioception
The fact that the content of phenomenal experiences can represented in another, but more time­
consuming manner is illustrated by persons who lack proprioception. There are few individuals 
that have no inner experience of how their bodies are positioned. To get this information, they 
have to look where their limbs are. Not until they have this information can they walk, and even 
then it is heartbreaking to see how severely impaired their movements are. The lack of 
proprioception shows that the same information can be represented in another way and that it 
can be used for the same purpose, but that the representation is no longer a direct presentation, 
and the use of this information requires a time-consuming processing of the information.
4.2 affordances
The account of phenomenal consciousness as evolution’s shorthand is somewhat similar to 
James Gibson’s (1966) account of affordances.
When the constant properties of constant objects are perceived (the shape, size, color, texture,
composition, motion, animation, and position relative to other objects), the observer can go on to
158
detect their affordances. [...] I mean simply what things furnish, for good or ill. What they afford the 
observer, after all, depends on their properties. (Gibson 1966: 285)
As is clear from the previous chapter, I do not believe that objects really have colors, for these 
are secondary properties, so my account differs from Gibson’s in that I defend the position that 
we can use our own experiences as indicators of the primary properties of the objects in our 
environment. However, since we project our phenomenal experiences onto the objects out there 
(hence the qualification secondary property of an object) and this is done reliably so (a system that 
would not do that would not survive in evolution by natural selection) we still can classify this as 
detecting the affordance of the object. In the case of the ripe tomato we perceive its edibility via 
our experience of red. If we had to pickup this information by representing the edibility as edibility, 
then we should have knowledge about the function of eating, which is evolutionary impossible to 
have developed before the actual eating. O f course it is also possible to represent the edibility of 
a ripe tomato in another way, as protanopes and deuteranopes have to do: instead of the color, 
one can use the shape to detect where it is, and can then use the brightness of the color the 
tomato has and also the way it feels to evaluate its edibility. Needless to say that it takes more 
time to do so. The facts that it can be done and that it takes more time support my claim that 
phenomenal presentations are used as shorthand to represent information that can also be 
represented in another way. Instead of immediately seeing that the tomato is edible, one can also 
get this information by detecting where the tomato is and consequently squeezing it.
5. some speculations about the experiences of beauty evoked by landscapes and by art
The evolutionary shorthand theory can account for why presentations such as the phenomenal 
experiences of beauty evoked by faces evolved. What about experiences of beauty evoked by 
other natural and by nonnatural objects and events? Can the evolutionary shorthand theory also 
provide us with an explanation of these phenomenal experiences? First, according to the 
evolutionary shorthand theory phenomenal experiences are presentations that can be used as 
representations. Having said that, nothing is said about any possible restriction to what it can be 
used to represent. It is because of the fundamental possibility for any presentation to represent 
anything, that synesthetic representations are different representations and not 
misrepresentations. Even though I have argued that selection is not blind as to what is 
represented, this fundamental possibility of presentations to represent anything implies that 
presentations might just as well be used to represent objects that evidently have no evolutionary 
function, or those in which we do not immediately see what it is that is represented that is of 
evolutionary importance. These two might even be related.
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Experiences of beauty are also used to represent features of natural objects other than those of 
conspecifics. For example experiences of beauty evoked by landscapes might represent that the 
environment is one that would be very beneficial for our ancestors: a beautiful landscape might 
indicate food, water and shelter against predators and other natural threats, as argued by Jay 
Appleton (1975: 68-74).
Experiences of beauty evoked by art might be related to this, in the way that we appreciate those 
properties in works of art that are abstracted from natural objects and scenes. Many works of art, 
for example, contain a high degree of symmetry, which we saw earlier was a feature of healthy 
bodies.
This is of course very speculative. There is a huge gap in the empirical data that would support 
claims like these. However, that is not relevant to the point I want to stress here: The important 
thing is that the evolutionary shorthand theory is in principle capable to explain why different 
natural and nonnatural objects can evoke similar phenomenal experiences and still be an 
evolutionary and representational account of phenomenal consciousness.
These conclusions drawn from the case study of experiences of beauty concludes my 
presentation of empirical data supporting the evolutionary shorthand theory of the phenomenal 
mind as explained in chapter two.
In the last chapter of this dissertation I will look at three objections to any representational 
theory of phenomenal consciousness. I will argue that the evolutionary shorthand theory of the 
phenomenal mind can counter these arguments. Besides defending the evolutionary shorthand 
theory of the phenomenal mind one further conclusion will be drawn based on the empirical data 
used in the third argument against representationalism: contrary to what one might expect 
phenomenal representations are not detailed representations.
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
THREE THREATS TO REPRESENTATIONALISM REFUTED
A representationalist theory of the phenomenal mind -  even if it does not accept that ell 
phenomenal states are representational -  should address the following three problems. All 
arguments apply to those phenomenal presentations that are used as representations. First of all, 
it might be argued that a representational account of phenomenal consciousness loses 
consciousness, for it tries to reduce phenomenal experiences to representations. But what we 
know of representations in general -  e.g. photographs, movies and natural representations like 
smoke representing fire -  does not tell us anything about phenomenal consciousness. An account 
that reduces phenomenal experiences to representations loses consciousness.
Secondly, if the phenomenal experiences are used as representations and they supervene on brain 
states, do they represent the same as the neural states? If the answer is yes, this would mean that 
there is a problem of overrepresentation: anything that is represented by the phenomenal states is 
already represented by the brain state. This then, would amount to conscious inessentialism, as 
described in chapter one. This position is defended by Max Velmans (2000). This argument can 
be interpreted as a second reductionist threat: phenomenal representations can be reduced to 
neural representations.
Thirdly, there are theories that are based on the assumption that there are no internal 
representations at all (neither neural nor phenomenal). We can perform any action without any 
internal representation. The outside world functions as its own representation. This is what I call 
representation inessentialism. A variant of this theory is defended by Kevin O ’Regan and Alva 
Noë (2001). They present empirical data to support their theory. Any representationalist theory 
of the phenomenal mind has to take into account these data.
In this chapter I will show that the first reductionist threat is no threat at all for phenomenal 
representations create intensional contexts. Furthermore, both inessentialisms are incorrect. In short, 
the evolutionary shorthand theory demonstrates that conscious inessentialism is wrong, for it 
falsely assumes that a phenomenal representation represents the same as its subvenient neural 
representation. Representation inessentialism is incorrect for the following reason: it heavily 
draws on refuting the representationalist account by showing that the alleged internal
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representation is not a detailed copy of the outside world. Empirical data indeed support this 
claim. However, this does only refute a representationalist theory of the phenomenal mind if a 
theory would accept such a claim. At least the evolutionary shorthand does not.
1. rebuttal of the first reductionist threat: losing consciousness
A common issue concerning any representational account of phenomenal consciousness has a 
positive and a negative interpretation. The positive view is the following: if we can develop a 
representational account of phenomenal consciousness, then the problems of phenomenal 
consciousness can be solved, for we understand in general how one thing can represent another. 
All we have to do is to show that phenomenal experiences are representations. The negative view 
is the following: given the strategy proposed by the positive view, we are reducing phenomenal 
consciousness to representational states in general. But representational states in general are not 
phenomenally conscious. Hence, by reducing consciousness to representational states we 
eliminate consciousness. This then, would be an argument to accept conscious inessentialism (Cf. 
chapter one, section two).
In my view the positive view is too optimistic and the negative view to pessimistic. We need to 
show that we can give a representational account of phenomenal consciousness, without running 
the risk of losing it. I believe that the evolutionary shorthand theory meets this demand, for three 
reasons. First, and this may already be enough, phenomenal experiences are not always 
representations. Hence, phenomenal experiences are not always intentional states, which implies 
a general theory of intentionality will not be able to explain all the aspects of phenomenal 
consciousness.
Secondly, as I already argued, phenomenal experiences are shorthand, and this is necessarily so. 
For a nonconscious system to perform just as we do, it would first need to know many things 
about reproduction and evolution before it can react in an appropriate manner to 
nonphenomenal representations like “this is a predator and it’s coming toward you.” In order to 
both understand this and react as fast as we do, this implies that the system has to be complex at 
the start of its evolutionary development, it needs to have stored knowledge about predators and it has 
to process the information very fast. This is not how evolution via natural selection work, in 
evolution things go from simple to complex, not vice versa.
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Thirdly, even if we look only at those situations in which phenomenal presentations are used as 
representations, we do not run the risk of losing phenomenal consciousness, for phenomenal 
representations create intensional contexts, which do not allow for substitution -  hence do not allow 
for reduction -  of phenomenal representations to nonphenomenal representations. For any 
intensional context goes that, even though we know from a third person perspective that two 
representational states represent the same object, property or event, we are not at liberty to 
substitute the representational states in their first person context, for this might change the truth 
value.
If we accept that phenomenal experiences are projected back on objects, generating secondary 
properties, and that this is an indirect way of representing primary properties, then it is legitimate 
to conclude that if phenomenal presentations are used as representations of properties of natural 
objects, all such phenomenal representations create intensional contexts, in a way similar to the 
creation of intensional contexts by experiences of beauty evoked by facial features.
This shows that the reductionist threat is no real threat at all, for there is no way we can 
substitute a linguistic representation for the phenomenal representation, for the person having a 
certain experience (that is representational) might not know what the primary properties are that 
are represented. Hence, we do not run the risk of reductionism.
Before I turn to the second reductionist threat, I first want to point out a difference between the 
way intensionality plays a role in my argument and the role it plays in an argument of Michael Tye. 
Tye presents an account of how perceptual sensations can represent. I agree with this account as 
far as perceptual sensations are a subclass of phenomenal experiences. Tye, however, wants so 
show that all phenomenal states are representational, hence he has to show that even afterimages 
are representational, a claim I deny. He uses the intensional character of phenomenal states to 
show that afterimages represent that something has a certain color F  and a certain shape G. And 
even though F  might be red, which is the color of most fire engines, something is represented as 
red and not as having the color of most fire engines: experiencing something as red creates an 
intensional context (1995: 107). I agree that it does. However claiming that this applies to all 
phenomenal states is begging the question against those that reject representationalist theories of 
the phenomenal mind and those that argue that not every phenomenal experience is a 
representation. It is only after we have established that a certain phenomenal presentation is used 
as a representation, that we can conclude that it creates an intensional context. In the case of
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afterimages it is clear that there is not something that is represented as being colored or having a 
shape. If one has an afterimage, one simply experiences a color and a shape and it is very clear 
that there is no object that has this color and shape. Hence, there is nothing that can be 
substituted for what is represented, for there is nothing that is represented.
2. rebuttal of the second reductionist threat: conscious inessentialism via
overrepresentation
There is a second reductionist threat. This threat comes from the conceivability of the truth of 
overrepresentation: the phenomenal representation can be reduced (and thereby eliminated) to 
the neural representation on which it supervenes, for both represent the same.
If phenomenal presentations are used as representations, why then are they not superfluous? If I 
am right, that phenomenal presentations supervene on neural states that are also representational, 
doesn’t this lead to what I call the problem of overrepresentation? The argument would be the 
following. Both the neural and the phenomenal state seem to represent the same features of the 
same referent. If this indeed is the case, then all the representational work is already done by the 
neural representation. What, then, is the additional function of phenomenal experience? 
Evidently, the problem of overrepresentation is closely related to the problem of causal 
overdetermination: if our brains do all the causal work what, then, does phenomenal 
consciousness do?
Both the problem of overrepresentation and causal overdetermination amount to either one of 
the following positions. First, one might defend epiphenomenalism with respect to phenomenal 
consciousness. Secondly, there is the related position in which one accepts the problems of 
overdetermination and overrepresentation as a paradox, like Chalmers’ paradox of phenomenal 
judgment (1996b; Cf. chapter three) or Velmans’ causal paradox (2000), without embracing 
epiphenomenalism. I believe that in both cases they are merely denying that their views lead to 
epiphenomenalism, for their theories clearly implicate that -  if they are right -  phenomenal states 
are neither causally efficacious, nor do they represent anything over and above the physical 
representations with which they are correlated.
Thirdly, one might conclude that phenomenal states can be reduced to neural states and that 
eliminativism is correct. If the phenomenal representations encodes the same information about 
a referent as the neural representations on which they supervene, and do not do anything that is
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not already done by these states, we can reduce the phenomenal states to the neural states, hence 
we are losing consciousness.
Either of these positions can be viewed as forms of conscious inessentialism. I will argue that the 
information contained in the phenomenal state represents different features from the referent 
than the neural representation does. This shows that there is no overrepresentation, hence, 
overrepresentation is no reason to accept conscious inessentialism. The further implication is that 
we do not have to choose between the three options I just mentioned. The case study of 
experiences of beauty evoked by faces of conspecifics can be used to demonstrate that there is no 
problem of overrepresentation.
What do the neural representations evoked by a face represent? First, they represent the different 
frequencies of the light that was reflected from the face, even though we are not consciously 
aware what those frequencies are. I believe that this already is enough to show that the neural and 
the phenomenal representation differ with respect to their contents. Secondly, the brain 
reconstructs the features of the face, based on the features of the light that stimulates the retina. 
What is represented neurally are the shape and size of the face, not whether it is beautiful or not, 
even though these are of course necessary for the experiences of beauty. It is the integration at 
the phenomenal level that results in experiences of beauty.
What is represented at the neural level are some of the primary qualities of the thing that is 
observed, like the shape, the size, the kind of light that it reflects, while the phenomenal 
representations represent those features that are of interest to the representing organism: the 
health or fertility of a possible mate or whether something is edible or not. Clearly, those 
properties are not represented at all at the neural level.
Another example is that the neural representation of a ripe tomato is a representation of the 
reflectance properties of the tomato (and its surroundings), while the phenomenal representation 
does not but it does represent that it is edible, via the phenomenal experience of red.
Yet another example might be the phenomenal experience of fear, while perceiving a tiger. Again, 
the neural representation is just one of the shape, size, movement etcetera of the object, and of 
the properties of the light that is reflected by it. The fact that it is a predator is not represented at 
the neural level. The neural representations on which phenomenal representations supervene but
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represent different aspects of the represented object. This means that phenomenal 
representations cannot be reduced to their subvenient neural representations. This, in turn, 
implies that the problem of overrepresentation does not arise, for there simply is no 
overrepresentation. Hence, we are not forced to accept conscious inessentialism and choose 
between the epiphenomenal and eliminativist version of this position.
3. rebuttal of representation inessentialism
I have just argued that the two reductionist threats to a representational theory of the 
phenomenal mind are in fact no threats at all. The two arguments started by accepting the claim 
that phenomenal experiences are representations, and went from there to show that reductionism 
might follow.
Recently, a more fundamental criticism of any representationalist account of phenomenal 
consciousness has been put forward by Kevin O ’Regan and Alva Noë (2001): we do not need 
representations at all to explain hat we are (visually) conscious of something. We could call this 
representation inessentialism: representations are inessential to our conscious actions (at least internal 
or mental representations are). O ’Regan and Noë present empirical data that support their view.
I will now address this question and show that from an evolutionary point of view this account 
only applies to behavior (and not action) triggered by single cues. Since it is doubtful that this 
behavior is guided by consciousness, it is also doubtful that the account given by O ’Regan and 
Noë is an account of consciousness at all. Furthermore, the evolutionary shorthand theory can 
handle the empirical data that O ’Regan and Noë present.
O ’Regan and Noë claim that a representational account of consciousness cannot be correct:
Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical and psychological approaches to vision rest on 
the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The 
activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The 
problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a 
detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. [...] We propose that seeing is 
a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal 
representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, 
external, representation. (2001: 939)
O ’Regan and Noë focus on visual consciousness. According to them “the experience of seeing 
occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor
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contingency.” (2001: 939) To see how this is an account of consciousness, we first have to 
answer two questions: What are sensorimotor contingencies? And What are the laws that govern them?
Consider a car that passes by. Most people will have different kinds of experiences: you will see 
the car passing by, you will also hear it, and if the car passes by closely you will also smell it and 
feel the wind it produces. Some of the light reflected by the car will fall on your retina, and the 
pattern on your retina will change as you or the car moves. These changes are governed by 
certain laws. Something similar goes for the auditory experience of the car passing by: here it is 
not light that is the stimulus, but oscillations in the air. These obey different laws than light does. 
Also, since it is not the eyes that are affected by the stimulus, different laws apply when the ears 
move relatively to the car, then in the case of the eyes that move relatively to the car. The 
difference between seeing the car and hearing the car then are governed by laws that are 
determined by the exploring sensory modalities and what they are exploring (2001: 941). These 
changes are what O ’Regan and Noë call sensorimotor contingencies. Sensorimotor contingencies come 
in two kinds: those that are determined by the sensory modality (corresponding to the traditional 
notion of “sensation”) and those fixed by the character of the object that is being tracked 
(corresponding to the traditional notion of “perception”) (2001: 943).
Each sensory modality, then, has its own sensorimotor contingencies and the laws that come 
with them. It is these laws that play an essential role in the theory of consciousness of O ’Regan 
and Noë. They focus on vision. Two basic conditions have to be satisfied for vision: An animal 
has to explore the environment in a way that is governed by both kinds of sensorimotor 
contingencies, and it has to do so by actively exercising its mastery of the appropriate laws (2001: 
943). This means that the animal must have knowledge of these sensorimotor contingencies and 
of the appropriate laws:
Visual perception can now be understood as the activity of exploring the environment in ways mediated by knowledge 
of the relevant sensorimotor contingencies. And to be a visual perceiver is, thus, to be capable of exercising 
mastery of vision-related rules of sensorimotor contingency. (2001: 943)
It seems that the mastery of the rules of the sensorimotor contingencies is enough, and that we 
do not need an additional representation of the world to guide our actions. O ’Regan and Noë 
support their view by presenting empirical data about change and inattentional blindness. They 
use these data to argue against the intuition that we have a detailed internal representation of 
everything we look at.
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They support their view that this is not the case by the empirical data coming from change and 
inattentional blindness experiments. In change blindness subjects are looking at a scene in which 
gradually a radical change is made. For instance the shirt of the person in the scene changes 
color, or a road slowly appears in a corn-field. This changes is not noticed. Even more shocking 
to most people is inattentional blindness. Subjects are shown a movie in which two teams are 
passing basketballs at each other. One is instructed to count the times the white team passes the 
ball. When performing this task approximately half of the observers fail to notice the woman in a 
gorilla suit that walks into the middle of the display, thumped its chest, and leaves again (Simons 
& Chabris 1999). From these experiments it follows that “Our intuition that we richly represent 
the visual details of our environment is illusory.” (Simons 1997: 501) This is exactly what 
O ’Regan and Noë argue for.
The results of the experiments showed that in many cases observers have great difficulty seeing 
changes, even though the changes are very large, and occur in full view -  they are perfectly visible 
to someone who knows what they are. Such results are surprising if one espouses the view that we 
should “see” everything that we are looking at: It is very troubling to be shown a picture where a 
change is occurring repetitively and in full view, without being able to see the ch ange. The 
experience is quite contradictory with one’s subjective impression of richness, of “seeing 
everything” in the visual field. However, the results are completely coherent with the view of seeing 
which is being defended here. (2001: 954)
The question is whether these data are also enough to get representationalism into serious 
trouble. This is what O ’Regan and Noë seem to think.
It is generally thought that somewhere in the brain an internal representation of the outside world 
must be set up which, when it is activated, gives us the experience that we all share of the rich, 
three-dimensional, colorful world. (2001: 939)
It will be clear that I do not agree with O ’Regan and Noë, for I defend a representationalist 
account of phenomenal consciousness. I will present three points of criticism. The first concerns 
a problem in the theory itself, the second is a defense of the need of representations for complex 
situations as is argued for by Kim Sterelny (1999). The third problem seems to be the most 
serious: empirical data refute any representationalist account. The last part of this chapter will be 
dedicated to refuting the argument that O ’Regan and Noë get from these data.
Point o f  criticism #  1
The first point of criticism is one that in my opinion is both obvious and fatal: their theory lacks 
the same explanatory power they claim the representational theories are supposed to lack. 
O ’Regan and Noë accuse theories that accept internal representations of having only found the
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neural correlations of consciousness at best, and since correlation is not causation these findings 
do not explain why activation of these representations should give rise to consciousness. The 
question why these correlates -  say 40 Hz synchronous oscillations -  produce consciousness 
remains unanswered, and “the problem of consciousness would simply be pushed back into a 
deeper hiding place[.]” (2001: 940) This is misleading. The firm corroboration of 40 Hz 
hypothesis (Cf. chapter nine) does not push consciousness deeper into a hiding place, but puts a 
spotlight on it: this is where we have to search for an explanation. It rules out other explanations, 
hence we do not have to waste time any more to -  say -  proposed explanations of consciousness 
at the quantum level. So, even though correlation is not explanation, searching for the neural 
correlates of consciousness is not as futile as O ’Regan and Noë want to us to believe. The real 
problem with their own theory is that it does not explain why consciousness arises in some 
creatures, for O ’Regan and Noë themselves claim that their account of consciousness applies also 
to nonconscious systems such as a missile guidance system (2001: 943). But if an account applies 
both to conscious and nonconscious systems, then evidently the account cannot explain 
consciousness.
Point o f  criticism #  2
The second point of criticism is derived from Kim Sterelny (1999). Sterelny argues against the so- 
called theory of situated agency, which claims that intelligent action is possible without internal 
representations. Part of this theory is that the information is stored outside the organism (1999: 
204). Even though O ’Regan and Noë primarily give an account of visual consciousness and not 
of intelligent action, the argument Sterelny makes against the situated agency theory also holds 
against the sensorimotor theory.
The argument is straightforward and is implied by the evolutionary shorthand theory of 
phenomenal consciousness. Many organisms are agents, and to be an agent is more than just 
reacting to the environment based on single cues. Some animal behavior can be described this 
way. For instance ants and bees do not see that a nestmate is dead. The way they recognize that 
they are dead is by the detection of the oleic acid that is produced by the decay of the dead 
nestmate. After detection they clean their nest, hence the disposal of dead nestmates is driven by 
a single cue. Much insect behavior can be described this way. Behavior based on single cues is 
prone to parasitism. If an organism produced the same chemical cue as young insects do, they 
can enter the nest and will be fed by the adult insects (1999: 206). However, if the environment 
becomes complex and many different objects are the causes of the same stimulus (the same cue),
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then one needs to choose between where one reacts to, and this means one needs to develop 
preferences and desires. But this is not possible without having representations of one’s 
environment, for choosing implies planning: not only does one need to perceive how the world is 
now, one also needs to represent the world how it will be if X  rather than Y  is pursued. Having 
preferences and planning one’s actions, requires representations of both the desires and ways to 
fulfill them (1999: 211, 214).
Representing the world as it will be, evidently cannot be done without representations, hence 
knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies will not be enough. O ’Regan and Noë’s theory might 
be enough to account for the behavior of insects, that seems to be single cue driven (at least 
some of their behavior is). Where such insect behavior is concerned, the demands that (a) than 
changes in cues are followed by a behavior response, and (b) that the mastery of the 
sensorimotor contingencies shows in the behavior of the insect (2001: 943) are met. However, it 
is precisely in these cases that the other mind problem becomes a real problem (as opposed to 
the question of whether other humans do have minds): do insects have consciousness? A positive 
answer to this question is by no means evident, for all we have to go on in determining whether 
other animals are conscious is the similarity of their behavior and brain, compared to ours. Sverre 
Sjölander (2001) uses these criteria to evaluate animal consciousness. He argues that other 
mammals and birds probably also have consciousness, for their brains are similar and so are their 
actions. A cat for instance will chase a mouse when it disappears from view; the cat seems to 
have a representation of what is behind its field of view. Reptiles, like snakes do have brains that 
are dissimilar to ours. So is their behavior. If a mouse flees behind a rock, a snake stops looking 
at it, does not look for it, and does not behave as if it knows that there is a mouse behind the 
rock. Sjölander, then, argues that we cannot be sure whether îeptiles do have consciousness. 
Since insects differ even more from us in brain and behavior demonstrating that they do have 
consciousness is an even harder problem.
Since it is hard to determine whether insects have conscious experiences, and O ’Regan and Noë’s 
theory seems to be adequate only to explain the information pickup and behavior of animals like 
insects, it is hard to see how theirs can be a theory of consciousness. A theory of consciousness 
should focus on those animals we are sure of that they are conscious beings. This means that we 
should focus on humans (and other mammals and birds). In our own case the environment is of 
such complexity that one needs make choices and plan ahead, which makes representations of 
what one wants and how the environment will chance according to one’s actions.
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Point o f  criticism #  3
My third point of criticism concerns the claim that change and inattentional blindness show that 
representationalism cannot be correct, since representationalism adheres to the view that we have 
an inner and detailed representation of the outside world. Clearly, we do not have such inner 
detailed representations, for then we would notice such a substantial change in our visual field as 
a gorilla walking into a basketball field. However, having an internal representation does not 
imply that this representation is as detailed as the outside world. What would the evolutionary 
function be of representing the outside world in every detail? I already argued that evolution does 
not care about what is a direct representation and the same goes for a detailed representation. 
Apparently we can go about in the world perfectly well using representations that are not as 
detailed as the world around us is. From an evolutionary viewpoint it would even be implausible 
if we had such representations, for then we would have too much information about the objects 
and events in our environment: we would have to evaluate every detail, which probably would be 
a time-consuming process. It makes much more sense to consciously represent only those 
features that are of interest to the organism, with the option that a shift of attention can result in 
seeing details where one did not before. The data provided by change and inattentional blindness 
experiments show exactly that evolution indeed did not work that way.
The three objections against representationalist theories of the phenomenal mind put forward in 
this chapter have all been met by the evolutionary theory of tie phenomenal mind. While 
theories of Tye and Dretske might not have an answer to the first objection, the view that 
phenomenal experiences are not always used as representations neutralizes that objection. 
Furthermore, where Velmans gets himself into trouble, viz. by his claim that it is plausible that 
the neural and the corresponding phenomenal representation represent the same, I have shown 
that these representations have different content. The objection of O ’Regan and Noë, at last, 
does not stand up whatever representationalist theory of the phenomenal mind one defends.
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EPILOGUE
In this dissertation I have argued against those who believe for different reasons that scientific 
investigation will not help to solve the problem of phenomenal consciousness. The chapters in 
which I present empirical data show otherwise. These chapters form the most important 
argument in favor of the view that science can help. The evolutionary shorthand theory provides 
a view on the phenomenal that is not new: in the long tradition of thinking about mind and body 
all of the different aspects have been proposed. In this dissertation, though, all the different 
aspects are the result, not of armchair philosophy, but of the combination of empirical data from 
different scientific disciplines. What follows is the characterization of the phenomenal mind, as 
presented in chapter two:
Phenomenal experiences form a heterogeneous set of causally efficacious internal and direct 
presentations. In most normal conditions they are used to represent real properties of external 
objects or bodily states in a nonconceptual, indirect though reliable way, approximately projecting 
them back on these states with which they causally covary. In other words: they represent or track 
those properties. The normal conditions are those conditions in which the experiencing organisms 
evolved. Phenomenal representations are a species-specific evolutionary shorthand for complex 
information about the environment or the body that -  in principle -  could also be represented in 
another less economic way. I t is precisely this economic manner of representing, which makes 
phenomenal consciousness a feature that is selected for in evolution by natural selection. In all other 
conditions phenomenal experiences are either just presentations not representing anything (e.g. 
afterimages), or they are used to represent features that are not found in the environment in which 
the experiencing organisms evolved (e.g. the beauty of art). Since phenomenal experiences were 
selected for their representational abilities, experiencing organisms have the natural inclination to 
interpret any phenomenal experience as representational, even i f  it is merely a presentation.
The most important claim is that usually phenomenal experiences are presentations that are used 
as representations. This makes the evolutionary shorthand theory a special representationalist 
theory, for it does not allow for a reduction of the phenomenal experience when it is used as a 
representation to nonphenomenal representations.
Furthermore, having demonstrated the presentational character of phenomenal experiences, the 
evolutionary shorthand theory of the phenomenal mind can abstain from strange claims that
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afterimages (and the like) are misrepresentations of -  say -  the wall one is looking at. This 
distinguishes the theory from other representationalist theories.
Another important aspect of the above characterization is that the issue between internalism and 
externalism about phenomenal content is scientifically settled in favor of internalism, which is 
consistent with the common sense belief that it is the brain that determines the phenomenal 
experience and not something out there.
The problem o f phenomenal consciousness revisited
As I mentioned in chapter one, the heterogeneity of phenomenal consciousness makes it unlikely 
that a solution to the problem of phenomenal consciousness can be presented in a single article 
or book. Hence, I do not claim that the aspects mentioned in the characterization above 
summarize all there is to phenomenal consciousness. There are many questions about 
phenomenal consciousness that remain. The evolutionary shorthand theory, however, does entail 
some suggestions for the remaining answers.
The main question is that makes up half of the problem of phenomenal consciousness: why do we 
have phenomenal consciousness given our physical make-up? (Cf. chapter one) The evolutionary shorthand 
theory does not provide an answer, for the relevant data are just not known yet. However, the 
discussion of dreams and how to determine whether one is dreaming showed that the 40 Hz 
hypothesis of Crick and Koch no longer is a hypothesis and points into the direction in which the 
study of consciousness has to look.
Also, with respect to the other half of the problem of phenomenal consciousness, viz. why did 
phenomenal consciousness evolve? Not all questions are answered. An important, unanswered question 
here is the question how phenomenal consciousness came into being, for it is evidently not the 
case that a conscious creature came into being with the heterogeneous set of conscious 
experiences we have today. Here we can speculate starting from what has been said in chapter 
twelve. In arguing against the sensorimotor account of consciousness, I claimed that this theory 
might solely apply to single-cue based behavior like that of an insect removing a dead conspecific 
from the nest only if it produces a certain chemical. In cases like these it is not clear whether it is 
just a chemical reaction with no phenomenology involved or whether the dead insect is removed 
from the nest because it smells bad. The latter scenario is at least conceivable. But as I argued in 
chapter three, conceivability does not lead us to knowledge. For now, I take these questions as
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problems that need to be solved in accordance with the evolutionary shorthand theory of the 
phenomenal mind.
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY)
INLEIDING
Dit proefschrift gaat over de wetenschappelijke studie naar bewustzijn. Als we kijken naar de 
bijdragen aan recente conferenties die als thema de wetenschappelijke bestudering van bewustzijn 
hebben, dan kan men niet ontsnappen aan de indruk dat er consensus lijkt te bestaan over de 
mogelijkheid dat de wetenschap uiteindelijk een oplossing kan geven voor het probleem van 
fenomenaal bewustzijn zoals dat in de cognitiefilosofie bestaat.
Ondanks deze groeiende consensus en de opeenstapeling van nieuwe gegevens over het 
bewustzijn, is er toch een aantal filosofen dat om verschillende redenen meent dat een 
wetenschappelijke bestudering van bewustzijn niet mogelijk is. In dit proefschrift argumenteer ik 
tegen een aantal van deze posities. Het voornaamste argument tegen diegenen die menen dat een 
wetenschap van bewustzijn onmogelijk is, is om te laten zien dat het wel degelijk kan. Daartoe 
presenteer ik de natural method van Owen Flanagan. Door deze toe te passen op een aantal soorten 
bewuste ervaringen, volgt wat ik de evolutionair steno theorie van fenomenaal bewustzijn noem. Deze 
theorie geeft een antwoord op de vraag waarom fenomenaal bewustzijn geselecteerd werd in de evolutie, het 
is een snelle manier om informatie op te pikken die van belang is voor het voortbestaan en de 
reproductie van het bewuste organisme. Dit zal niet als een verrassing komen omdat dit immers 
geen nieuw idee is. Mijn doel in deze dissertatie is dan ook niet om een nieuwe theorie te 
presenteren, maar een die ondersteund wordt door recente empirische data.
HOOFDSTUK I 
TWEE AANNAMEN EN TWEE VRAGEN 
Ik houd erg van Chimay Grande Réserve. Soms maakt dat dat ik er teveel van drink wat als gevolg 
heeft dat ik de volgende dag een vreselijke kater heb. Volgens mij is dit het kortste argument wat 
gegeven kan worden om te laten zien dat fenomenale ervaringen bestaan en dat ze causaal 
interacteren met de rest van de fysische wereld. Als we verder de causale geslotenheid van de 
fysische wereld accepteren en causale overdeterminatie uitsluiten, dan volgt dat fenomenaal 
bewustzijn ook een (bepaald soort) fysische eigenschap is.
In hoofdstuk één doe ik twee dingen. Ten eerste zet ik de twee vooronderstellingen uiteen die ik 
accepteer in het hele proefschrift: qualia realisme en breed fysicalisme. Ten tweede geef ik de twee 
vragen die samen het probleem van fenomenaal bewustzijn vormen.
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AANNAME ÉÉN: QUALIA REALISME 
Over qualia realisme kan ik vrij kort zijn: het is iets om een mens te zijn, in tegenstelling tot een 
robot of een zombie. Een zombie wordt in de cognitiefilosofie gedefinieerd als een fysisch en 
functioneel identiek duplicaat (in een parallel fysisch en functioneel identieke wereld) die echter 
geen fenomenale ervaringen heeft. Mijn zombie-broer gaat in de zombie-wereld wel naar het café 
als ik dat hier doe, zal ook langzaamaan moeite met praten, denken en lopen hebben, maar zal 
daarnaast geen prettige ervaringen hebben. Gelukkig voor mijn zombie-broer heeft hij de 
volgende dag ook geen hoofdpijn. Het is dus iets voor een mens om bier te drinken, terwijl dat 
voor een zombie of robot niet zo is. Dit aspect is wat fenomenaal bewustzijn is, en daar gaat het 
om in dit proefschrift.
AANNAME TWEE: BREED FYSICALISME
Als je zegt dat iets echt is, dat iets bestaat, dan moet je zeggen wat je daarmee bedoelt. In mijn 
visie bestaat iets enkel dan als het tot het brede fysische domein behoort. Hiermee wordt de vraag 
direct: wat is het brede fysische domein? Dat is dat domein van eigenschappen die ofwel zelf 
fysisch zijn of door fysische entiteiten of eigenschappen geconstitueerd worden. Biologische 
eigenschappen zijn zelf geen fysische eigenschappen, maar worden wel door fysische entiteiten -  
moleculen -  geconstitueerd of gerealiseerd. Een biologische eigenschap is daarmee een brede 
fysische eigenschap.
Breed fysicalisme is een vorm van monisme, omdat het stelt dat uiteindelijk alles wat bestaat 
geconstitueerd wordt door een onderste fysische laag: er is slechts één soort “spul” waaruit alles 
is opgebouwd. Je kan de vraag stellen of je dat nog wel fysisch moet noemen, maar dat is een 
kwestie van terminologie. Ik kies ervoor om dat fysisch te noemen.
Breed fysicalisme is ook een vorm van pluralisme, omdat het stelt dat hogere-orde eigenschappen 
(die geconstitueerd worden door lagere-orde eigenschappen) nieuwe eigenschappen zijn. De 
claim dat dit nieuwe eigenschappen zijn is een andere manier om te zeggen dat de hogere-orde 
eigenschappen niet gereduceerd kunnen worden tot lagere-orde eigenschappen. Breed fysicalisme 
is dus een non-reductionistisch fysicalisme. Dit wil echter niet zeggen dat er geen 
reductionistische verklaring mogelijk is van hogere-orde eigenschappen: precies omdat lagere-orde 
eigenschappen de hogere-orde eigenschappen realiseren, zijn deze nodig in een verklaring die 
aangeeft (1) wat de hogere-orde eigenschap doet, en (2) hoe dat gedaan wordt.
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HET PROBLEEM VAN FENOMENAAL BEWUSTZIJN
Mijns inziens is het probleem van fenomenaal bewustzijn niet the hard problem, zoals David 
Chalmers (1996a; 1996b) meent, maar gaat het om de combinatie van de volgende twee vragen:
(1) waarom hebben we fenomenaal bewustzijn gegeven onze fysische structuur? En (2) waarom is fenomenaal 
bewustzijn geëvolueerd?
Men kan de eerste vraag interpreteren op de manier waarom Chalmers dat doet. De assumptie die 
men daarbij maakt is dat fenomenaal bewustzijn niet gerealiseerd wordt door fysische of breed 
fysische entiteiten of eigenschappen, maar dat het iets radicaal anders is. Als je de vraag op die 
manier interpreteert, dan moet je inderdaad concluderen dat de hedendaagse wetenschap het 
antwoord principieel schuldig moet blijven. In hoofdstuk vier toon ik aan dat Chalmers’ 
veronderstelling tot een reductio ad absurdum leidt, en dat deze interpretatie dus onjuist is.
Hoe moeten we de eerste vraag dan wel interpreteren? We moeten accepteren dat fenomenaal 
bewustzijn een natuurlijke, hogere-orde, biologische eigenschap is, en we willen weten hoe die 
gerealiseerd wordt. Op deze vraag geef ik slechts een gedeeltelijk antwoord. De reden daarvoor is 
dat het antwoord mede moet komen van de neurowetenschap, en dat die eenvoudigweg niet ver 
genoeg ontwikkeld is om op alle relevante vragen een antwoord te kunnen geven.
Op de tweede vraag geef ik wel een antwoord, waarvan ik hoop dat het een bevredigend 
antwoord is voor diegenen die realisten omtrent fenomenaal bewustzijn zijn en menen dat het 
causaal effectief is.
HOOFDSTUK TWEE 
DE EVOLUTIONAIR STENO THEORIE VAN FENOMENAAL BEWUSTZIJN
De inzet van het proefschrift is om het volgende aan te tonen.
Fenomenale ervaringen vormen een heterogene verzameling van causaal effectieve interne en directe 
presentaties. In de meeste normale gevallen worden ze gebruikt om echte eigenschappen van externe 
objecten of lichamelijke toestanden op een niet-conceptuele, indirecte maar betrouwbare manier te 
representeren, waarbij deze representaties teruggeprojecteerd worden naar een locatie nabij de 
toestanden waarmee ze causaal covariëren. Met andere woorden: ze representeren ofwel sporen met 
deze eigenschappen. De normale omstandigheden zijn die waarin de ervarende organismen
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evolueerden. Fenomenale representaties zijn een soort-specifiek evolutionair steno voor complexe 
informatie over de omgeving of het lichaam die -  in principe -  ook op een andere, minder 
economische, manier gerepresenteerd zou kunnen worden. H et is precies deze economische manier 
van representeren die van fenomenaal bewustzijn een eigenschap maakt die geselecteerd werd in 
evolutie door natuurlijke selectie. In alle andere omstandigheden zijn fenomenale ervaringen slechts 
presentaties die helemaal niets representeren (vb. nabeelden) of worden ze gebruikt om zaken te 
representeren die we niet terugvinden in de omgeving waarin het ervarende organisme evolueerde 
(vb. de schoonheid van kunst). Omdat fenomenale ervaringen geselecteerd zijn vanwege de 
mogelijkheid om te representeren, hebben de ervarende organismen de natuurlijke neiging om elke 
fenomenale ervaring te interpreteren als een representatie, ook als het slechts om een presentatie 
gaat.
In de hoofdstukken zeven tot en met elf zullen empirische data aangedragen worden, waaruit 
deze beschrijving van fenomenaal bewustzijn volgt. Voordat ik die data presenteer zal ik eerst een 
aantal posities weerleggen die stellen dat een wetenschappelijke oplossing van het probleem van 
fenomenaal bewustzijn (nu) onmogelijk is.
Ten eerste is er de bedreiging van een versie van dualisme: indien fenomenaal bewustzijn niet 
fysisch of breed fysisch is, dan kan de hedendaagse wetenschap geen bijdrage leveren aan de 
oplossing van het probleem van fenomenaal bewustzijn, omdat de wetenschap zich beperkt tot 
het domein van het breed fysische. In hoofdstuk drie zal ik laten zien dat het recentelijk meest 
gebruikte argument voor dualisme -  het voorstelbaarheidsargument -  niet deugt, waarna ik in 
hoofdstuk vier zal laten zien dat de meest recent dualistische positie (namelijk die van Chalmers) 
zelf ook onhoudbaar is.
Met de dualistische bedreiging uit de weg zijn we er echter nog niet. Ten eerste is er de 
agnostische positie waarbij men ervan uit gaat dat we nu niet inzien hoe we het probleem van 
fenomenaal bewustzijn op moeten lossen en we dus agnostisch moeten zijn met betrekking tot 
het accepteren van monisme of dualisme. In hoofdstuk vijf zal ik laten zien dat het argument voor 
de agnostische positie voortkomt uit een te sterke eis aan een theorie over fenomenaal 
bewustzijn.
Ten tweede is er ook een bedreigend argument van de naturalistische, monistische zijde: we zijn 
cognitief te beperkt om de oplossing van het probleem van fenomenaal bewustzijn te begrijpen,
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hoewel die oplossing in principe monistisch van aard is. We zitten in een positie die vergelijkbaar 
is met die van chimpansees die kwantummechanica proberen te begrijpen. Het argument dat 
gebruikt wordt om deze visie te ondersteunen is het volgende. We hebben slechts twee methoden 
tot onze beschikking om het probleem op te lossen: introspectie en hersenonderzoek. 
Introspectie zal nooit laten zien dat we voor bewustzijn een lichaam nodig hebben, en als je 
hersens onderzoekt zal je nooit bewustzijn zien. We hebben geen idee hoe we het probleem op 
kunnen lossen. In hoofdstuk zes presenteer ik Flanagans argument tegen deze positie. Er is wel 
degelijk nog een methode om bewustzijn te bestuderen en tot antwoorden op bewustzijnsvragen 
te komen: de natuurlijke methode die inhoudt dat we andere methoden combineren, en dan met 
name fenomenologie, psychologie en neurowetenschap. Een voorbeeld wordt besproken om aan 
te tonen dat Flanagans claim correct is. In de hoofdstukken zeven to t en met elf pas ik deze 
methode toe om zo uiteindelijk to t de bovenstaande karakterisering van fenomenaal bewustzijn te 
komen. In hoofdstuk twaalf bespreek ik dan nog drie mogelijke objecties tegen een 
representationele theorie van fenomenaal bewustzijn, waarop de evolutionair steno theorie van 
fenomenaal bewustzijn een antwoord heeft.
HOOFDSTUK DRIE
v o o r s t e l b a a r h e i d : d e  w e g  d i e  n e r g e n s  h e e n  l e id t
Als we ervan uitgaan dat de wetenschap monisme accepteert, dan komt de belangrijkste 
bedreiging voor een wetenschappelijke oplossing van het probleem van fenomenaal bewustzijn 
van die vormen van dualisme die claimen dat fenomenaal bewustzijn naast niet te reduceren ook 
niet reductionistisch te verklaren is. Het gangbare argument is een voorstelbaarheidsargument: 
het is voorstelbaar dat er in een fysisch een functioneel identiek universum duplicaten van ons 
rondlopen die wel fysisch en functioneel exact hetzelfde zijn, maar die radicaal verschillen waar 
het fenomenaal bewustzijn betreft: ze hebben het of helemaal niet (zombie) of het is omgekeerd 
(omgekeerde tweeling). Ik hoofdstuk drie laat ik zien dat uit de voorstelbaarheid van dit soort 
scenario’s geen conclusies met betrekking tot de onjuistheid van (breed) fysicalisme kan leiden.
Traditioneel wordt een aantal soorten mogelijkheid onderscheiden. De belangrijkste zijn logische, 
epistemische, ontologische en metafysische mogelijkheid. De verschillen zitten in de criteria 
waarmee beoordeeld wordt of iets als dan niet mogelijk is.
Logische mogelijkheid valt uiteen in formele en conceptuele mogelijkheid. Een uitspraak is formeel 
mogelijk als deze geen syntactische contradictie bevat (A & — A). Een uitspraak is conceptueel
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mogelijk als deze geen conceptuele contradictie bevat (een vrijgezel is getrouwd). Een uitspraak 
kan dus formeel wel mogelijk maar conceptueel onmogelijk zijn.
Epistemische mogelijkheid valt ook in twee versie uiteen. Iets is slechts epistemisch mogelijk als we 
geen informatie hebben die een bepaald scenario uitsluit. Iets is positief epistemisch mogelijk als we 
enige reden hebben om het scenario te geloven.
Ook met betrekking to t ontologische mogelijkheid kunnen we een onderscheid maken. Ten 
eerste is er fysische mogelijkheid. Iets is fysisch mogelijk indien er geen fysische wetten zijn die het 
uitsluiten. Men kan van mening zijn dat er naast de fysische wetten ook nog andere wetten zijn. 
Dit is de visie van Chalmers: de fysische en niet-fysische wetten samen vormen wat hij de 
natuurlijke wetten noemt. Daarmee wordt iets natuurlijk mogelijk als het de natuurlijke wetten niet 
schendt. Fysische wetten zeggen niets over niet-fysische entiteiten, waardoor het fysisch mogelijk 
is dat er engelen of ectoplasmatische entiteiten zijn. Dit is natuurlijk onmogelijk wanneer niet- 
fysische wetten het uitsluiten.
Dualisten moeten aantonen dat zombies fysisch mogelijk zijn. De conclusie die uiteindelijk 
getrokken wordt is dat fysicalisme onjuist is. Het gaat daarmee om een ontologische claim en om 
een claim die betrekking heeft op het domein van het breed fysische, wat dus betrekking heeft op 
ontologische mogelijkheid en dan op de variant daarvan die stelt dat er enkel fysische wetten zijn. 
In hoofdstuk drie laat ik zien dat geen van de andere varianten van mogelijkheid een route 
oplevert naar fysische mogelijkheid. Zo leidt logische mogelijkheid niet naar fysische 
mogelijkheid. Het is bijvoorbeeld logisch mogelijk dat zwarte gaten toegangswegen zijn tot 
andere dimensies, omdat we geen formele noch een conceptuele contradictie kunnen ontdekken 
in dit scenario. We weten echter niet of dat er fysische wetten zijn die dat verbieden: we moeten 
meer weten om de stap van logische naar fysische mogelijkheid te maken.
Een argument tegen fysicalisme dat begint met de voorstelbaarheid van zombies, moet dan ook 
uitkomen bij de fysische mogelijkheid van zombies. Als daarin een tussenstap gemaakt wordt via 
een ander vorm van mogelijkheid, moet beargumenteerd worden hoe men van die vorm van 
mogelijkheid naar fysische mogelijkheid komt. Het argument tegen de anti-fysicalistische 
voorstelbaarheidsargumenten is precies dat dat achterwege blijft.
Het argument van Chalmers tegen fysicalisme gaat in het kort als volgt:
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1. In onze wereld zijn er bewuste ervaringen.
2. E r is een logisch mogelijke wereld fysisch identiek aan de onze, waarin de positieve feiten 
omtrent bewustzijn niet gelden.
3. Daarom zijn feiten met betrekking to t bewustzijn verdere feiten van onze wereld, bovenop en 
naast de fysische feiten.
4. Daarom is materialisme onjuist. (1996b: 123)
Het is duidelijk dat Chalmers hier uit de logische mogelijkheid van een zombie wereld (stelling 
twee) een ontologische conclusie trekt (stelling drie) zonder daarbij aan te geven hoe die 
conclusie volgt. Chalmers’ argument is dus ongeldig.
HOOFDSTUK VIER 
DAVID CHALMERS’ EIGENSCHAPSDUALISME
Uit de ongeldigheid van een argument volgt niet dat datgene waarvoor geargumenteerd wordt 
ook niet klopt. In dit geval is het argument voor dualisme ongeldig, waarmee echter niet gezegd is 
dat ook de conclusie ongeldig is. In hoofdstuk vier laat ik zien dat ook de conclusie onjuist is: het 
eigenschapsdualisme van Chalmers is onhoudbaar omdat het een contradictie bevat. Aan de ene 
kant accepteert Chalmers terecht dat we weten dat we fenomenaal bewust zijn, maar aan de 
andere kant volgt uit Chalmers’ theorie dat we dat niet kunnen weten. Vanzelfsprekend ontkent 
Chalmers dat dat laatste volgt en dat zijn theorie daarom met een probleem zou zitten.
Chalmers onderscheidt logische van natuurlijke superveniëntie, waarbij hij claimt dat fenomenaal 
bewustzijn wel natuurlijk maar niet logisch supervenieert: fenomenale ervaringen superveniëren 
louter natuurlijk. Het probleem zit hem in de notie van louter natuurlijke superveniëntie. Ik begin 
met het uiteenzetten van deze noties van superveniëntie.
Logische superveniëntie: B-eigenschappen superveniëren logisch op A-eigenschappen, wanneer we 
kunnen zeggen dat de A-eigenschappen de B-eigenschappen insluiten, waarbij een feit een ander 
feit insluit als het logisch onmogelijk is voor de eerste om overeind te blijven zonder de tweede. 
(1996b: 36)
Natuurlijke superveniëntie: B-eigenschappen superveniëren natuurlijk op A-eigenschappen als twee 
natuurlijk mogelijke situaties met dezelfde A-eigenschappen dezelfde B-eigenschappen hebben.
(1996b: 36)
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Logische en natuurlijke superveniëntie vallen vaak samen. Chalmers wil echter laten zien dat dit 
voor fenomenaal bewustzijn niet geldt: fenomenaal bewustzijn is wel natuurlijk maar niet logisch 
superveniënt. Natuurlijke superveniëntie zonder logische superveniëntie is louter natuurlijke 
superveniëntie.
O m dat we weten waar Chalmers heen wil, is fenomenaal bewustzijn het beste voorbeeld om een 
test te maken voor loutere natuurlijke superveniëntie. Chalmers meent dat zowel zombies als 
omgekeerde tweelingen mogelijk zijn. Dat impliceert dat gegeven de A-feiten een B-eigenschap 
afwezig kan zijn (in het geval van de zombies), of anders (in het geval van de omgekeerde 
tweelingen). De volgende test volgt.
(T) B-eigenschappen superveniëren louter natuurlijk op A-eigenschappen alleen dan als 
voor twee werelden wj en w2 die identiek zijn met betrekking to t de A- 
eigenschappen, het mogelijk is dat de B-eigenschappen die aanwezig zijn in wj anders 
of afwezig zijn in w2. Met andere woorden, louter natuurlijk superveniërende 
eigenschappen kunnen onafhankelijk van hun A-eigenschappen variëren tussen 
werelden.
Deze test maakt duidelijk dat er geen eigenschappen zijn die to t het breed fysische domein 
behoren die louter natuurlijk superveniënt zijn, tenzij de fysische wetten niet to t de A-feiten 
behoren. Chalmers is ambigu over de status van de fysische wetten: al naar gelang het hem 
uitkomt behoren ze to t de A-feiten of niet. Mijn voorstel is dat hij de ambiguïteit als volgt oplost. 
Alle fysische wetten behoren tot de A-feiten, omdat anders er geen enkele logisch superveniënte 
eigenschap is: alle superveniërende eigenschappen zijn dan louter natuurlijk superveniërende 
eigenschappen. De vraag die we vervolgens kunnen stellen is: geef eens een voorbeeld van een 
louter natuurlijk superveniërende eigenschap. Dit moet dus een eigenschap zijn die buiten het 
breed fysische domein valt. Welk voorbeeld men ook geeft, het probleem hiermee is dat we er 
geen epistemologische relatie mee kunnen hebben, omdat een kennistoestand volgens Chalmers 
een breed fysische toestand is (in mijn termen). Dit moet dus de A-feiten veranderen ook in de 
wereld waarin de betreffende eigenschap niet voorkomt. Maar dan heeft men in die wereld kennis 
van iets wat niet bestaat, en kan er dus geen sprake zijn van een epistemische relatie. Ik ben van 
mening dat we enkel kennis kunnen verwerven via een causale relatie met het gekende, iets wat 
Chalmers in ieder geval voor fenomenaal bewustzijn ontkent. De vraag die nu dus volgt is: is 
fenomenaal bewustzijn wellicht speciaal in die zin dat het zowel louter natuurlijk superveniënt is, 
alsook kenbaar zonder causale relatie tussen de kennis toestand en de fenomenale ervaringen? 
Dat is precies wat Chalmers beweert. H et grote probleem is nu dat Chalmers de mysterieuze
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epistemische relatie enkel een naam geeft (“acquaintance”) maar dat hij die geenszins uitlegt. Om 
als oplossing voor het bovenstaande probleem te kunnen gelden, moet Chalmers deze 
bekendheid relatie uitleggen. Zolang hij dat niet doet, volgt uit de notie van louter natuurlijke 
superveniëntie dat dit soort eigenschappen -  inclusief fenomenaal bewustzijn -  onkenbaar zijn. 
Dit is contradictoir met de juiste aanname dat we weten dat we fenomenaal bewust zijn. 
Chalmers’ theorie is dus incorrect. (Ik bespreek in hoofdstuk vier verder nog Chalmers’ 
retorische truc om de aandacht van dit probleem af te leiden, en laat zien dat hij daarmee 
hetzelfde probleem terug krijgt.)
HOOFDSTUK VIJF 
GEEN TE STERKE EISEN 
Hoofdstuk vijf is een relatief kort hoofdstuk waarin ik twee verwante argumenten bespreek: het 
vleermuis-argument van Thomas Nagel (1974) en het kennis-argument van Frank Jackson (1982). 
Nagel trekt uit zijn argument de conclusie dat we niet inzien hoe fysicalisme juist kan zijn, 
Jackson meent dat we kunnen concluderen dat het een onjuiste positie is. In beide gevallen volgt 
dat we geen wetenschappelijke theorie over fenomenaal bewustzijn op kunnen stellen.
In het kort komt mijn kritiek op beide argumenten op het volgende neer. Zowel Nagel als 
Jackson eisen van een theorie dat deze kan vertellen aan een blinde wat het is om rood te zien. 
Dit is een veel te sterke eis, analoog aan de eis dat een theorie over vloeibaarheid vloeibaarheid 
constitueert. Als je deze eis laat vallen, dan vervallen ook de argumenten van Nagel en Jackson 
die erop gericht zijn aan te tonen dat een fysicalistische theorie niet kan vertellen aan een blinde 
wat het is om rood te zien.
HOOFDSTUK ZES 
DE NATUURLIJKE METHODE 
Colin McGinn verdedigt een naturalistische en monistische positie. Desondanks meent hij dat we 
geen wetenschappelijke oplossing voor het lichaam-geest probleem kunnen vinden en wel om de 
reden dat we daar cognitief te beperkt voor zijn: we hebben de concepten er niet voor. Wat er 
zou moeten gebeuren is dat we op de een of andere manier de concepten die betrekking hebben 
op bewustzijn relateren aan die concepten die betrekking hebben op de fysische 
(neurofysiologische) wereld. Dit zal niet lukken, vanwege de homogeniteits-restrictie: om 
menselijk gedrag en handelen te kunnen verklaren kunnen we met onze fysische concepten toe: 
er is geen reden om concepten met betrekking tot bewustzijn te introduceren. Aan de andere kant
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weten we via introspectie dat we bewuste wezens zijn. Hoe we het ook proberen: introspectie laat 
nooit zien dat voor bewustzijn een fysisch lichaam nodig is, en neurologisch onderzoek brengt 
ons nooit bij bewustzijn.
Owen Flanagan meent dat McGinn een methode over het hoofd ziet: de combinatie van 
introspectie met psychologie en neurowetenschap. Dit is wat hij de natuurlijke methode noemt.
Begin met het met gelijk respect behandelen van drie verschillende manieren van analyse. G eef de 
fenomenologie wat haar toekomt. Luister goed naar wat individuen te zeggen hebben over hoe de 
dingen lijken. Laat ook de psycholoog en de cognitiewetenschapper hun verhaal vertellen. Luister 
goed naar hun beschrijvingen over hoe het mentale leven werkt en wat de rol -  zo die er is -  van 
bewustzijn in haar totale economie. Tenslotte, luister goed naar wat de neuroloog te vertellen heeft 
over hoe verschillende soorten bewuste gebeurtenissen gerealiseerd worden, en onderzoek hoe hun 
verhalen aansluiten bij de fenomenale en psychologische verhalen. (1992: 11; 1995a: 1104; 1995b: 7­
8)
In de hoofdstukken zeven tot en met elf wordt deze methode toegepast op de volgende typen 
fenomenaal bewustzijn: (1) fantoom ervaringen; (2) synesthetische ervaringen; (3) dromen; (4) 
kleurervaringen; (5) ervaringen van schoonheid van gezichten van soortgenoten.'
In de samenvatting van deze hoofdstukken beperk ik me to t (1) een beschrijving van de 
betreffende fenomenale ervaringen; (2) de conclusies die uiteindelijk volgen uit de toepassing van 
de natuurlijke methode op de data die betrekking hebben op de betreffende fenomenale 
ervaringen.
HOOFDSTUK ZEVEN 
STUDIE #  1: ERVARINGEN VAN FANTOOMLEDEMATEN 
Sommige mensen hebben het ongeluk dat zij een of meerdere ledematen moeten missen. Vaak 
hebben deze mensen de ervaring alsof zij hun geamputeerde ledematen nog hebben. Dit zijn 
fantoomervaringen. Veelal zijn de ervaringen pijnlijk en gaat het dus om pijn die men lijkt te 
hebben in een deel van het lichaam wat er niet langer is. Dit maakt de pijn niet minder werkelijk.
De toepassing van de natuurlijke methode betreft in deze case studie (1) de fenomenologie 
combineren met (2) de neurologie van fantoomervaringen. Een belangrijke rol is hierbij 
weggelegd voor de representatie van het lichaam in de hersenen.
De gegevens over fantoomledematen laten het volgende zien. Fenomenale ervaringen kunnen 
aanwezig zijn in de afwezigheid van de normale fysische oorzaak. Als de representatie van het
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lichaam in de hersenen op de juiste manier gestimuleerd wordt, dan resulteert dat in de beleving 
van een fenomenale wereld die buiten het hoofd gelokaliseerd lijkt te zijn. Echter, de ervaring 
moet in het hoofd gelokaliseerd zijn (vanwege de volgende redenering: (a) fenomenale ervaringen 
bestaan; (b) bestaan impliceert fysisch gerealiseerd zijn (of fundamenteel zijn, maar dat is 
bewustzijn niet); (c) als iets fysisch gerealiseerd is, dan heeft het ipso facto een locatie; (d) ergo 
fenomenale ervaringen moeten een locatie hebben; (e) omdat er geen realisatiebasis buiten het 
hoofd is voor fantoomervaringen moeten ze dus in het hoofd zitten. Omdat de ervaring in het 
hoofd zit en erbuiten lijkt te zijn, moet deze dus geprojecteerd worden naar de locatie waar deze lijkt 
te zijn.
Dit projectionisme lijkt in eerste instantie sterk op dat van Max Velmans (2000) maar verschilt 
voornamelijk met betrekking to t punt vier: Velmans meent dat de fenomenale wereld wel degelijk 
daarbuiten is, en niet in het hoofd.
HOOFDSTUK ACHT 
STUDIE #  2: SYNESTHESIE
Synesthesie wordt door Simon Baron-Cohen en John Harrison (1997a) als volgt gedefinieerd:
Wij, en anderen [...], definiëren synesthesie als optredend indien stimulering van een sensorische 
module automatisch een perceptie teweegbrengt in een tweede module, in de afwezigheid van enige 
directe stimulering van die tweede module.” (1997a: 3)
In hoofdstuk acht laat ik allereerst zien dat er vele varianten zijn van synesthetische ervaringen. 
Men kan een extra ervaring hebben van kleur als men iets proeft, hoort, voelt of ruikt, maar ook 
als men een bepaald cijfer ziet of er zelfs maar aan denkt. Niet alle combinaties zijn echter 
gerapporteerd: visuele input die resulteert in het horen van geluiden bijvoorbeeld lijkt niet voor te 
komen.
De toepassing van de natuurlijke methode bestaat uit de combinatie van (1) de fenomenologie, 
(2) de psychologie en (3) de neurologie van synesthesie.
De gegevens over synesthesie laten het volgende zien. Naast de vele varianten van synesthesie 
kunnen we synesthetische ervaringen indelen in twee soorten: (a) sensorische en (b) conceptuele 
synesthesie. Bij de eerste vormen normale sensorische stimuli de input die leidt tot de 
synesthetische ervaring, bij de tweede zijn dat concepten.
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D oor gebruik te maken van de conceptuele synesthesie kunnen we zien dat externalisme met 
betrekking tot fenomenale inhoud niet houdbaar is. (Voor sensorische synesthesie geldt 
hetzelfde, maar bij de conceptuele soort is de conclusie veel helderder.) Het argument hiervoor 
gaat als volgt: (a) het fenomenale is de representationele inhoud; (b) een synestheet heeft twee 
ervaringen bij één input, en daarmee dus extra inhoud; (c) deze extra inhoud kan enkel 
internalistisch verklaard worden: (c1) als we de extra ervaring zien als een representatie, dan 
moeten we zeggen -  bij conceptuele synesthesie -  dat de extra ervaring een concept 
representeert; (c2) een concept is zelf een representatie, en dus is de extra ervaring een 
representatie van een representatie; (c3) externalisme sluit secundaire eigenschappen uit (McGinn 
1989); (c4) omdat concepten niet gekleurd zijn is het zeker dat in dit geval de kleuren secundaire 
eigenschappen zijn van het concept en dus kan een externalistische verklaring hier niet juist zijn.
De neurologie van conceptuele synesthesie laat zien dat de activering van het neurale correlaat 
van het concept de oorzaak is van de activering van het neurale correlaat van de extra ervaring. 
Omdat dit een ongebruikelijke manier is voor het veroorzaken van fenomenale ervaringen (het 
lijkt een gevolg te zijn van het niet afsluiten van neurale paden tussen de desbetreffende modules) 
kunnen we zeggen dat het hier in eerste instantie gaat om een ervaring die niet bedoeld is om te 
representeren: de synesthetische ervaringen zijn allereerst louter presentaties. Het is duidelijk dat 
deze presentaties gebruikt kunnen worden als representaties: een synestheet kan bijvoorbeeld 
blauw gebruiken om het concept vier te representeren.
Een extra conclusie van (c4) is dat fenomenale ervaringen hogere-orde representaties kunnen zijn, 
waarmee een eerste-orde theorie over fenomenale ervaringen dus principieel tekort schiet.
De objectie die men kan maken en die ervoor zorgt dat geen van de bovenstaande conclusies zou 
volgen is: synesthetische ervaringen zijn misrepresentaties. Het argument in het kort tegen deze 
opvatting van synesthetische ervaringen is het volgende. Neem bijvoorbeeld een geluid dat ook 
als rood ervaren wordt. Het geluid wordt niet verkeerd gerepresenteerd als het gaat om de 
representatie van het geluid als een geluid. Van totale misrepresentatie (zoals een kat die we voor 
een konijn aanzien) is dus geen sprake. Het moet dus gaan om de misrepresentatie van een 
eigenschap van het geluid. Maar welke eigenschap is dat dan? Het antwoord is dat die eigenschap 
er niet is, waardoor aan een belangrijke eis voor misrepresentatie niet voldaan is: er moet iets zijn 
dat verkeerd gerepresenteerd wordt. Bovendien zijn de extra ervaringen consistent doorheen de
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tijd, waardoor ze gebruikt kunnen worden als betrouwbare representaties, iets wat met 
misrepresentaties niet het geval is.
De conclusies met betrekking to t synesthetische ervaringen staan dus overeind. Deze conclusies 
suggereren het volgende.
(1) In het geval van synesthesie is het duidelijk dat externalisme onjuist is en dat kleuren 
secundaire eigenschappen zijn. Wellicht geldt dit voor alle fenomenale ervaringen.
(2) Synestheten gebruiken hun extra presentaties als representaties. Wellicht hebben alle 
mensen de natuurlijke neiging om presentaties onmiddellijk als representaties te 
interpreteren, ook als ze dat niet zijn.
In hoofdstuk negen laat ik aan de hand van dromen zien dat de tweede suggestie klopt. Ook hier 
volgt weer de eerste suggestie. In hoofdstuk tien toon ik aan dat ook die juist is.
HOOFDSTUK NEGEN  
STUDIE #  3: DROMEN
Hoofdstuk negen is voor een groot deel gebaseerd op het broek van Flanagan Dreaming Souls 
(2000) waarin hij de natuurlijke methode toepast op dromen. In dit hoofdstuk laat ik zien dat de 
fenomenale herrie die tijdens de slaap gegenereerd wordt als bijproduct van slapen 
geïnterpreteerd wordt als representaties. Als verdere conclusie volgt dat fenomenale ervaringen in 
het hoofd gelokaliseerd zijn.
De fenomenologie van dromen vertelt ons onder andere dat dromen in twee soorten komen. Ten 
eerste de bizarre dromen die erg levendig zijn en voornamelijk visueel zijn. Ten tweede de 
dromen die bestaan uit een klein probleem (bijvoorbeeld de vraag waar je je schoenen gelaten 
hebt) en wat alsmaar herhaald wordt. O m  de een of andere reden is dit klein probleem in je slaap 
een erg groot probleem, en deze soort dromen heeft dan ook het karakter van een nachtmerrie. 
Verder is het zo dat we dromen erg slecht of helemaal niet onthouden. Dit suggereert dat het 
goed mogelijk is dat we de hele nacht onafgebroken dromen.
De empirische data die ik in hoofdstuk negen presenteer laten zien dat we zo slecht zijn in het 
onthouden van dromen omdat ’s nachts de neurotransmitters die nodig zijn voor het onthouden 
van zaken niet afgescheiden worden door de neuronen die ze aanmaken.
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De vraag of we wellicht de hele nacht dromen, en dus de hele nacht bewust zijn kunnen we ook 
positie beantwoorden. De these dat voor bewustzijn 40 Hz oscillaties in de hersenen nodig zijn is 
inmiddels erg goed gecorroboreerd, zodat we als we deze oscillaties aantreffen in de hersenen we 
kunnen concluderen dat de persoon in kwestie bewust moet zijn. Tijdens alle fasen van dromen 
treffen we deze oscillaties aan.
De evolutie-biologie van dromen laat zien dat ’s nachts de hersenen actief zijn met het herstellen 
van de niveaus van neurotransmitters en hormonen die overdag nodig zijn. Tijdens deze periode 
wordt één functie echter niet uitgeschakeld, namelijk die van het interpreteren van de presentaties 
als representaties: dit maakt dromen tot bijverschijnselen van het interpreteren van presentaties 
die door reguliere stimuli veroorzaakt worden. Omdat het evident is dat deze reguliere stimuli 
tijdens de slaap niet de oorzaak van de presentaties zijn, is het ook duidelijk dat een 
externalistische kijk op deze fenomenale ervaringen niet juist kan zijn: dromen plaatsten 
fenomenale (re)presentaties stevig in het hoofd.
Omdat internalisme hand in hand gaat met een secundaire kijk op -  onder andere -  kleuren, en 
die suggestie ook voortkwam uit het toepassen van de natuurlijke methode op synesthesie, kijk ik 
in hoofdstuk tien naar kleuren.
HOOFDSTUK TIEN 
STUDIE #  4: KLEURERVARINGEN
Indien kleuren secundaire eigenschappen zijn, dan zijn ze daarmee voor hun bestaan afhankelijk 
van (1) een waarnemer en (2) de primaire eigenschappen van het object waarvan we zeggen dat 
het een kleur heeft. Dit biedt twee manieren om te laten zien dat kleuren inderdaad secundaire 
kwaliteiten zijn. Ten eerste kunnen we laten zien dat kleuren afhankelijk zijn van de waarnemer, 
door naar de fenomenologie van verschillende waarnemers te kijken. Ten tweede kunnen we 
aantonen dat er geen primaire eigenschappen zijn die in aanmerking komen om geïdentificeerd 
the worden met kleuren. In beide gevallen heeft het argument de volgende structuur: (a) wat is 
het voorstel van de verdedigers van de claim dat kleuren primaire eigenschappen zijn? Is dat 
identificatie met een eigenschap van licht of van oppervlakten van objecten; (b) laat in beide 
gevallen zien dat de voorstellen neerkomen op het accepteren van bijvoorbeeld rood als een 
disjunctieve eigenschap; (c) laat vervolgens zien dat dat een excessief disjunctieve eigenschap is,
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met andere woorden: laat zien dat het dan om meerdere verschillende eigenschappen gaat; (d) als 
dat zo is dan kan je vervolgens laten zien dat er slechts één de echte kleur rood is, en de andere 
zijn niet echt. Maar die laatste claim impliceert dus dat wij iets dat niet rood is ervaren als iets dat 
wel rood is. Maar dat maakt dus van deze gevallen van namaak-rood secundaire eigenschappen.
D oor naar kleurenblindheid te kijken komen we achter een manier om het eerste punt te 
bewijzen: kleuren zijn afhankelijk van waarnemers. De meerderheid van de mensen heeft wat we 
normale kleurenvisie noemen. Sommige mensen -  voornamelijk mannen -  zijn “kleurenblind”: 
ze ervaren wel alle kleuren maar vaak verwarren ze verschillende kleuren. Stel je nu voor dat er 
mensen zijn die echter nog meer kleuren onderscheiden dan mensen met normale kleurenvisie, 
dan zijn voor die mensen diegenen die we gewoonlijk als niet-kleurenblind beschouwen 
kleurenblind. De empirische data laten zien dat een zeer klein percentage van de vrouwen 
waarschijnlijk extra kleuren ervaart ten opzichte van de mensen met normale kleurenvisie. Het is 
daarmee duidelijk dat de kleur die een object heeft afhankelijk is van de waarnemer en dus dat 
kleuren secundaire eigenschappen zijn.
Een tweede mogelijkheid om te laten zien dat kleuren secundaire eigenschappen zijn, is om te 
laten zien dat het geen primaire eigenschappen kunnen zijn: er is niet één primaire eigenschap die 
bijvoorbeeld rode objecten met elkaar gemeenschappelijk hebben, maar er zijn vele van dit soort 
eigenschappen, die onderling zo verschillend zijn dat ze niet als één eigenschap kunnen 
beschouwen. Als we kijken naar wat de voorstanders van de claim dat kleuren primaire 
eigenschappen aanwijzen als wat dat dan zou zijn, dan is er een tweetal mogelijkheden: (1) het is 
een (disjunctieve) eigenschap van het licht; (2) het is een (disjunctieve) eigenschap van het 
oppervlak van een gekleurd object.
Kunnen we bijvoorbeeld de kleur geel identificeren met een bepaalde samenstelling an  licht? Het 
fenomeen kleurconstantheid geeft aan dat dat niet kan: een banaan is geel of deze nu verlicht 
wordt door daglicht, kaarslicht, in de schemer of als er een lamp op schijnt. In deze gevallen is de 
samenstelling van het licht zo verschillend dat we moeten spreken van een disjunctieve 
eigenschap. Mijns inziens is de disjunctie hier al zo breed dat we het eigenlijk niet meer over één 
disjunctieve eigenschap kunnen hebben, maar dat dit een excessief disjunctieve eigenschap is. 
Jackson stelt echter voor om dit toch als kandidaat voor kleur te beschouwen. Maar dan volgt 
eveneens dat de disjunctieve eigenschap excessief disjunctief is. Het is experimenteel vastgesteld 
dat eenzelfde samenstelling van licht verschillende kleurervaringen teweeg kan brengen.
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Samenstelling A veroorzaakt bijvoorbeeld rood en groen, en samenstelling B rood en bruin. Dat 
impliceert dus dat zowel samenstelling A als samenstelling B in de disjunctieve eigenschap van 
rood terecht komt, wat deze eigenschap dermate excessief maakt dat we niet langer meer over 
één eigenschap kunnen spreken. Daarbij kunnen we dan niet langer verschil maken tussen rood, 
groen en bruin, omdat deze allemaal dezelfde eigenschap in hun disjunctieve eigenschap hebben.
De poging om kleuren te identificeren met eigenschappen van objecten komt ook uit bij het 
accepteren van excessief disjunctieve eigenschappen. Het probleem is nu dat experimenteel is 
vastgesteld dat als we waarnemer, samenstelling van het licht en object constant houden, en enkel 
de condities van de omgeving van het object veranderen, het object van kleur verandert. De 
betreffende primaire eigenschappen van het oppervlak van het object kunnen dus eenvoudigweg 
niet met één bepaalde kleur geïdentificeerd worden, omdat dat dan ook moet gebeuren met een 
andere kleur. Dit houdt verder (alweer) in dat als we kleuren willen identificeren met een 
disjunctie van eigenschappen het zo zal zijn dat een eigenschap die bijvoorbeeld in de 
disjunctieve eigenschap rood komt te zitten, ook in de disjunctieve eigenschap grijs komt te 
zitten, waardoor er geen verschil meer is te maken tussen rood en grijs (in ieder geval niet op het 
niveau van primaire eigenschappen). Met andere woorden: de disjunctie wordt excessief, 
waardoor we dus over verschillende eigenschappen praten.
Jackson meent dat er een oplossing bestaat: kleuren zijn excessief disjunctieve eigenschappen. 
Met andere woorden: er zijn meerdere soorten rood. Jackson meent echter dat er nu sprake is van 
echt rood en van nep-rood. Maar het accepteren van nep-rood is eenvoudigweg stellen dat er een 
primaire eigenschap is die (1) niet echt rood is, maar die (2) wel rood-ervaringen in ons 
veroorzaakt. Nep-rood is dus een secundaire eigenschap van een object dat wel rood lijkt maar 
het niet is. Dat is precies wat de theorie die de excessief disjunctieve eigenschappen moet 
accepteren afwijst, waardoor de theorie zichzelf weerlegd.
HOOFDSTUK ELF 
STUDIE #  5: ERVARINGEN VAN SCHOONHEID
Mensen hebben ervaringen van schoonheid bij gezichten. In tegenstelling to t wat de meeste 
mensen denken zijn deze ervaringen intersubjectief: we ervaren dezelfde gezichten als mooi. Ten 
eerste zijn gezichten die gemiddeld zijn erg mooi. Ten tweede wijken de gezichten die we het 
mooist vinden allemaal op een specifieke manier af van dat gemiddelde. Zo zijn de mooiste 
gezichten van vrouwen gezichten waarbij de lippen net iets voller zijn en de onderkaak iets
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kleiner is. De mooiste mannengezichten hebben precies een grotere onderkaak dan het 
gemiddelde mannengezicht (indien geëvalueerd door een vrouw die in haar vruchtbare periode 
is). Deze gezichtskenmerken komen overeen met een bepaalde mix van testosteron en 
oestrogeen in de pubertijd. Veel testosteron en weinig oestrogeen leidt tot een extreme groei van 
de onderkaak. De tegenovergestelde mix leidt tot een remming van die groei. De mix van weinig 
testosteron en veel oestrogeen zorgt er bij vrouwen ook voor dat zij erg vruchtbaar zijn. De 
tegenovergestelde mix bij mannen is een indicatie van hun goede genotypische en fenotypische 
gezondheid.
Zonder dat we het zelf weten, gebruiken we dus ervaringen van schoonheid om de meest 
vruchtbare vrouwen en de gezondste mannen te herkennen. Deze manier van herkennen is 
direct. Het gaat immers om een presentatie die gebruikt wordt als een representatie en 
presentaties zijn altijd direct. Daarnaast is het een indirecte representatie, omdat de 
vruchtbaarheid van de vrouw niet direct gerepresenteerd wordt, maar enkel de secundaire 
eigenschap aantrekkelijk zijn. Het gaat daarmee om een zeer economische manier van het 
representeren van de vruchtbaarheid van een vrouw (of de gezondheid van een man) zonder dat 
er kennis vereist is van de neodarwiniaanse evolutie-theorie. Precies omdat er zeer snel, kort en 
indirect evolutionair belangrijke en complexe informatie wordt gerepresenteerd noem ik 
fenomenaal bewustzijn het steno van de evolutie.
HOOFDSTUK TWAALF 
DRIE BEDREIGINGEN VOOR REPRESENTATIONALISME GENEUTRALISEERD
Nu de evolutionair steno theorie van de fenomenale geest ondersteund is met empirische data, 
rest het me nog om een drietal argumenten tegen representationele theorieën van fenomenaal 
bewustzijn van repliek te dienen.
Een positieve kijk op representationele theorieën van bewustzijn is de volgende. We begrijpen 
hoe representaties (zoals foto’s) werken en als we nu van bewuste ervaringen kunnen laten zien 
dat ze ook representaties hebben, dan ligt er een verklaring klaar voor bewuste ervaringen. Uit 
deze positieve kijk volgt een algemeen kritiekpunt op representationele theorieën van bewustzijn. 
In het algemeen zijn representationele toestanden niet bewust, dus theorie van bewustzijn laat 
precies bewustzijn weg als men bewuste ervaringen reduceert to t representaties. Een 
representationele theorie loopt dus het risico bewustzijn te verliezen.
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Er is een aantal redenen waarom de evolutionair steno theorie niet het risico loopt fenomenale 
ervaringen te reduceren tot representaties. Ten eerste claimt de theorie enkel dat bewuste 
ervaringen gebruikt kunnen worden als representaties, niet dat het altijd representaties zijn. 
Reductie is daarmee onmogelijk voor die presentaties die niet als representatie gebruikt worden.
Ten tweede creëren fenomenale representaties intensionele toestanden waardoor we geen niet- 
fenomenale representaties voor ze niet mogen substitueren, en ze daar dus niet toe kunnen 
reduceren. Een ervaring van schoonheid is en blijft een ervaring van schoonheid, ook al 
representeert het indirect de vruchtbaarheid van degene waarnaar je kijkt. De meeste mensen 
realiseren zich niet eens dat dat zo is. Een reductie van ervaringen van schoonheid naar 
kennistoestanden met betrekking tot de vruchtbaarheid van de persoon die men ziet is dan ook 
uitgesloten.
Een tweede punt van kritiek op een representationele theorie van bewustzijn komt voort uit de 
volgende redenering: fenomenale toestanden worden bepaald door neurale toestanden. Als die 
neurale toestanden iets representeren, dan is het plausibel dat de fenomenale toestanden hetzelfde 
representeren. Dit is de positie van Max Velmans. Dit leidt to t wat ik het probleem van 
overrepresentatie noem: alle representationele werk wordt al gedaan door de neurale 
representaties, waardoor de fenomenale representaties overbodig worden. (Dit probleem is 
verwant aan dat van causale overdeterminatie.) Ook hier dreigt weer reductionisme, in dit geval 
van de fenomenale naar de neurale representaties.
Het argument tegen de veronderstelling dat de neurale toestand hetzelfde representeert als de 
fenomenale toestand die erdoor bepaald, komt van de studie naar ervaringen van schoonheid. De 
directe representatie van een mooi gezicht is dat van het gezicht als zijnde mooi (het gaat hier nu 
niet om de indirecte representatie van vruchtbaarheid of gezondheid). Het is duidelijk dat op 
fenomenaal niveau de verhoudingen tussen de ogen, neus, mond etcetera niet gedetailleerd 
gerepresenteerd worden. (Was dat wel het geval, dan had men geen onderzoek hoeven doen naar 
wat die verhoudingen zijn voor mooie gezichten.) Maar op het -  onbewuste -  niveau van de 
neurale representaties zal dat wel nodig zijn, omdat het precies die verhoudingen zijn die de 
gevoelens van schoonheid bepalen. Wat we hier zien is dat de neurale representatie van een 
gezicht een heel andere inhoud heeft dan de fenomenale representatie die erdoor bepaald wordt. 
Het is daarmee niet langer vol te houden dat beide representaties hetzelfde representeren 
waardoor de fenomenale representatie een representationeel bijverschijnsel zou worden.
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Een derde objectie tegen een representationele theorie van de fenomenale geest is dat bewustzijn 
überhaupt niets met representaties te maken heeft. Kevin O ’Regan en Alva Noë (2001) 
verdedigen zo’n theorie. Zij zijn van mening dat het voldoende is voor een bepaald organisme 
om de wetten te kennen die betrekking hebben op (1) de veranderingen die de dingen 
veroorzaken die je waarneemt (bijvoorbeeld het geluid dat een auto maakt als die voorbij rijdt) en
(2) het waarnemingsapparaat (bijvoorbeeld het oor). Als een organisme de betreffende wetten 
beheerst, dan heeft het geen representaties nodig om zich in de wereld te bewegen. De wereld 
dient zelf dan als een representatie van zichzelf.
Ik meen dat hier drie grote problemen mee zijn. Ten eerste geven O ’Regan en Noë zelf aan dat 
hun theorie niet enkel opgaat voor bewuste organismen, maar ook voor een raket- 
geleidingssysteem. Hierdoor is het onduidelijk waarom dit een theorie over bewustzijn zou zijn.
Ten tweede kan de theorie niet uit de voeten met keuzes maken en planning. Wil men niet enkel 
direct reageren op bepaalde stimuli, maar wil men keuzen kunnen maken die de omgeving 
veranderen, dan zal men de omgeving op verschillende manieren voor moeten kunnen stellen, 
om zo te kunnen bepalen welke verandering aan de omgeving de meest wenselijke is. Dat is dus 
enkel mogelijk als men de omgeving op verschillende manieren kan representeren.
Ten derde, volgens O ’Regan en Noë is representationalisme gecommitteerd aan de claim dat we 
een gedetailleerde representatie hebben van datgene waar we naar kijken. Ze geven overtuigend 
empirisch materiaal om aan te tonen dat dat niet zo is: we missen zelfs een vrouw in een 
gorillapak die door een veldje van zes basketballende mensen loopt. In plaats van te stellen dat de 
representatie niet gedetailleerd is, trekken O ’Regan en Noë de conclusie dat representationalisme 
geen correcte theorie is. Mijns inziens moet men de eerste conclusie trekken. Deze is ook veel 
plausibeler vanuit een evolutionair gezichtspunt: het is veel economischer om enkel de 
belangrijke zaken bewust te representeren dan om alles te representeren. Het zou dan veel 
moeilijker worden om beslissingen te nemen, omdat men eerst nog uit moet zoeken wat wel en 
wat niet belangrijk is.
Met dit weerwoord is ook de laatste van de drie objecties tegen representationalistische theorieën 
van fenomenaal bewustzijn weerlegd. In ieder geval kan men ze niet langer in stelling brengen 
tegen de evolutionair steno theorie van de fenomenale geest.
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